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Abstract 
 
Predicting the behavior of others is crucial in social interactions and requires 
sophisticated cognitive mechanisms with which to do so. In order to make a more informed 
prediction, it is necessary to integrate information about the mental state and intentions of 
the actor with the perception of the action itself. The aim of this thesis was to investigate in 
what way social cues that convey another person‟s goals and intentions contribute to an 
observer‟s anticipation of that person‟s actions. 
The first three experiments used a representational momentum paradigm to test 
the hypothesis that judgments of how far another agent‟s head has rotated are influenced 
by the perceived gaze direction of that agent. Participants observed a video-clip of a face 
rotating 60o towards them starting from the left or right profile view. The gaze direction of 
the face was either congruent with, ahead of, or lagging behind the angle of rotation. 
Following this, two static faces, at varying angles of rotation with respect to the end-point 
angle of the face in the video-clip, were presented simultaneously. The task of the 
participants was to decide which of the two heads was at an angle best resembling the 
angle of the end-point of the moving face. The critical test condition consisted of one test 
face oriented at 10o before, and the other at 10o after the end-point. 
In experiment 1 the gaze-lagging condition elicited a significant underestimation of 
the rotation compared to the „congruent‟ and „ahead‟ gaze conditions. Participants did not 
exhibit similar biases when judging the rotation of several non-face control stimuli with 
visual features that mimicked different aspects of gaze direction, in particular the 
configuration of black and white components and the directional information it conveys. In 
experiment 2, the stimuli were spatially inverted to disrupt the integration of gaze direction 
and head rotation. Under these circumstances there was no effect of social cues on action 
anticipation, while presentation in an upright orientation replicated the effect observed in 
experiment 1. In experiment 3 the effect of gaze persisted when the actor expressed an 
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avoidance motivation (fear, disgust) but not when expressing an approach motivation 
(happiness, anger). As the goal of an action that moves toward the observer with an 
avoidance expression is ambiguous but is unambiguous when expressing approach, it is 
concluded that the use of gaze as a cue to the end-point of the action is flexible and 
depends on the perceived ambiguity of the agent‟s behavioural intentions.  
Experiment 4 assessed the role that social cues have in attributing the intentions of 
an individual. Furthermore, it looked at whether this capacity is related to individual 
differences in empathising, systemising and the extent to which participants possess 
autistic-like traits. Participants completed a gaze cueing experiment in which a centrally 
presented gaze averted to the left or right preceded the appearance of a target in either 
the gazed at location (valid) or on the opposite side of the screen (invalid). The difference 
in target detection times between valid and invalid trials is a measure of how quickly an 
observer is able to orient their attention in the direction that someone is looking. The speed 
with which participant‟s oriented attention in response to the gaze direction was expected 
to depend on the intentions attributed to the identity. Participants initially completed a 
learning phase in which the three identities were presented. The gaze and expression of 
the identities was such that one conveyed a prosocial intention, one conveyed an 
antisocial intention and one was spatially predictive of target location. It was found that 
those with high empathising skills and few autistic traits showed a smaller cueing effect in 
response to the gaze of the antisocial identity than the prosocial identity. Those with more 
autistic traits and systemising skills showed a larger cueing effect in response to the gaze 
of the predictive identity. This suggests that both groups were able to orient attention in 
response to gaze direction, but that they prioritised different aspects of the gazers 
intentions. Those who are more sensitive to social information learnt the social intentions 
of the individual and this decreased the cueing effect in response to a negative identity. 
Those less sensitive to social information but more sensitive to spatial regularities learnt 
that one identity was spatially predictive and consequently increased the cueing effect in 
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response to the gaze direction of that identity.  
Overall, these studies suggest that social cues are automatically integrated in the 
representations of the perceived actions of others, and contribute to anticipations of how 
they will behave in the immediate future. This plays a crucial role in Theory of Mind and in 
enabling us to successfully interact with others.   
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Chapter 1. The role of social cues in the involuntary attribution of intentionality 
Humans inhabit large and complex social groups, and such social complexity 
requires a level of cognitive complexity with which to manage the social information 
regarding the interactions of oneself and others (e.g. Brune & Brune-Cohrs, 2006; Dunbar, 
1992, 1995, 1998). It is important to understand the behaviour of others, and to interpret 
the mental states that govern and dictate their actions. Theory of mind (ToM, also referred 
to as perspective taking, folk psychology, empathising, mentalising) is the ability to 
conceptualise the internal mental states of oneself, and to recognise and represent the 
mental states held by others. These mental states encompass the perceptual experience, 
attention, desires, emotions, beliefs, knowledge and thoughts of others (Flavell, 2004). 
ToM is defined as the ability to represent not only one‟s own mental state (1st order 
intentionality) but also those of others (2nd order intentionality). It is necessary to know that 
the mental states of oneself and others are subjective and are not necessarily the same, 
nor that they are the same as the real state of the environment. Moreover, the behaviour of 
oneself and that of others is determined by these subjective states of mind (Gallagher & 
Frith, 2003; Tomasello & Rakoczy, 2003). As a consequence, the behaviour of others can 
be predicted and manipulated based upon what one knows about the others persons 
emotional and epistemic mental state. Tests of these abilities, such as the false belief task 
or that of 2nd order perspective taking consistently show the age of acquisition of 
belief/reality discrimination to be between 3-5 years of age (Flavell, 2004). From here on 
further advances are made in terms of the complexity of mental state attributions, such as 
the recognition of social faux pas at between 9-11 years of age (Baron-Cohen, O'Riordan, 
Stone, Jones, & Plaisted, 1999). 
There are several schools of thought regarding the cognitive mechanisms 
underpinning mental state attribution. Simulation Theorists (ST) propose that 
understanding and predicting what, why, and how another person will act is achieved by 
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the same means as envisaging the nature and outcome of one‟s own actions (Flavell, 
1999). That is, by imagining what one‟s own mental state and behaviour would be in the 
same situation, and then attributing the same to the other person (Currie & Ravenscroft, 
1997). In contrast, theory theorists (TT) propose that, as mental states are intangible and 
cannot be directly perceived, the individual must therefore literally theorise as to their 
content. These theories are either supported and persist, or are modified and refined to 
account for anomalous findings (Gopnik, 2003). Some authors argue that such theorising 
is a domain general ability that is also used to understand other non-social domains such 
as the biological and physical world as well (e.g. Gopnik, 2003). However, others propose 
that ToM is a domain specific capacity only employed to understand other people. Leslie 
(1994) argues that ToM is rooted in a core neurocognitive architecture that selectively 
confines the inputs it receives to just the social domain. This serves to maintain the high 
level of innateness necessary for such a complex domain specific ability, whilst enabling 
enough flexibility to allow for developmental learning and plasticity (Scholl & Leslie, 1999).  
Baron-Cohen (1995, 2005) and Leslie (1994) have both proffered models based on this 
core neurocognitive architecture they call the Theory of Mind Mechanism (ToMM). The 
role of the ToMM is two-fold. Firstly, to represent the mental states held by others. 
Secondly, to merge these into a workable theory as to the causative relation between an 
observable action and the mental states that brought it about (Baron-Cohen, 1995). Baron-
Cohen (2005) proposes that the ToMM works in tandem with a second domain specific 
module he calls The Empathising System (TESS), the task of which is to instil an 
appropriate emotional reaction in the observer that compels the individual to act. In this 
way, theory of mind is less a passive observer, and takes a more proactive role in the 
creation of adaptive pro-social behaviour.  
Several authors point to evidence both for and against the different models of ToM 
and suggest that the role of simulation and theory in social cognition is not so much an 
either/or debate, but more an integration of the two processes (Apperly, 2008; Mitchell, 
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2005). For example, Keysers and Gazzola (2006, 2007) propose that simulation processes 
enable the automatic and implicit attribution of another‟s emotion, sensation and 
intentionality, and that these form a „primary representation‟ of another person‟s bodily 
state. A subsequent theory based process then uses these „primary representations‟ to 
form „secondary representations‟ of another person‟s knowledge and beliefs through 
explicit conscious reflection. In this way, simulation informs the formation of subsequent 
theories. Lieberman (2003) has extended this dual process system by proposing that 
simulation mechanisms form part of a reflexive X system and that Theory of Mind forms 
part of a reflective C system. The X system is engaged pre-attentively to generate 
expectancies based on perceptual input. The outputs of these processes are mediated 
and/or overridden by the consciously controlled C system when necessary (e.g. when X 
system outputs are erroneous). The dichotomy between the X and C systems is not 
discrete but reflects two ends of a processing spectrum. Furthermore, novel situations that 
necessitate the C system will, through repeated encounters, become more automatic and 
be governed by the X system (Satpute & Lieberman, 2006). Others have argued that 
simulation processes encompass reflective as well as reflexive mechanisms in that it can 
be disembodied, conscious and voluntary (Coricelli, 2005). Uddin (2007) points to 
evidence that reflecting on the mental state of others employs the same mechanisms as 
when reflecting on one‟s own mental state. This implies the presence of shared circuits for 
the explicit representation of the mental states of oneself and others. Overall, the evidence 
in favour of either TT or ST is equivocal and the more pertinent question is in what 
circumstances one is employed over another and why (Mitchell, 2005).  
Neurophysiological data implicate the frontal lobes in tasks necessitating the 
attribution of another person‟s mental state (Frith & Frith, 2003). For example, inferring the 
knowledge and beliefs that another person has elicits activity in the medial prefrontal 
cortex (Gallagher & Frith, 2003), medial frontal gyrus (Fletcher et al., 1995; Ruby & 
Decety, 2003) and also in the anterior cingluate cortex (Vogeley et al., 2001). Impairments 
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in ToM tasks are evident in patients with lesions to the frontal lobes (Rowe, Bullock, 
Polkey, & Morris, 2001; Stuss, Gallup, & Alexander, 2001). Two studies have specified the 
location of medial prefrontal cortex activity during mental state attributions to the anterior 
paracingulate cortex, a border region between the ACC and MFG (Gallagher, Jack, 
Roepstorff, & Frith, 2002; McCabe, Houser, Ryan, Smith, & Trouard, 2001). This area is 
also active in tasks involving the attempted deception of others (Langleben et al., 2002). 
However, the attribution of emotional states of mind has been shown to activate more 
ventral areas of the mPFC (Adolphs, 1999; Saxe, 2006) and the orbito-frontal cortex 
(Hynes, Baird, & Grafton, 2006). This suggests a dissociation between different aspects of 
mental state attributions, that of the cognitive and the emotional, each recruiting separate 
cortical areas (Blair, 2005; Saxe, 2006), which corroborates the modular separation 
between ToMM and TESS proposed by Baron-Cohen (2005). This is further corroborated 
by the finding that a task requiring the detection of a social faux pas, which necessitates 
the attribution of a social emotion, elicits activity in the orbitofrontal cortex (Baron-Cohen et 
al., 1994). Those with lesions to this area are unable to do so, but retain their ability to 
pass tasks of 2nd order mental state attribution (Stone, Baron-Cohen, & Knight, 1998).  
Despite the divergent views as to the nature of how mental states are attributed 
there is a consensus that ToM is the product of less complex, prerequisite cognitive 
abilities. Tomasello and Rakoczy (2003) propose that the ability to form an abstract 
representation of knowledge and beliefs is ultimately an auxiliary capability to a 
prerequisite, and more important ability to recognise that others are intentional agents in 
the first place, whose behaviour is determined by more basic psychological states such as 
goals, desires, attention and emotion. These can be derived from a perceptual analysis of 
their behaviour that Tomasello and Rokoczy (2003) refer to as „scratching the surface‟ of 
immediately observable behaviour. That is, because mental states cannot be observed 
directly, they must be inferred from the behaviour of others through the analysis of their 
actions, which reveal the underlying motives. For them, this provides a foundation upon 
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which more complex socio-cognitive abilities can be built later in life. The ability to deduce 
basic psychological states from observable behaviour therefore emerges earlier in 
development. Furthermore, it also acts as an evolutionary precursor to ToM and may 
account for the socio-cognitive abilities of non-human primates.    
Action perception 
By necessity, the individual must first distinguish between biological and non-
biological objects. That is, to recognise the distinction between stimuli which are animate 
and whose behaviour is caused by its goals and intentions, and those stimuli which are 
inanimate and incapable of internal mental processes. The spontaneous nature of such 
classifications necessitates an efficient and automatic cognitive system with which to do so 
(Hassin, Bargh, & Uleman, 2002). For example, attention is automatically allocated to 
biological stimuli, such as images of human bodies, but not to other stimuli (Downing, 
Bray, Rogers, & Childs, 2004; New, Cosmides, & Tooby, 2007; Thornton & Vuong, 2004). 
Baron-Cohen (1995, 2005) encapsulates this ability in a domain specific module called the 
„Intentionality Detector‟ (ID), the task of which is to identify agentive motion through the 
amodal perception of self-propelled motion, and to interpret it as a product of basic 
intentional states such as desire or goal-directedness. Likewise, Leslie (1994) describes a 
module called the „Theory of Bodies‟ (ToBy), a domain general ability involved in 
monitoring the spatio-temporal dynamics of all 3D objects, by which biological motion is 
similarly delineated by virtue of its difference from that of non-biological motion. Again, the 
primary differentiating factor is that of self-propulsion. Behavioural studies in infants have 
shown that these mechanisms are in place from birth (Simion, Regolin, & Bulf, 2008). They 
have also shown that, as well as self-propulsion, other facets of motion kinematics are 
necessary for an object to be perceived as agentive. These include reciprocal interaction 
with other agents (Johnson, 2000; 2003), and a trajectory and speed of movement that is 
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similar to one‟s own movement (Morewedge, Preston, & Wegner, 2007; Rakison & Poulin-
Dubois, 2001). 
 However, neither Leslie (1994) nor Baron-Cohen (1995, 2005) provide a precise 
mechanism by which acknowledging that an agent‟s motion is mechanically distinct from 
that of non-agents leads to the attribution of desires and goals. That is, whilst the visual 
appearance of the motion itself is sufficient to set it apart from other objects, it seems a 
leap to assume that this in itself warrants the attribution of agency and intentionality, and 
does not preclude the possibility that its motion is purely mechanical. Rakison and Poulin-
Dubois (2001) and Baldwin and Baird (2001) propose that biological motion shows 
structural regularities that coincide with the initiation and termination of goal-directed 
actions. Sensitivity to these regularities, especially when associated with the spatial 
context in which it occurs (Bach, Knoblich, Gunter, Friederici, & Prinz, 2005), is sufficient 
enough to be able to parse the constant flow of complex movement into discrete functional 
units of goal directed actions. The action is therefore perceived in terms of its end-point, 
and is encoded synonymously with the perception of the motor act itself (Hassin, Aarts, & 
Ferguson, 2005). The emergence of this ability by 10 months of age (Baldwin, Baird, 
Saylor, & Clark, 2001), and its evidence in Macaque monkeys (Rochat, Serra, Fadiga, & 
Gallese, 2008), indicates this to be a rudimentary foundation on which further advances in 
social cognition can be built.  
However, adopting this „teleological stance‟ (Csibra, 2003) is still one step removed 
from appreciating its psychological nature (Baldwin & Baird, 2001). That is, that the aim to 
achieve a goal through performing the action is the product of internal and unobservable 
intentional drives. Meltzoff (2005, 2007a, 2007b) bridges this gap by proposing that 
intentionality is ascribed to individuals through a process of self/other equivalence. From 
birth, the infant possesses an internal representation of its own body and is able to 
perceive its own movements (proprioception) that encompasses visual, auditory and tactile 
information. It is able to recognise that the kinematic regularities of its own movements 
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correspond to those it observes in others. The infant is therefore aware that some objects 
share mechanistic qualities with itself, and are labelled as „like me‟. Furthermore, because 
of its amodal nature, actions can be recognised that are visually unavailable, such as facial 
movements. The encoding of the goal of the action enables the observer to recall the 
concomitant intentional drives that accompany the action when oneself is performing it, 
thus providing a means by which intentional states can be associated with the observation 
of goal directed actions. A by-product of this process is that intentionality is often over-
attributed to inanimate objects whose behaviour approximates the characteristics used to 
define agency (Baron-Cohen, 1995; Luo & Baillargeon, 2005). In such ambiguous 
situations where errors are likely, natural selection favours making the less costly error 
(Haselton & Buss, 2000). This over attribution may therefore be an adaptive cognitive bias 
to assign agency where there is none (false positive) rather than assume an intentional 
agent to be inanimate (false negative) (Haselton & Nettle, 2006). 
Action anticipation 
Perceiving the behaviour of others in terms of their goal or end-state enables the 
actions to be predicted. Several studies have shown an anticipatory effect for biological 
motion. In such studies, participants typically view a biological action sequence, followed 
by a test stimulus of a static posture. The posture depicted in the test stimulus can vary in 
three ways with respect to the final posture of the action sequence. It can be either the 
same posture, it can be a posture that preceded the final posture, or it can be a posture 
that would have resulted had the action been allowed to continue. An anticipatory effect is 
evident as a processing asymmetry between postures that occur after the stopping point 
and those that occur before it, or are the same as it. This notion of asymmetric processing 
encompasses a number of different effects. For example, Verfaillie and Daems (2002) 
found that judgments of whether or not the test posture was anatomically possible or not 
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were faster for postures that were related to a previously observed action sequence. 
Crucially, such priming was greater for postures that occurred after the stopping point than 
those preceding it (which had actually been witnessed).  
The most common method used to measure anticipation of biological motion is that 
of representational momentum (RM). Again, after watching an action sequence, 
participants view a static posture that is either after, the same as, or before the stopping 
point of the moving sequence. Participants are required to judge whether the test posture 
and the stopping point are the same or different. The proportion of same responses is 
higher for postures that occur after the stopping point than those occurring before the 
stopping point. Therefore, participants are less able to distinguish the end-point of an 
action from a posture that will naturally follow on from it, than from a posture that precedes 
the end-point. As such, the memory for the end-point of the action sequence is displaced 
further along the observed trajectory and this is taken as evidence that observers 
automatically anticipate how an observed action is most likely to unfold in the immediate 
future (please see Chapter 3 for a detailed review of the representational momentum 
literature and also its relationship with motion anticipation). This bias has been consistently 
demonstrated for a wide variety of biological motion stimuli, from simple linear movements 
of schematic animals (Freyd & Miller, 1992), to the more complex pattern of motion of 
point light stimuli (Graf et al., 2007; Jarraya, Amorim, & Bardy, 2005), and video-clips of 
real world scenes of people moving (Thornton & Hayes, 2004). It has even been observed 
for the motion of oneself, with a spatiotemporal forward displacement observed for the 
pattern of optic flow caused by egocentric motion (Thornton & Hayes, 2004). 
Neural basis for action anticipation 
The ability to perceive and predict the actions of others is underpinned by a 
comprehensive cortical system that encompasses both visual and motor areas. Cortical 
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regions in the ventral and dorsal visual streams have been shown to be either dedicated, 
or at least maximally active, to the perception of biological motion. Several areas in the 
posterior visual cortex exhibit category specific processing of body stimuli, and as such 
have been termed the Fusiform Body Area (FBA) and Extrastriate Body Area (EBA) 
(Downing, Chan, Peelen, Dodds, & Kanwisher, 2006; Peelen & Downing, 2007). The EBA, 
located in the inferior temporal sulcus, shows selective activation to the sight of bodies 
(Downing, Jiang, Shuman, & Kanwisher, 2001; 2007), and does not differentiate between 
the actions of others (Peigneux et al., 2000; Urgesi, Candidi, Ionta, & Aglioti, 2007) and 
those of oneself (Astafiev, Stanley, Shulman, & Corbetta, 2004). Furthermore, when 
presented with an action sequence, the EBA shows greater activation when frames were 
presented in an incoherent order than in the correct temporal sequence, suggesting its 
functional properties are more concerned with the form and structure of the body than with 
biological motion (Downing, Peelen, Wiggett, & Tew, 2006). Equivalent selectivity for body-
like stimuli has been found in homologous areas in the macaque using both single cell 
(Desimone, Albright, Gross, & Bruce, 1984) and fMRI techniques (Pinsk, DeSimone, 
Moore, Gross, & Kastner, 2005). The FBA, in the mid-fusiform gyrus, is similarly active to 
body like stimuli (Morris, Pelphrey, & McCarthy, 2006; Peelen & Downing, 2005; 
Schwarzlose, Baker, & Kanwisher, 2005). However, whereas the extent of FBA activity is 
greater in response to the whole body than to individual body parts, the EBA is more 
sensitive to the amount of the body presented, with activity increasing as the extent of 
visible body increases (Taylor, Wiggett, & Downing, 2007). 
The EBA feeds into the Superior Temporal Sulcus (STS) (Giese & Poggio, 2003) 
which also shows activity to static images of bodies. However, whilst the EBA is most 
responsive to postures presented in a random order, the STS shows preferential activation 
when they are sequenced in a coherent temporal order (Downing, Peelen et al., 2006). 
This elucidates the functional role of the STS in processing biological motion. Single cell 
recording in the anterior portion of the STS of Macaques (corresponding to the posterior 
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STS in humans) have revealed that coding in the STS goes beyond that of recognition of 
general biological motion, to the coding of specific actions and postures (Jellema & Perrett, 
2006). Furthermore, this can be accomplished when the information conveyed by the 
stimulus is impoverished. For example, accurate recognition of biological actions and STS 
activity in monkeys and humans is observed for motion cues alone in the absence of 
information regarding the form and structure of the stimulus, such as for point light walkers 
(Neri, Morrone, & Burr, 1998) and elicits STS activity in both monkeys and humans (Oram 
& Perrett, 1996; Pelphrey, Morris, Michelich, Allison, & McCarthy, 2005; Puce & Perrett, 
2003). Activity is also observed in response to static images of bodies in which motion is 
implied by the articulation of body parts (Jellema & Perrett, 2003a; Perrett et al., 1989). 
The visual properties of STS cells extend beyond that which is necessary for mere 
identification of particular actions (Jellema & Perrett, 2005). For example, cells selectively 
active to grasping actions will respond only to the sight of a valid interaction with an object, 
such that the absence of the object or its remoteness from the action will fail to elicit 
activation (Perrett et al., 1989). Activity in these cells is therefore reliant on the action 
being meaningful and goal-directed. Furthermore, repeated observation of specific actions 
enables associations to be made between postures that constitute part of the same action. 
This enables probabilistic inferences about the end-point of an action to be made based on 
previous experience (Giese & Poggio, 2003; Perrett, Xiao, Jellema, Barraclough, & Oram, 
2006). For some cell populations, no discrimination is made between the action and its 
articulated end-point, in that they are coded for synonymously (Jellema & Perrett, 2003a). 
The activity of other neurons to a specific posture is conditional on it being the result of a 
specific action sequence (Jellema & Perrett, 2003b), whilst this sensitivity to perceptual 
history may allow other cell groups to code for an end-point after it has become occluded 
from view (Baker, Keysers, Jellema, Wicker, & Perrett, 2001; Saxe, Xiao, Kovacs, Perrett, 
& Kanwisher, 2004). The integration of the spatial context in which an action occurs and 
it‟s positioning within a temporal sequence allows for not only the compilation of biological 
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postures to be coherently processed, but for the end-state of the action to be encoded 
synonymously with the action itself during the perceptual process (Hassin et al., 2005). 
The goal of the action can then be derived and predicted on the basis of a purely visual 
analysis of its appearance (Jellema & Perrett, 2005, 2007). Thus, a mechanism is 
apparent for the analysis and parsing of the continuous inputs of biological motion into 
discrete units based on the (sub)goals of the action. The role of the STS is elevated 
beyond that of a visual description, to the parsing and comprehension of biological motion 
(Redcay, 2008). 
Despite the complex perceptual properties of the STS, its processing remains 
confined to the purely mechanistic nature of biological motion (Jellema & Perrett, 2005, 
2007). However, the STS projects to the intrapareital lobe (IPL) in the dorsal stream, which 
along with the ventral premotor cortex (vPFC), is also involved in the processing of 
biological motion. The role of these regions in motor coordination affords it a degree of 
processing capable of accessing the intentions underlying others actions. In macaques, 
these areas are involved in the preparation of making goal-directed actions and contain 
cells that fire immediately prior to the onset of the action (Rizzolatti, Fadiga, Fogassi, & 
Gallese, 1999). This enables an internal prediction to be made of how the action will 
proceed (forward model), and which can be compared to visual and somatosensory inputs 
during execution in order to make fine adjustments and increase efficacy (Blakemore & 
Decety, 2001; Miall, 2003; Wilson & Knoblich, 2005; Wolpert, Doya, & Kawato, 2003). 
However, some of the cell populations are also active to the sight of another individual 
performing the action. Neurons in the Macaque F5 that fire prior to the execution of a 
specific hand action will fire in response to the sight of another individual performing that 
action (Gallese, Fadiga, Fogassi, & Rizzolatti, 1996; Rizzolatti, Fadiga, Gallese, & Fogassi, 
1996). Such cells are called mirror neurons (MNs). A large proportion of these neurons do 
not code for specific motor commands, but are able to generalise across different actions if 
they share the same goal, such as grasping an object with the hand, mouth or even a tool 
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(Ferrari, Rozzi, & Fogassi, 2005). Conversely, two identical actions will elicit differential 
activity if the goal of the actions differ (Fogassi et al., 2005; Iacoboni et al., 2005), and will 
similarly persist in activity even if the end-point of the action is not visible (Umilta et al., 
2001). 
It is not possible to use single cell recording techniques in humans to establish the 
presence of visuomotor neurons. Therefore, no studies have directly investigated if 
observed and executed actions share a common representation at the neuronal level, or 
whether they are encoded by separate neurons that are distributed within the same 
cortical area (Dinstein, Thomas, Behrmann, & Heeger, 2008). Nevertheless, neuroimaging 
using both PET and fMRI have revealed activity in the IPL and vPMC, as well as the STS, 
during action observation (Grafton, Arbib, Fadiga, & Rizzolatti, 1996; Grezes, Armony, 
Rowe, & Passingham, 2003). Because MNs prepare an action for execution, responses to 
actions performed by others are restricted to those that are part of the observers motor 
repertoire, such as those which can be replicated (Buccino et al., 2004) and for those 
performed regularly in the past (Calvo-Merino, Grezes, Glaser, Passingham, & Haggard, 
2006). 
Several theorists have argued that MNs constitute the internal simulation of others 
behaviour that is necessary for ToM (Gallese & Goldman, 1998; Preston & de Waal, 2002; 
Wolpert et al., 2003). That is, embodied simulation of others actions provides access to 
their epistemic and emotional mental states. The transformation of an intention into an 
action can be operated in reverse when observing other people‟s actions, such that the 
intention can be inferred from the action. However, ToM is not evident in macaques for 
which MNs are also evident, or for any other species of primate. This suggests that MNs 
evolved for a different purpose that is common to both human and non-human primates 
(Brass & Heyes, 2005), that of understanding and predicting the complex sequence of 
actions performed by others (Jacob & Jeannerod, 2005), or „motor empathy‟ (Blair, 2005). 
The recruitment of the „forward model‟ during action observation serves an anticipatory 
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function as to the future course of an action through facilitating the recognition and 
categorisation of actions (Binkofski & Buccino, 2006), which in turn enables inferences to 
be made as to the goal or end-point of the action (Blakemore & Frith, 2005). This is 
supported by neurophysiological evidence showing that anticipating another person‟s 
action elicits activity in the vPMC, whereas the dPMC shows activity during preparation to 
act oneself (Ramnani & Miall, 2004). Further evidence from behavioural studies shows that 
anticipation of biological actions occurs only for actions that are anatomically possible and 
not for those that the observer cannot perform themselves, implicating a role for MNs in 
action prediction (Verfaillie & Daems, 2002). However, as noted above, the ability to 
encode the end-point of an action necessitates only a visual description that can be 
provided by the STS (Csibra, 2005). This has lead to the proposal that the MNs functions 
to infer not only the goal of the immediately observable action, but in predicting the action 
most likely to follow it (Jeannerod, 2001). In this way, the current action can be placed 
within a temporal context of both the causative and consequential actions it enables, 
permitting the behaviour of others to be more richly understood (Csibra, 2005). 
The ability to anticipate the behaviour of others relies on more than analysing the 
kinematics of observed behaviour, but also relies on other cues as to the intentions 
underpinning behaviour. Of particular importance in this respect is the face, and more 
specifically the social cues it provides such as direction of gaze and the expression. From 
these the observer can discern the other person‟s attentional state and emotions and 
ultimately their intentions. Furthermore, the morphology of these features has evolved to 
intentionally convey such information to others. Understanding the goals and intentions 
motivating an observed action and predicting its outcome is facilitated by integrating 
information derived from these cues with the action itself. This provides a means by which 
socio-cognitive processes go beyond the observable kinematics of an observed action, to 
the intentional dynamics that underpin and motivate its execution. 
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Face perception 
Faces present a complicated but informative stimulus in our environment, and there 
is evidence that they are afforded preferential processing in the human visual-cognitive 
system. Faces capture visual attention (Hershler & Hochstein, 2005; Theeuwes & Van der 
Stigchel, 2006), and when freely viewing natural scenes containing people, 80% of initial 
fixations are directed towards faces (Cerf, Harel, Einhaeuser, & Kock, 2007). Furthermore, 
when freely viewing faces alone, the spatial distribution of attention of humans and other 
primates is predominantly biased to the internal features (mouth, nose, eyes) rather than 
the external features, such as the hair and jaw line (Barton, Radcliffe, Cherkasova, 
Edelman, & Intriligator, 2006; Guo, Mahmoodi, Robertson, & Young, 2006; Guo, 
Robertson, Mahmoodi, Tadmor, & Young, 2003; Pelphrey et al., 2002).  
The first order relations between the inner features are uniform across all faces 
(Maurer, Grand, & Mondloch, 2002), with the two eyes positioned above the mouth to form 
a triangle, with the nose at the centre (Barton, Zhao, & Keenan, 2003). Some studies 
suggest that humans are sensitive to this unique configuration from birth, with newborns 
gazing more at face-like stimuli than non-face-like stimuli (Pascalis & Kelly, 2009). This 
has led to the proposal that humans are born with an innate disposition to detect faces that 
has evolved as a result of the adaptive pressures placed on cognitive abilities to process 
social information (de Gelder & Rouw, 2001; Johnson, 2005; Morton & Johnson, 1991).  
Repeated exposure to faces leads to greater sensitivity to facial configurations, and 
this drives the sophisticated face processing skills of adults, collectively known as face 
expertise. This includes the differentiation between identities, the recognition of familiar 
faces, and discerning age and gender. The origin of this sophisticated sensitivity to facial 
information has been proposed to derive from a unique ability to process the 2nd order 
relations between facial features. That is, whereas the first order relations define that the 
two eyes are placed above the nose, which in turn is above the mouth, the second order 
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relations refer to the relative spatial distances between these features, their size and 
position within the face contour, whilst retaining the same first order configuration (Maurer 
et al., 2002). The integrated whole therefore takes on additional properties not accounted 
for by the mere summation of its individual parts (Tanaka & Sengco, 1997). The prototype 
theory proposes a means by which configural information is measured (Anderson & 
Wilson, 2005; Leopold, O'Toole, Vetter, & Blanz, 2001; Leopold, Rhodes, Muller, & Jeffery, 
2005; Rhodes & Jeffery, 2006). The configural information of all the faces one encounters 
are averaged and represented as a prototype. All individual faces are then assessed in 
terms of how much they deviate from the average, with increasing strength of any given 
social attribute represented by an increase in the distance from the prototype. Judgments 
of identity, gender, attractiveness and trustworthiness have all been correlated with how 
much the 2nd order relations between the facial features differ from that of an average face 
(Oosterhof & Todorov, 2008; Potter & Corneille, 2008; Todorov, Baron, & Oosterhof, 2008; 
Wallis, Siebeck, Swann, Blanz, & Bulthoff, 2008; Wilson, Loffler, & Wilkinson, 2002).  
Further support for the contention that configural information is important for face 
processing comes from the effect of stimulus inversion. Detecting a change in the spatial 
relations between features (the distance between the eyes, or between the nose and 
mouth), is worse for inverted faces than for upright faces (Barton et al., 2003; Davies & 
Hoffman, 2002; Leder, Candrian, Huber, & Bruce, 2001; Leder & Carbon, 2006), more so 
than for detection of changes to individual features, for example their size or colour 
(Barton, 2001; Leder & Bruce, 2000; Rhodes, Brake, & Atkinson, 1993; Searcy & Bartlett, 
1996). Detecting configural and featural changes in upright faces is correlated across 
individuals, whereas they are not for inverted faces, suggesting that the two processing 
types are dissociated from each other when processing inverted faces (Yovel & 
Kanwisher, 2008). This inversion effect appears to disrupt the processing of spatial 
relations on the vertical axis more than those on the horizontal axis (Goffaux & Rossion, 
2007).  
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Processing the inter-individual variation in the 2nd order relations between features is 
necessary for discriminating between individuals, as well as their age and gender. 
Recognition of identity is less accurate and slower for inverted faces than for upright faces 
(Diamond & Carey, 1986; Dwyer, Mundy, Vladeanu, & Honey, 2009; Metzger, 2001; 
Nachson & Shechory, 2002; Teunisse & de Gelder, 2003). Judgments of age, gender, and 
attractiveness have also been found to be impaired for inverted faces, as well as 
personality judgments such as trustworthiness and intelligence (Baudouin & Humphreys, 
2006; Bauml, Schnelzer, & Zimmer, 1997; Sangrigoli & de Schonen, 2004; Santos & 
Young, 2008). Furthermore, the second order relations between features also vary within 
individuals over time. Therefore, face inversion also impairs the perception of dynamic 
facial information such as lip reading (Rosenblum, Yakel, & Green, 2000) and emotional 
expressions (Aguado, Garcia-Gutiuerrez, & Serrano-Pedraza, 2009; Calder & Jansen, 
2005; Goren & Wilson, 2006). Inversion has not been found to impair the processing of 
non-face stimuli, such as dot patterns, houses or textures (Husk, Bennett, & Sekuler, 
2007; Tanaka & Farah, 1991), and an ambiguous stimulus elicits an inversion effect if 
perceived as a face but not if perceived as a Chinese character (Ge, Wang, McCleery, & 
Lee, 2006; McCleery et al., 2008). However, inversion effects have also been observed 
when discriminating between and identifying static body postures (Reed, Stone, Bozova, & 
Tanaka, 2003; Reed, Stone, Grubb, & McGoldrick, 2006), and when processing biological 
action sequences (Loucks & Baldwin, 2009; Pavlova & Sokolov, 2003). As such, the 
processing of social stimuli in general may require configural processing.  
It must be noted, though, that the face inversion effect is defined as the decrement in 
performance in relation to that of upright faces. However, processing remains above 
chance. Furthermore, inversion also affects the processing of featural changes (Leder & 
Carbon, 2006; Riesenhuber, Jarudi, Gilad, & Sinha, 2004), but to a lesser extent than for 
configural changes, suggesting that inversion effects reflect a quantitative shift in 
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processing rather than a qualitative/categorical shift between processing styles (Sekuler, 
Gaspar, Gold, & Bennett, 2004). 
As with the perception of biological motion, there is evidence to suggest that the face 
and its dynamic features exploit a distributed and dedicated processing system. Faces 
have been found to elicit a negative event related potential deflection that peaks at around 
170ms (N170) and which is larger than in response to other types of stimuli (Bentin, 
Allison, Puce, Perez, & McCarthy, 1996; de Haan, Pascalis, & Johnson, 2002). This 
suggests that faces exploit a specific cortical system not exploited by non-face stimuli. 
Several areas in the lateral occipital complex have been shown to be selectively 
responsive to faces. Discrete regions of the inferior occipital cortex and middle fusiform 
gyrus exhibit greater activity in response to faces than to bodies without faces, places and 
other objects (Downing, Chan et al., 2006; Grill-Spector, Knouf, & Kanwisher, 2004; 
Kanwisher, McDermott, & Chun, 1997; Rossion, Schiltz, & Crommelinck, 2003; 
Schwarzlose et al., 2005). These have been termed the occipital face area (OFA) and the 
fusiform face area (FFA) respectively. A further area has been identified in the posterior 
Superior Temporal Sulcus (Allison, Puce, & McCarthy, 2000).  
The distributed nature of these areas suggests some functional dissociation between 
them, with each area serving a specific facet of face processing (Haxby, Hoffman, & 
Gobbini, 2000, 2002). Several studies indicate that the OFA is sensitive to the physical 
features of the face whilst the FFA is sensitive to facial identity. FFA activity is higher when 
discriminating faces with equivalent physical structure but which differ in identity 
(Rotshtein, Henson, Treves, Driver, & Dolan, 2005), and only when the observer is 
consciously aware of these differences (Large, Cavina-Pratesi, Vilis, & Culharn, 2008). 
FFA activity is also sensitive to stimulus manipulations that modulate the ability to perceive 
identity, such as reversal of contrast polarity (George et al., 1999), stimulus inversion 
(Chen, Kao, & Tyler, 2007; Tong, Nakayama, Moscovitch, Weinrib, & Kanwisher, 2000; 
Yovel & Kanwisher, 2004) and deviation from an averaged prototype (Loffler, Yourganov, 
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Wilkinson, & Wilson, 2005). Face inversion is associated with decreased activity in the 
FFA (Goffaux, Rossion, Sorger, Schiltz, & Goebel, 2009; Mazard, Schiltz, & Rossion, 
2006; Passarotti, Smith, DeLano, & Huang, 2007; Tong et al., 2000; Yovel & Kanwisher, 
2004) and the magnitude of this decrease correlates with the extent to which inversion 
impairs face processing ability (Yovel & Kanwisher, 2005). The response of the OFA to 
inverted faces is less consistent, with both an insensitivity to face inversion and a reduction 
in activity being reported (Chen et al., 2007; Joseph et al., 2006; Yovel & Kanwisher, 
2005), whilst the pSTS has been shown to increase activity (Leube et al., 2003). 
Activity in OFA is not sensitive to identity changes but is higher when discriminating 
between two faces based on differences in their physical structure (Rotshtein et al., 2005), 
and this is evident in the absence of any conscious awareness of those differences (Large 
et al., 2008). Creating neuronal noise in the OFA by means of Transcranial Magnetic 
Stimulation (TMS) impairs the ability to detect featural changes in faces but not the 2nd 
order spatial relationships between those changes (Pitcher, Walsh, Yovel, & Duchaine, 
2007). Putative homologues of these areas have been found in non-human primates. fMRI 
and single cell recordings have revealed face selective areas in the inferior temporal 
cortex (ITC) and anterior STS of macaques (Desimone et al., 1984; Perrett, Rolls, & Caan, 
1982; Pinsk et al., 2005).  
Haxby et al (2000, 2002) (see also Cohen & Tong, 2001; Kadosh & Johnson, 2007) 
proposed a model of face processing to account for the broad distinctions outlined above. 
The OFA performs an initial analysis of the physical structure of the face which projects in 
two parallel streams to the FFA for the purpose of identification and the pSTS to process 
the facial movement (see below). In this way, the OFA and FFA process static and 
invariant facial attributes, whilst the pSTS is motion sensitive. These constitute the core 
components of a distributed system of face processing, and interact with non-face specific 
areas (the extended system), to integrate the facial information with emotional (amygdala), 
semantic (anterior temporal regions), and spatial (intraparietal sulcus) information. Others 
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have elaborated on this model. The functional distinction between areas could be due to 
the constant attentional demands necessary when processing motion but not when 
perceiving invariant features (Calder & Young, 2005). O‟Toole, Roark and Adbi (2002) 
propose that these areas interact rather than function in parallel, such as when recognising 
identity from facial movement, and Rossion et al (2003) suggest that face selective areas 
may be involved in several functions but at different stages of processing.  
Are faces special? 
The nature of face processing outlined above suggests an innate predisposition to 
attend specifically to faces that employs a qualitatively different means of processing to 
that of other objects by a dedicated cortical system. This has led many to propose that 
faces are represented in the cognitive system differently to other stimuli and therefore 
represent a special stimulus (Fox, 2005; Liu & Chaudhuri, 2003). However, many have 
challenged this assumption. The innate tendency to orient to faces demonstrated by 
newborns has been proposed to reflect a generalised sensory bias to the low level visual 
properties of the face, such as the amplitude spectra of faces (Kleiner & Banks, 1987; 
Nelson, 2001) and the greater number of features in the upper half than the lower half 
(Simion, Cassia, Turati, & Valenza, 2001; Turati, 2004). Furthermore, these types of non-
face patterns also elicit greater activity in the adult FFA (Caldara et al., 2006). This casts 
into doubt the specialisation of specific cortical areas for processing faces. However, whilst 
these areas do show some activity in response to non-face stimuli, it is significantly less 
than in response to faces, suggesting that the stimulus selectivity in these regions is 
relative rather than absolute (Spiridon & Kanwisher, 2002). Others maintain that so-called 
face specific cortical regions show no bias for faces at all, but subserve a generalised 
expertise process (Gauthier & Tarr, 1997). That is, where all exemplars of a stimulus share 
the same basic configuration, the FFA and OFA enable one to discriminate between them 
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at the subordinate level. For example, people trained to identify cars, birds or abstract 
stimuli show greater OFA and FFA activity in response to these categories, whereas those 
with no training do not (Gauthier, Skudlarski, Gore, & Anderson, 2000; Gauthier, Tarr, 
Anderson, Skudlarski, & Gore, 1999; Rogers, Hocking, Mechelli, Patterson, & Price, 2005). 
However, this is not to say that faces do not preferentially activate these regions. Indeed, 
these areas may most frequently be employed for face stimuli, and the need to recognise 
individual faces may have been the initial adaptive pressure favouring the evolution of an 
expertise mechanism.  
The role of the face in Theory of Mind 
Infants are more likely to interpret a stimulus as agentive if it has a face than if not 
(Johnson, Slaughter, & Carey, 1998; Johnson, 2003), and where a face is not present, its 
location will be inferred from the direction of movement (Johnson, Grossmann, & Farroni, 
2008). As such, the presence of a face contributes to Baron-Cohen‟s (1995) notion of an 
Intentionality Detector in ascribing agency. However, the role of the face extends beyond 
conveying that a stimulus has intentions, but also specifies what those intentions are, and 
this is achieved primarily through facial movement (Yazbek & D'Entremont, 2006). Two 
crucial facets of facial dynamics are the changing direction of eye gaze and emotional 
expression. These two important components in social interactions will now be introduced 
in turn.  
Gaze direction 
The gaze direction of another person denotes the focus of their attention, and as 
such is informative about the external world. Furthermore, an observer can also deduce 
aspects of the other person‟s internal mental state from gaze direction, such as their 
intentions towards the focus of attention, be it oneself or another object/individual. This can 
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subsequently enable the observer to anticipate and predict the nature of the other person‟s 
actions. The direction of another‟s attention can be discerned from the orientation of their 
torso, their head, or the direction of their gaze (cf. Perrett et al., 1989). However, the eyes 
offer the most specific and informative cue, and this is reflected in the preferential 
allocation of attention afforded to the eye region over other internal facial features 
(Bindemann, Scheepers, & Burton, 2009; Buchan, Pare, & Munhall, 2007; Hernandez et 
al., 2009). Indeed, this attention to the eyes has been proposed to facilitate face 
processing and the development of face expertise, as the eye region is important for the 
recognition of identity and expression (Gliga & Csibra, 2007). The computation of the exact 
direction of gaze has been proposed to be a function of the geometrical properties of the 
eye, with the position of the round iris within the oval sclera determining the gaze direction 
(Todorovic, 2006). This is facilitated by a sharp degree of contrast marking the boundary 
between the two features, known as the limbus. However, the degree of contrast itself is 
insufficient to discern gaze direction, as reversing the polarity (whilst maintaining the 
contrast), can impair judgments of gaze direction (Ricciardelli, Baylis, & Driver, 2000; 
Senju & Hasegawa, 2005), and can induce the perception that gaze is looking in the 
opposite direction (Sinha, 2000). Furthermore, reducing the contrast on one side of the 
eye can lead to a bias in perceiving the gaze to be averted in that direction (Ando, 2002, 
2004). This suggests that, in addition to the geometrical configuration of the components, 
mechanisms for perceiving gaze direction are also sensitive to the relative contrast 
between them, with the dark part of the configuration indicative of where the eyes are 
directed.  
However, the above studies assume the head to be oriented toward the observer, 
whereas gaze discrimination must also be possible when the head is averted, which alters 
the perceptual geometry of the eyes (Kluttz, Mayes, West, & Kerby, 2009; Todorovic, 
2006). Discriminating gaze direction is impaired when the head is incongruently aligned 
with gaze direction, both in terms of accuracy and discrimination time (e.g. Todorovic, 
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2009). Discerning where someone is looking is therefore computed from adding the 
direction of head orientation to the direction of gaze (Kluttz et al., 2009; Todorovic, 2006). 
However, Ricciardelli and Driver (2008) observed that such interference was evident only 
when participants were required to discriminate gaze as quickly as possible, but not when 
no time limit was imposed, suggesting that when under pressure, participants will use 
easily identifiable cues such as head orientation as a proxy to gaze direction. Furthermore, 
George and Conty (2008) note that the effect of head orientation is stronger for averted 
gaze, but has less of an influence on direct gaze, possibly due to the greater social 
saliency of direct gaze (see below). However, these constitute what Bock et al (2008) refer 
to as „sender-centric‟ processes, which contrast with „receiver-centric‟ properties of gaze 
processing, such as the observers expectancies as to the gaze direction based on the 
environmental context. For example, perceptions of gaze direction can be erroneously 
biased towards the location of external objects (Lobmaier, Fischer, & Schwaninger, 2006).  
The social significance of direct and averted gaze  
Several distinctions between the different facets of gaze direction have been 
proposed based on the functions they serve and the cognition involved in their processing. 
Todorovic (2006) proposes three frames of reference in which gaze can be processed. 
Firstly, whether or not the other person is looking at you or not (mutual gaze or dyadic 
gaze direction), and secondly where they are looking with respect to oneself (averted gaze 
e.g. to the left right, down or up). The preferential fixation on the eye region is enhanced 
when the gaze direction is directed at the observer. For example, in visual search tasks, 
faces with direct gaze „pop-out‟ of an array of faces with averted gaze, whereas no pop-out 
effect is observed for faces with averted gaze in an array of faces with direct gaze (Senju 
& Hasegawa, 2005; Senju, Kikuchi, Hasegawa, Tojo, & Osanai, 2008). Furthermore, 
disengagement of attention from a direct gaze is impaired compared to that of an averted 
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gaze (Senju & Hasegawa, 2005). As direct gaze enhances attention to the face, the 
processing of social information is also facilitated, with direct gaze improving recognition of 
gender and identity (Hood, Macrae, Cole-Davies, & Dias, 2003; Macrae, Hood, Milne, 
Rowe, & Mason, 2002; Vuilleumier, George, Lister, Armony, & Driver, 2005). There is 
evidence that discrimination of different gaze directions is possible early in life. Within 36 
hours after birth the infant is able to discriminate between faces with eyes open and shut 
(Batki, Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Connellan, & Ahluwalia, 2000), and by 5 days old they 
look preferentially at faces with a mutual gaze than with an averted gaze (Farroni, Csibra, 
Simion, & Johnson, 2002).  
Thirdly, a more complex process is to compute to what another person is looking at 
(joint attention or triadic gaze direction). The target of another‟s attention when their gaze 
is mutual is unambiguously oneself. However, when it is averted, their target of attention 
could be any number of external stimuli. To accomplish this, the observer must first follow 
their line of sight to the correct location (level 1 perspective taking).  By inferring an 
outward bound line that originates from the eyes, an observer can determine to where 
another is looking with a high degree of accuracy, and can pinpoint the target of another‟s 
attention to 2.81o (Bock et al., 2008). Tomasello and Rakoczy (2003) proposes that these 
three abilities constitute merely a low level capacity to process gaze, and proposes an 
additional high level capacity in which the observer is able to comprehend what the other 
person is seeing. That is, once the other person‟s line of sight has been deduced, one can 
then infer what the object looks like from their perspective (level 2 perspective taking). The 
perspective oneself has of the scene (the spatiotopic map of the egocentric and allocentric 
coordinates) is reoriented to that of the other person, and thus enables the observer to 
imagine the perspective of the other person. The dissociable nature of level 1 and 2 
perspective taking was demonstrated by Michelon and Zacks (2006). They found that the 
time taken to perform level 1 perspective taking increased as the distance between the 
other person and the target increased, and thus the length of the line of sight to be traced 
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increased. However, this was not affected by the extent to which the perspectives of the 
observer and the other person differed. Conversely, the opposite was found for level 2 
perspective taking. The time taken to identify the perspective of a scene from another 
person‟s viewpoint increased as the difference between the two, and therefore the degree 
of mental transformation required, increased. However, this was not affected by the 
distance between the other person and the target objects. Furthermore, there is evidence 
that level 2 perspective taking is accomplished automatically. Participants viewed a scene 
in which another person was either absent or present. They were then required to identify 
the same scene from a different perspective. Such perspective transformations were 
facilitated if the viewpoint was that of the other person depicted rather than if the person 
was absent, suggesting that their viewpoint was automatically encoded (Amorim, 2003). 
Baron-Cohen (1995) proposed that these abilities are governed by an innate ability to 
detect the gaze direction of others that he calls the Eye Direction Detector (EDD). The 
module functions to detect eye-like stimuli and discern in which direction they are looking, 
and also to infer what they are seeing. The relationships that the EDD processes are 
dyadic, in that the other person‟s gaze direction is represented with respect to either the 
observer or to another object. However he, as well as Emery (2000), suggest that a full 
understanding of the social significance of another person‟s gaze direction requires the 
additional ability of knowing that you and another person are attending to the same 
stimulus („shared attention mechanism‟). 
Neural basis of gaze perception 
The prominent role that gaze direction plays in social cognition is reflected in the 
extensive network of brain areas implicated in its perception, encompassing visual and 
semantic processing of the extrastriate and temporal cortices (Haxby et al‟s core system), 
as well as sub-cortical areas, the spatial orienting mechanisms of the parietal lobe and 
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higher level cognitive functions of the MPFC (Haxby et al‟s extended system). Haxby et 
al‟s (2000) distributed model of face perception proposes that dynamic facial information is 
predominantly processed by the STS, in keeping with its more general role in the 
perception of biological motion. Indeed, fMRI studies have revealed robust activation in the 
posterior STS in response to determining the direction of another‟s gaze (Hoffman & 
Haxby, 2000; Kuzmanovic et al., 2009; Materna, Dicke, & Thier, 2008). Furthermore, 
impairments in ascertaining direction of gaze have been observed in patients with lesions 
to the right Superior Temporal Gyrus (Akiyama et al., 2006), and lesions to the right Medial 
Temporal Lobe are associated with an inability to perform level 2 perspective taking 
(Lambrey et al., 2008). More specifically, several studies have suggested that different 
gaze directions are encoded by separate cell populations in the STS, as evidenced by 
both behavioural (Calder, Jenkins, Cassel, & Clifford, 2008; Duchaine, Jenkins, Germine, 
& Calder, 2009; Kloth & Schweinberger, 2008; Seyama & Nagayama, 2006) and fMRI 
adaptation studies Calder et al (2007). Furthermore, right pSTS activity is higher when 
gaze is directed at the observer than when looking into empty space (Pelphrey, Viola, & 
McCarthy, 2004). Single cell studies in macaques have found cell populations in the 
anterior STS (a proposed homologue of the human pSTS) selectively active to specific 
directions of gaze, head and torso orientation (Perrett et al., 1985). Many species of non-
human primates engage in joint attention (Ferrari, Kohler, Fogassi, & Gallese, 2000; 
Tomasello, Call, & Hare, 1998) and exploit another‟s gaze direction in situations of food 
competition (Hare, Call, & Tomasello, 2001; Hare & Tomasello, 2004; Melis, Call, & 
Tomasello, 2006). This is in keeping with the shared selection pressures favouring the 
ability to process the social behaviour of others. 
The STS is not the only area implicated in the processing of gaze direction. Because 
of the simplicity of the pattern formed by the eyes, Senju and Johnson (2009) have 
proposed that gaze direction can initially be processed by a rapid, but crude, sub-cortical 
route sensitive to low spatial frequencies. For example, bilateral amygdala activity is found 
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in response to gaze direction, with the right amygdala more responsive to direct than 
averted gaze, and the left amygdala equally responsive to both gaze directions 
(Kawashima et al., 1999) and lesions to the amygdala prevent normal gaze processing 
(Adolphs et al., 2005). Information regarding gaze direction from both cortical and sub-
cortical areas then proceeds to other areas such as the intraparietal sulcus for the purpose 
of spatial orienting (Hoffman & Haxby, 2000; Mosconi, Mack, McCarthy, & Pelphrey, 2005; 
Pelphrey, Singerman, Allison, & McCarthy, 2003), and the mPFC for more higher level 
mental state attributions necessary for ToM (Calder et al., 2002; Kuzmanovic et al., 2009).  
Emotional facial expressions  
When faced with a stimulus that either promotes or impairs the attainment of one‟s 
goals, an emotional response is often elicited in the form of changes in one‟s physiological, 
psychological and behavioural state. These prepare the organism for a particular course of 
action. Emotions are therefore thought to be an adaptive response to external stimuli that 
aid an organism‟s survival (Lang & Davis, 2006; Nesse, 1990). Different external stimuli 
require different behavioural responses, and as such elicit different emotional states.  
These emotional states are often displayed by the individual as expressions through 
movement of the facial musculature into distinctive configurations (Burrows, 2008), though 
emotions are also expressed via other means such as body posture and vocal intonation. 
Expressions are thought not to be a simple manifestation of an individual‟s internal state, 
but serve to intentionally communicate specific information to others. Therefore, an 
observer is well placed to obtain information regarding the stimulus that elicited the 
response, the expresser‟s internal physical and mental state, what their behavioural 
response will be, and the expected response of the observer to the sight of the expression 
(Ekman, 1997). Whilst expressions can be a consequence of a person‟s emotional state, 
they can also be strategically deployed in the absence of a felt emotion for other social 
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purposes (Blair, 2003; Griffiths, 2003; Hager & Ekman, 1983). Whilst the array of possible 
expressions and the emotions they convey is vast, Ekman (1999) proposed six basic 
emotions, along with their antecedent expressions. The basic expressions are sadness, 
anger, joy, disgust, fear and surprise. This is drawn from evidence that they appear early 
in life, are evident across different cultures, share homologies in non-human primates, and 
are characterised by distinct physiological and psychological changes. Furthermore, the 
expressions that accompany them are distinct from one another, with little overlap 
between them in terms of the patterns of facial movement (Smith, Cottrell, Gosselin, & 
Schyns, 2005), although there is individual variation in the quality and quantity of their 
production (Waller, Cray, & Burrows, 2008). 
Parallels between the processing of emotional expression and gaze direction 
Expressions are as vital a component in an observer‟s ability to anticipate another‟s 
behaviour as is gaze direction, and share a common social function in the information they 
convey. Emotional expressions can be delineated on the grounds of what behaviour or 
course of action the emotion prepares the individual to make. The experience of anger or 
happiness is associated with appetitive motivations and a disposition to approach the 
stimulus, whereas the experience of fear or disgust is associated with withdrawal 
motivations and a disposition to avoid the stimulus (Gray, 1994). The experience of these 
different behavioural motivations are characterised by hemispheric asymmetries in frontal 
and anterior temporal activity, with approach emotions showing greater activation in the 
left hemisphere and avoidance emotions greater activity in the right hemisphere 
(Davidson, Saron, Senulis, Ekman, & Friesen, 1990). The dissociation between approach 
and avoidance is also supported by the motor responses that different affective stimuli 
elicit. Participants are faster to pull their arm towards them (indicative of an approach 
response) in response to a positively valenced stimulus, and quicker to push their arm 
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away from them (indicative of an avoidance response) in response to a negatively 
valenced stimulus (Chen & Bargh, 1999). The influence of stimulus valence and motor 
response also works the other way, as moving the arm towards oneself in response to a 
neutral stimulus induces a more positive evaluation of that stimulus than when moving the 
arm away from oneself (Cretenet & Dru, 2008).  
In this way, the behavioural inferences made on the part of an observer when seeing 
another‟s emotional expressions are comparable to those when seeing their gaze 
direction. As the target of another‟s attention is often indicative of what they want and the 
goal of their action, a direct gaze is synonymous with the tendency to approach, whereas 
an averted gaze is synonymous with a tendency to avoid. In support of this, viewing 
someone with a direct gaze increases neuronal activity in the left hemisphere, congruent 
with the motivation to approach, whereas viewing someone with an averted gaze 
increases neuronal activity in the right hemisphere, congruent with the motivation to avoid 
(Hietanen, Leppanen, Peltola, Linna-Aho, & Ruuhiala, 2008).  
The role of gaze direction in the perception and anticipation of goal directed actions  
The use of gaze as a cue to the attentional state of the observer can be integrated 
with the processing of the actions and with the location of external objects. This can derive 
from the relationship between their gaze and the location of environmental objects, and its 
relationship with other parts of the body, most notably head orientation. This contributes to 
the generation of expectancies as to how the other person will act in the immediate future. 
Comprehending the relationship between another‟s gaze direction and the location of 
objects enables anticipation of the potential actions that another can make on them. Action 
execution is guided by visual information, which places the action in an egocentric spatial 
frame of reference, and enables planning of the fine motor control of future movements 
(Bertenthal & Von Hofsten, 1998). Gaze is typically directed to the intended location of the 
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action in the immediate future (Land & Furneaux, 1997), either when reaching for an object 
(Land, Mennie, & Rusted, 1999), walking (Hollands, Patla, & Vickers, 2002), or steering a 
vehicle (Wilkie, Wann, & Allison, 2008). This intricate coupling of eye and head movement 
with other motor behaviours are initiated automatically and in parallel (Biguer, Jeannerod, 
& Prablanc, 1982), most likely subserved by the superior colliculus (Gorbet & Sergio, 
2009). However, as orienting of the eyes is a quicker and more efficient means with which 
to focus visual attention, saccadic shifts will often precede movement of the head, resulting 
in an articulation of the eyes and the head, such that they are oriented in incongruent 
directions (Biguer et al., 1982; Freedman, 2008; Oommen, Smith, & Stahl, 2004).  
In a perceptual sense, the expectancy that someone‟s gaze will be fixated at an 
object results in a bias to perceiving others gaze to be directed at a specific target rather 
than to open space (Lobmaier et al., 2006). Several studies have shown that observing 
someone simply look at an object influences one‟s own perception of the object. Seeing 
someone look at an object facilitates the subsequent detection, localisation or 
discrimination of the object (e.g. Driver et al., 1999) and this has been proposed to arise 
due to the observers spatial attention being automatically oriented in the direction that 
another person is looking. However, such orienting is greatest when the eyes and head of 
the other person are oriented in incongruent directions (Hietanen, 1999). As gaze 
movement often precedes movement of the head when orienting to a stimulus, this 
articulation of head and gaze direction conveys the impression that something has recently 
caught the attention of the agent and is indicative of the location of external objects (Conty, 
Tijus, Hugueville, Coelho, & George, 2006; Vuilleumier et al., 2005).  
An observer can therefore use the relative orientation of another‟s gaze direction 
with that of their head orientation, or with the location of objects as an aid to inferring their 
goal and behavioural intentions. That is, because of the necessity of fixating on the goal of 
an action, an observer can use gaze direction as a probabilistic cue to the goal of the 
action and therefore anticipate its end-point. Children as young as 4 years old will infer that 
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another person wants or desires an object they are looking at (Baron-Cohen, Campbell, 
Karmiloff-Smith, Grant, & Walker, 1995; Lee, Eskritt, Symons, & Muir, 1998). Adults will 
similarly hold objects in a positive regard if they are looked at by another, either whilst they 
are reaching for it or merely looking at it (Bayliss, Paul, Cannon, & Tipper, 2006; Hayes, 
Paul, Beuger, & Tipper, 2008). Therefore, the gaze direction of others plays an important 
role in inferring their intentions towards the objects themselves. For this reason, the 
relationship between gaze direction and object location plays a role in action perception. In 
the same way that an actor‟s gaze is directed at the goal of his/her action, an observer will 
gaze at the goal of the actor‟s action as well (Flanagan & Johansson, 2003; Rotman, 
Troje, Johansson, & Flanagan, 2006) and this ability is evident as early as 12 months of 
age (Falck-Ytter, Gredeback, & von Hofsten, 2006).  In addition, children will use gaze 
direction to determine whether or not an action was performed intentionally, or to 
understand an action whose goal is not clear (Call & Tomasello, 1998; Phillips, Baron-
Cohen, & Rutter, 1992). 
The same behaviours have also been observed in a variety of non-human primates, 
with orangutans and chimpanzees attributing intentionality to actions from gaze direction 
(Call & Tomasello, 1998). Diana monkeys expect the gaze of others to be congruent with 
the location of an object (Scerif, Gomez, & Byrne, 2004), and cotton-top tamarins expect 
an actor to grasp the object they are looking at, and show violation of expectancy 
behaviours (longer looking time) when an actor grasps the object not looked at (Santos & 
Hauser, 1999), although the same behaviour has not been observed in several other 
monkey species (Anderson, Kuroshima, Kuwahata, & Fujita, 2004). 
Evidence for a role of gaze direction in action perception is evident in imitation 
studies. Reaching for and grasping an object is facilitated after observing someone else 
perform the same action. Such priming occurs even when the observer hasn‟t seen an 
overt action, but merely watches someone look at the object. No priming is observed when 
the other person is looking away from the object (Pierno et al., 2006). Furthermore, the 
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presence of a distracter object will interfere with the person‟s execution of an action toward 
a target object, and this interference will be similarly imitated by an observer (Frischen, 
Loach, & Tipper, 2009), but only when the other person is seen to look at the distracter 
and not when fixating only at the target (Castiello, 2003). Evidence suggests that infants 
as young as 6 months of age can use the relationship between gaze direction and object 
location when comprehending the goal directed reaching of others (Luo & Baillargeon, 
2007; Luo & Johnson, 2009). Level 2 perspective taking, or an allocentric representation of 
what the other person is seeing, is therefore necessary when perceiving the actions of 
others. According to Becchio et al (2008), this enables a process of „intentional imposition‟. 
An object seen to be gazed at by another individual activates representations of its 
affective valance and the possible motor acts that can be performed on it. This leads to an 
attribution of the intentions of the person who is looking at it. This process does not occur 
for objects not looked at by another person. 
Cortical areas previously shown to be involved in biological motion perception have 
been implicated in the integration of gaze direction and the actions of others. Jellema et al 
(2000) recorded the activity of single cells in the STS of Macaques and found a small 
population to respond selectively to reaching actions only when the actor‟s gaze was 
directed at the target of the reach, and not when directed away from it. STS activity was 
similarly observed by Pierno et al (2008; 2006) in adults using fMRI when observing 
someone reach for an object or merely observe the object, but not when looking away 
from the object. Furthermore, the same task also elicited activity in the premotor cortex 
and intraparital cortex, which contain mirror neurons in monkeys and show mirror 
properties in humans. 
As noted above, studies of RM using biological stimuli have suggested that the 
perception of biological motion entails a synonymous encoding of how the action is most 
likely to continue. This results in a distortion for the remembered final position of the 
action. As gaze direction is indicative of the goal or end-point of an action, it is plausible 
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that such memory distortions would be sensitive to the gaze direction of the actor. That is, 
that anticipating the end-point of an action would be facilitated through integration of 
information regarding the goal of the action from gaze direction. This hypothesis has so far 
never been explicitly tested, but several studies report related effects. Freyd and Miller 
(1992) observed a greater displacement effect for a schematic animal moving forward in 
the direction it was looking than when moving backwards. However, Thornton and Hayes 
(2004) found the opposite effect using video clips of real world crowd scenes, with a 
greater displacement for clips played backwards than forwards. It should be noted, 
however, that for both of these studies the movement itself was not the same across 
conditions, so the differences cannot be attributed solely to the variation in gaze direction. 
Jellema et al (2009) used static images of two characters depicted as running towards 
each other and asked participants to subsequently recall the distance between the two 
figures. They were remembered as being closer together if they were both looking in the 
direction of motion than if both were looking in the opposite direction (i.e. looking over their 
shoulder), despite their proximity being the same. Nummenmaa et al (2009) presented 
participants with an actor depicted as walking towards them with a mutual gaze, which 
necessitated a change in trajectory in order to avoid a collision. If the other person‟s gaze 
is averted to the left or right, the observer can anticipate that they will alter their path of 
motion in the direction they are looking. The observer will then choose to move to the 
opposite side. Finally, Adams et al (2006) presented participants with a face whose gaze 
was directed either to the left or right. The face then moved in a direction either congruent 
or incongruent with gaze direction, and participants were required to judge in which 
direction (left/right) the face had moved. Responses were quicker when the movement 
was congruent with gaze direction than when incongruent, suggesting that gaze direction 
enabled the observer to anticipate the direction the face was most likely to move. 
Interestingly, this effect was found to interact with the emotional expression of the 
stimulus. However, the motion itself could not be described as biological in nature, as the 
44 
 
picture was of a disembodied face and motion was induced through the presentation of 
two frames depicting the stimulus as shifting laterally across the screen, which is more 
reminiscent of the type of motion used in studies of non-biological stimuli (see Chapter 2). 
Summary and aims 
Observing other people‟s behaviour is crucial in social interactions as it is revealing 
of the goals and intentions motivating their actions. This enables the observer to anticipate 
how the action will most likely continue in the immediate future. A visual description of the 
kinematics of another person‟s movement can be parsed into units of goal directed 
actions. The end-point of an action can therefore be encoded along with the perception of 
the action itself. Previous research has provided evidence for this by demonstrating that, 
after observing a biological action sequence, subsequent processing is biased for static 
postures that would have occurred after the end-point of the observed action than those 
occurring before the end-point. Furthermore, that this is underpinned by a distributed 
cortical system that shows selective activity to actions based on the goal of the action, and 
maps these onto one‟s own motor representation of those actions.  
Attributing goals to actions is facilitated by integrating information obtained from their 
gaze direction. During the execution of a goal-directed action, visual attention is aimed at 
the target of the action. An observer can therefore use the gaze direction of another when 
observing their behaviour as a predictive cue to the end-state of the action. Therefore, 
encoding the end-point of an action, and predicting its future course, entails not only a 
representation of the mechanical kinematics of the action, but also integrates a 
representation of the dynamics underpinning the action, in terms of the actor‟s goals and 
intentions. 
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The aims of this thesis: 
1. The aim of Experiment 1A is to establish if estimations of how far an action has 
proceeded are influenced by the gaze direction of the actor whilst performing the 
action. Participants should overestimate how far the action has progressed when 
the actor‟s gaze is directed at the goal of the action and underestimate how far it 
has progressed when the actor‟s gaze is directed in the opposite direction. A 
further aim was to ensure that the influence of gaze on action anticipation is due to 
inferences made by the observer with regards to the goals and intentions of the 
actor, and not to any non-social aspect of gaze direction, such as its visual 
appearance or directional meaning. The effect of gaze direction was therefore 
compared with several non-biological control stimuli (Experiments 1A and 1B).  
2. The proposed effect of gaze direction on action anticipation assumes that 
intentional information from gaze direction is integrated with the perception of the 
action itself. The ability to process body parts in relation to one another (configural 
processing) has been found to be impaired when the stimulus is inverted. The aim 
of Experiment 2 is to disrupt this ability to integrate visual information by inverting 
the stimuli. It is predicted that gaze direction will have no effect on judgments of 
how far the action has proceeded when the stimuli are inverted. 
3. The aim of Experiment 3 is to investigate how the role of gaze direction on action 
anticipation is affected by the presence of other social cues that serve a similar 
function in attributing goals to the actions of others, namely facial expressions of 
emotion. Different emotional expressions convey different information, and as such 
will influence the social meaning of gaze direction. It is therefore expected that the 
effect of gaze direction on action anticipation will be affected by the emotional 
expression of the actor. 
4. Experiment 4 aimed to investigate how the contribution of social cues to intentional 
attribution goes beyond anticipating the end-point of actions that are immediately 
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observable (motor empathy) to predicting behaviour in a subsequent interaction. 
Specifically, that gaze direction and emotional expression enable an observer to 
infer whether that person is prosocial or antisocial, and that these inferences will 
affect how quickly the observer orients their spatial attention in response to the 
gaze direction of that individual. Participants should be quicker to follow the gaze of 
someone they infer to be prosocial and slower to follow the gaze of someone they 
infer to be antisocial. 
5. A secondary aim of Experiment 4 is to investigate if the perception of gaze 
direction is uniform across the population or whether individuals differ in how such 
cues are interpreted. Those who are more sensitive to social information will be 
better able to attribute prosocial/antisocial intentions from gaze and expression and 
the effect of such attributions on gaze following will be larger in these individuals. 
Others are less sensitive to the social meaning of gaze direction and process it in a 
more mechanistic way. The effect of inferences based on gaze and expressions 
should be weaker for these individuals. However, a third identity was introduced 
whose gaze direction was spatially predictive of target location. Those who are 
more sensitive to the mechanistic properties of gaze direction should be more 
perceptive of the spatial congruency between gaze direction and target location 
and should be quicker to follow the gaze of the spatially predictive identity.  
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Chapter 2. The effect of gaze direction on anticipating the movement of biological 
stimuli 
Based on evidence that gaze direction plays a role in inferring the intentions of 
another‟s actions, and contributes to the anticipation of how they may act in the immediate 
future, the aim of the first experiment was to investigate if the anticipation of biological 
motion is modulated by the gaze direction of the actor. That is, different gaze directions 
lead observers to infer differing intentions underpinning the action, which will in turn 
modulate their anticipation of how the action will most likely proceed. This necessitates the 
integration of the perception of the movement itself with information regarding the 
dynamics underpinning the movement. Anticipatory memory displacements have been 
extensively observed for non-biological stimuli, which has been shown to be sensitive to 
cues regarding the physical causes and constraints acting upon the object‟s motion. This 
chapter will begin with a detailed review of the literature on the anticipation of movement 
for non-biological stimuli, both in terms of the methodologies used and the effects found. 
This will lead to the formulation of the central hypothesis that estimations of biological 
motion are influenced by the observed gaze direction of the agent. 
Forward displacements in memory for the motion of non-biological stimuli 
Just as for biological stimuli, the memory for a non-biological stimulus (typically a 
geometric shape) is displaced further along the observed trajectory. Participants are less 
likely to detect the difference between the stopping point and a test stimulus positioned 
after the stopping point, than one positioned before it (Freyd & Finke, 1984), implying that 
the stopping point appeared as more similar to the „after‟ than to the „before‟ test stimulus. 
This forward displacement is evident over a number of different types of motion including 
rotations in the picture plane (Freyd & Finke, 1984), linear translations (Hubbard, 1997) 
and rotations in depth (Munger & Minchew, 2002; Munger, Solberg, Horrocks, & Preston, 
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1999). It has also proved robust despite differences in the quality of the depicted motion, 
ranging from the apparent motion created by presenting several frames in which the object 
is depicted as having moved a large amount between frames (e.g. Freyd & Finke, 1984), 
to the smooth motion created when the difference in the object‟s position between frames 
is too small to be noticed by the observer (e.g. Hubbard, 1995), and even for the implied 
motion depicted in static pictures of objects in motion (e.g. Freyd, 1983). Evidence of 
forward memory displacements is not confined to motion, but is also evident for other 
types of object transformations including changes in size and dimensions (Kelly & Freyd, 
1987), and for auditory transformations, such as increases in pitch (Freyd, Kelly, & Dekay, 
1990; Neuhoff, 1998, 2001).  
The nature of the displacement has been shown to vary as a function of cues 
regarding the physical forces that underpin the movement. For example, increasing the 
speed of the object‟s motion results in a greater forward displacement (Finke, Freyd, & 
Shyi, 1986; Freyd & Finke, 1985; Freyd & Johnson, 1987). This effect seems to reflect a 
cognitive representation of momentum, whereby objects moving at a greater speed will 
cover more distance in a given time. In contrast, the magnitude of the displacement is 
decreased if the object is seen to travel along another surface, or to approach or break 
through a barrier, suggesting that the frictional forces implied by such contact are similarly 
represented and lead to an expectation that the object‟s motion will be impeded (Hubbard, 
1995, 1998). Furthermore, a representation of the gravitational forces acting upon object 
motion has also been observed to affect memory displacements (Bertamini, 1993; Freyd, 
Pantzer, & Cheng, 1988). Objects moving from left to right show a displacement 
downwards as well as a displacement in the direction of motion (Hubbard, 1995, 1997). 
Objects moving downwards show a greater memory displacement in the direction of 
motion than objects moving upwards, presumably because the former is moving in the 
same direction as the pull of gravity, whereas the latter is moving against gravity (Hubbard, 
1997, 1998; Nagai, Kazai, & Yagi, 2002). If the source of the object‟s motion is implied to 
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result from a collision with another moving object, the discrepancy between the 
remembered and veridical final positions may be less than if just the moving target is 
presented. Therefore, if the object‟s motion is self-propelled, it is subject to a greater 
displacement than if it is depicted to have no intrinsic means of movement (Hubbard, 
Blessum, & Ruppel, 2001; Hubbard & Favretto, 2003; Hubbard & Ruppel, 2002).  
Methodological issues relating to the displacement effect 
The magnitude of the displacement effect has been found to be susceptible to two 
major methodological factors. The first is that of the time delay between offset of the 
moving stimulus and onset of the test stimulus on which the similarity judgment must be 
made, also known as the retention interval (RI). Various RI lengths have been used 
throughout the literature, from 10 ms (Freyd & Johnson, 1987) through to 2000 ms (Finke, 
Freyd, & Shyl, 1985), with the most frequent being between 250 ms and 1000 ms. The 
extent of the memory displacement increases as a function of RI up to around 250 – 300 
ms. RI lengths greater than this elicit either no further increases, or a slight decrease in the 
magnitude of the displacement effect. This relationship between RI length and memory 
displacement is quite robust when the extent of the memory displacement is derived by 
analyzing the proportion of errors made when judging the similarity between the stopping-
point and the test stimulus positions. However, several studies have estimated the degree 
of memory shift by performing a quadratic regression on the data, and plotting this against 
RI. As with the previous method, the memory shift increases with RI‟s up to 250 – 300 ms. 
However, a sharp decrease is observed at RIs longer than this (Bertamini, 1993; Freyd & 
Johnson, 1987). 
There have been few explicit tests of whether the memory distortion of biological 
motion is similarly subject to the length of RI. In the RM studies on biological motion 
described above, RI was varied between 100 ms and 1500 ms, and in the priming study of 
50 
 
Verfaillie and Daems (2002) the test postures were presented five minutes after 
observation of the priming action sequences. Graf et al (2007) found that the extent of 
displacement for a point light walker was greatest when the length of the RI corresponded 
to the temporal difference between the stopping point of the action and the particular test 
posture. That is, with an RI of 250 ms, displacement was greatest for test stimuli consisting 
of a posture that would have occurred 250 ms after the stopping point. However, no study 
has investigated if the presence of an RI is necessary to elicit a memory displacement for 
the motion of biological stimuli. Indirect evidence is provided by a priming study by Kourtzi 
and Shiffrar (1999). They presented participants with the static start and end-points of an 
action sequence. The participants then saw a posture that would have occurred either 
between the start and end-points or after the end-point. These two test stimulus types are 
equivalent to the before and after postures used in studies of motion anticipation. Given 
the literature described above, one would expect priming for the „after‟ but not the „before‟ 
posture. However the opposite was found, with processing facilitated for „before‟ postures 
and not for „after‟ postures. Crucially this study did not have an RI between the end-point 
and the test stimulus, suggesting that a temporal delay is necessary for the displacement 
of biological motion, as it is in the case of non-biological motion. 
The second factor influencing the extent of displacement is that of the response 
mode. One method is to have the participant indicate by pressing one of two buttons 
whether the position of the test stimulus is the same or different as that of the stopping 
point (e.g. Freyd & Finke, 1984). A second method is to have the participant manually 
indicate the point at which the stimulus disappeared, for example by pointing to a position 
on the computer screen using the mouse cursor (e.g. Hubbard, 1995). The distinction 
between the two is that the former entails a response based on visual information, 
whereas the latter requires that this information be encoded into spatial information for the 
purpose of making a corresponding motor response. A greater displacement effect has 
been found when a motor response is required rather than a visual response (Ashida, 
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2004), with the latter exploiting dorsal visual pathways and the former exploiting ventral 
visual pathways (Brouwer, Franz, & Thornton, 2004). 
Forward memory displacements reflect the anticipation of object motion 
The effects of RI and response mode highlight the possible functional role that 
memory displacement plays in anticipating object motion. The time course of the 
displacement effect, as reflected in its relationship with RI length, suggests that the 
memory displacement occurs in real time (Freyd & Johnson, 1987). This combined with 
the enhanced effect when a motor response is required has lead several authors to 
suggests that forward memory displacements serve to compensate for the sensory lag 
between perception and action by anticipating where the object will be in the immediate 
future when an action is performed on it (Freyd, 1992; Hubbard, 2005, 2006; Kerzel, 
2005). This sensory lag entails two components. Firstly, visual information takes around 
100 ms to be processed, meaning that by the time a percept is made of an object, its 
position has already changed, and any action will be directed to the incorrect point in 
space. Secondly, the objects position will have changed during the time the action takes to 
reach the object. Therefore, by extrapolating along the observed path of motion, the object 
is represented in the position it will occupy by the time an action reaches it, not the position 
when the action is initiated.  
Several studies have investigated if representational momentum indeed reflects the 
capacity to anticipate an objects motion in the immediate future by linking RM effects with 
that of motion extrapolation effects. As with RM, participants are presented with a stimulus 
in motion. The difference is that the test pattern was either the same, before or after the 
next most likely position in the sequence rather than the final position itself. Participants 
were required to judge if the test pattern was the same as the position one would expect 
given the previously observed motion. There is a robust finding of a backwards 
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displacement, in that participant‟s judgments are biased to choosing a test pattern that is 
slightly before the actual next position as being correct. Munger and Minchew (2002) found 
that this backwards displacement is smaller when the axis of rotation is aligned with the 
observer‟s line of sight (rather than, for example, around a component of the object itself) 
and that such rotation axes also elicit a larger forward displacement in RM tasks. Also, as 
the speed of rotation increases, then the extent of the forward and backward 
displacements in the RM and extrapolation tasks respectively also increases, suggesting 
that estimations of both the actual final position and the next most likely position are more 
accurate at slower velocities. Such motion extrapolation necessitates the ability to mentally 
rotate an object and again, this is quicker for axes of rotation and speeds that facilitate 
motion extrapolation and also elicit the largest RM effects (Munger, Solberg, & Horrocks, 
1999). Finke and Shyi (1988) used linear translations of dot patterns and found that as the 
implied velocity of the motion increased so too did both the forward displacement in the 
RM task and the backward displacement in the extrapolation task. Furthermore, by 
estimating the rate at which the motion was extrapolated (i.e. deg/sec), they found that this 
correlated with the extent of the RM effect. That is, for a given velocity, the extent of the 
RM effect is proportional to the speed with which the motion is extrapolated along its 
implied trajectory. These studies highlight the association between RM effects and motion 
extrapolation effects, and suggest that motion prediction and RM are governed by the 
same cognitive processes. Further support for the role of motion prediction in the RM 
effect comes from studies showing that so long as the motion can be reliably predicted to 
continue along its observed trajectory, RM can be elicited. No memory displacement is 
observed when the object‟s motion is unpredictable or is not expected to continue after the 
stopping point is reached (Getzmann & Lewald, 2009; Makin, Stewart, & Poliakoff, 2009; 
Verfaillie & Dydewalle, 1991). 
Several authors have proposed that such a process entails higher level cognitive 
mechanisms. For Freyd (1992) this necessitates the formation of a cognitive 
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representation of the temporal as well as the spatial aspects of an object‟s motion. 
Hubbard (2005, 2006) proposed that this takes the form of a second order isomorphism by 
which the kinematics and dynamics of the object‟s motion are represented as a functional 
analogue. This produces a default displacement based, not upon objective physical 
principles, but on the observer‟s subjective interpretation of those principles. However, he 
extends this to accommodate a second level of processing by which the context of the 
object‟s motion and the observer‟s own expectancies are also incorporated into the 
anticipation. However, the notion that anticipatory memory displacements are the result of 
higher level cognitive processes has been disputed. For example, Kerzel (2005, 2006) 
argues that anticipatory memory displacements are due to a purely perceptual process 
caused by the visual tracking of the objects motion. When monitoring an object in motion, 
the path of eye movements follows the path of the object‟s motion (smooth pursuit). When 
the object abruptly disappears, as in studies of displacement, there is a lag between offset 
of the stimulus and cessation of the eye movements. Therefore, the eyes overshoot the 
true stopping point further along the observed trajectory and it is the point in space to 
which they are looking that participants recall the object to have vanished. Crucially, the 
size of this lag is 250 ms, the same amount of time found to elicit the maximal amount of 
displacement. Such occulomotor overshoot is even more pronounced for objects with 
apparent motion, as the saccadic jump to the next expected location is greater than for 
smooth motion. In support of this, Kerzel (2000) found that no displacement is evident 
when participants are instructed to fixate at the same spot during presentation of the 
moving stimulus in order to remove the effects of visual tracking. 
 Furthermore, other effects found for anticipatory memory displacements can similarly 
be accounted for by low level perceptual biases. The effect of implied gravity can be 
explained by a bias to remembering objects as being nearer the fovea than they were 
(Kerzel, 2002). In addition, the presence of other objects attracts attention away from the 
moving target and disrupts the visual tracking, explaining the decreased displacement 
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when observed to collide with or move along another object. It must be noted though, that 
Kerzel is not completely disputing that these results reflect anticipatory functions, just the 
mechanisms by which they are achieved. However, this explanation does not account for 
the reduction in displacement observed for objects whose paths of motion and velocities 
are unpredictable, as the occulomotor overshoot would be equivalent despite differences 
in motion type. In addition, displacement has been reported for objects rotating in depth, 
whose spatial position remains in the fovea at all times and for which no visual tracking is 
necessary. Furthermore, as Hubbard (2006) pointed out, this explanation does not account 
for the memory displacements observed for static objects with implied motion, again as no 
visual tracking is necessary, nor does it explain the effect of top-down expectations on the 
displacement effect. Additionally, Maus and Nijhawan (2006) found that displacement 
occurred for objects which gradually faded in luminance, demonstrating that the effect 
persists in the absence of abrupt stimulus offsets that would cause occulomotor overshoot. 
Summary and hypothesis  
When observing an object in motion, the observer is able to extrapolate beyond the 
object‟s current position further along the implied trajectory, and anticipate its motion in the 
immediate future. The manipulations outlined above suggest the observer uses cues to 
infer the dynamics underpinning the motion and a representation of these are integrated 
with the representation of the kinematics of the motion. In the case of non-biological 
stimuli, these inferences are informed by visual cues conveying information regarding the 
physical dynamics underlying the motion. However, the motion of biological stimuli 
(agents) is additionally caused by psychological aspects such as their goals, motivations 
and intentions. This information is similarly conveyed visually through social cues such as 
gaze direction. As RM for non-biological stimuli is modulated by inferences as to the 
physical dynamics underpinning the motion, it is plausible that RM for biological motion is 
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sensitive to cues regarding the intentional dynamics motivating the action. The aim of the 
first experiment is therefore to investigate if the displacement of motion for biological 
stimuli is influenced by the gaze direction of the agent as they are moving.  
Specifically, it is hypothesised that judgments of how far an action has proceeded 
will be overestimated when gaze is directed at the goal of an action and underestimated 
when gaze is directed in the opposite direction. For this a head was chosen that rotated in 
depth towards the observer. This was appropriate for several reasons. Firstly, it provides a 
clear platform from which to present variation in social cues conveyed by the face. 
Secondly, these manipulations can be made without altering the nature of the motion. 
Thirdly, as the stimulus maintains the same screen position throughout, the observer does 
not have to visually track the objects motion to maintain it in the fovea, either with 
saccades or smooth pursuit. Therefore any displacement observed cannot be attributed to 
the effects of occulomotor overshoot identified by Kerzel as a possible explanation of 
displacement for objects changing screen position. 
However, the effect may also be the result of several low level factors, including the 
visual appearance of the pupil shifting within the sclera, which does not entail any 
processing of the social significance of the gaze cue. For this reason, a non-biological 
control stimulus was used to investigate this alternative explanation. It possessed features 
that imitated the visual appearance of the eyes of the biological stimulus in the different 
gaze direction conditions, yet did not invoke the appearance of actually being eyes. These 
variations did not convey information regarding either the physical forces underpinning the 
motion nor the goal of the motion (as the object itself was incapable of intentionality). It is 
therefore expected that the pattern of black and white contained in these visual features 
will not affect estimations of how far the non-biological object has rotated. 
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Experiment 1a 
Method 
Participants 
Participants (N = 28, 27 females) had a mean age mean age of 21.5 years (SD = 
9.1). All participants were students at the University of Hull, UK, and participated in 
exchange for course credit. All had normal or corrected to normal vision, and gave written 
informed consent prior to taking part. 
Apparatus 
All stimuli were presented on a 21 inch monitor (100 Hz refresh rate) using E-Prime 
software (Psychology Software Tools, Inc) from which participants sat approximately 50 
cm away.  
Stimuli 
Stimuli were created using Poser 6 animation software (Curious Labs, Inc. & e-
frontier, Inc). The general methodology used derived from that typically employed by 
previous studies of memory displacement. Participants first observed a moving stimulus 
consisting of an object in motion on a computer screen, the final position of which must be 
remembered.  
Biological stimulus 
The biological stimulus consisted of a head that rotated 60o along the vertical axis 
from a profile view (90o from full front view) to a semi-profile view (30o from full front view). 
Motion was induced by presenting 16 static frames at 4o interpolations for 40 ms each 
(total duration 640 ms, 93.75o per second). This was fast enough to induce an impression 
of smooth continuous motion. The gaze direction of the rotating head varied horizontally 
along three levels. In 1/3 of the trials the gaze was directed 30o in advance of the head 
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direction (gaze-ahead condition), in 1/3 of the trials the gaze direction was the same as the 
head direction (gaze-congruent condition), and in 1/3 of the trials the gaze direction was 
30o lagging behind the head direction (gaze-lagging condition). Two different identities 
were used, one male and one female. The subtended width between the outer edges of 
the two test stimuli was between 16.2o and 18.4o, with the inner edge of each between 0.8o 
and 1.7o from the centre, and outer edge between 8.4o and 9.6o from the centre (Figure 
2.1A). 
Non-biological stimulus 
The non-biological stimulus consisted of a cylinder of comparable size, colour and 
texture to the biological stimulus (Figure 2.1B). The subtended angle of the stimulus height 
was 6.3o, and 4.3o to 3.3o for stimulus width. It was placed on a disc of the same diameter 
as the cylinder (but with different texture), which provided a base upon which the object 
rotated, analogous to that provided by the torso in the biological stimulus. Three white fins 
protruding from the cylinder provided additional cues to the degree of rotation in the same 
way as the chin and nose of the biological stimulus did. Placed in-between the three fins 
were two white cubes half submerged into the cylinder. Half of the surface area of the 
cubes was coloured black; this area was either on the left, right or centre of the cube. This 
pattern of colouration mimicked the pupil/sclera configuration in the three gaze conditions. 
The nature of rotation was identical to that of the biological stimulus. This controlled for 
any low-level contribution to a displacement effect by the horizontal shift of the pupil 
location. 
 
58 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1. The three gaze conditions of the agentive (A) and non-agentive (B) stimuli. The 
starting point was a profile view (90o), facing either to the right (Ai) or left (Bi). The end-
points were at 30o from full frontal view in the gaze-ahead (ii), gaze-lagging behind (iii) and 
gaze-congruent (iv) conditions. 
 
Test stimulus 
To measure the remembered position of rotation, participants compared a pair of test 
stimuli with the end-point of the video-clip (which was always at 30o, left or right). Several 
pilot studies were conducted which aimed to evaluate the efficacy of different test stimuli 
and methods (see Appendix). The strongest result was obtained with a test stimulus 
consisting of two still images of the rotating stimulus and was adopted in the first 
experiment. They were shown simultaneously, side by side, each oriented at a different 
angle. One was oriented before the end-point (i.e. at an orientation encompassed within 
the rotation trajectory of the moving stimulus), the other after that point (i.e. extrapolated 
beyond the end-point of the moving stimulus further along the trajectory). One of the 
choices always deviated by 10o either before („-„) or after („+‟) the stopping angle of the 
rotating stimulus, while the other choice deviated by 10o, 20o or 40o in the opposite 
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direction. This created five test stimulus levels (-40o/+10o, -20o/+10o, -10o/+10o, -10o/+20o, -
10o/+40o; left/right positions on the screen were counterbalanced).  
In symmetrical experimental trials, both test choices deviated 10o from the stopping 
angle (-10o/+10o, Figure 2.2A). For these trials there was no correct answer. If no memory 
displacement occurs, participants would be no more likely to choose the „before‟ or „after‟ 
option, yielding a 50/50 split on average. Occurrence of a memory displacement would 
result in a bias for one choice over the other: a bias toward choosing the „after‟ choice 
would be indicative of overestimation and a bias toward choosing the „before‟ choice of 
underestimation. 
In the asymmetrical experimental trials, the remaining test choice was oriented 20o in 
the opposite direction. In these trials either the „before‟ choice (-10o/+20o) or the „after‟ 
choice (-20o/+10o) was correct (Figure 2.2B and C). The aim was to see if gaze direction 
could induce errors in the presence of a correct answer. Although a weaker effect of gaze 
direction is expected in asymmetrical compared to symmetrical experimental trials, an 
effect of gaze direction would strengthen the hypothesis should it be present.  
In the final two levels, the asymmetry was increased even further by pairing the 10o 
choice with a 40o choice (Figure 2.2D and E). The correct answers, either „before‟ (-
10o/+40o) or „after‟ (-40o/+10o), could easily be given and ceiling performance was 
expected. Incorrect answers here could be attributed to insufficient attention being paid to 
the task, so these were designated as catch trials and performance on these trials was 
used as a selection criterion. 
 The height of the test stimuli were the same as for the rotating stimuli. The two test 
stimuli were positioned in the centre of the screen, at equal distances at either side of 
fixation. The width and distance from the centre varied according to the test stimulus used. 
The subtended width between the outer edges of the two test stimuli was between 16.2o 
and 18.4o, with the inner edge of each between 0.8o and 1.7o from the centre, and outer 
edge between 8.4o and 9.6o from the centre. In the test stimuli, the gaze direction (or its 
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non-biological equivalent) was always congruent with the angle of the head (or the control 
object). Left/right screen positions of the „before‟ and „after‟ choices were counterbalanced 
across trials. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.2. Examples of test stimuli for the biological (top) and non-biological stimuli 
(bottom). A: Symmetrical experimental trials where neither choice is more similar to the 
end-point of the moving stimulus. B-C: Asymmetrical experimental trials where the „after‟ 
(B) and „before‟ (C) response was correct. D-E: Catch trials in which the „after‟ (D) and 
„before‟ (E) response was correct.  
 
Procedure 
Participants were instructed they would see a face or object rotate along the vertical 
axis towards them, and that this would be followed by two still faces or objects. Their task 
was to indicate by pressing one of two keys on the keyboard which of the two 
faces/objects was at an angle most similar to the final angle of the moving face/object. The 
„J‟ and „L‟ keys were used, labelled as „left‟ and „right‟ respectively. No mention of gaze 
A: -10o/+10o 
Symmetrical 
experimental 
Trials 
B: -20o/+10o          -C: 10o/+20o 
Asymmetrical experimental 
trials 
D: -40o/+10o          E: -10o/+40o 
Catch Trials 
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direction was made. It was stressed that accuracy was more important than speed of 
response, but that answers were to be made within a few seconds.   
 Participants completed 12 practice trials representative of the range of 
manipulations. This was followed by the experimental session which contained 2 blocks of 
108 trials (216 trials in total). In one block, a retention interval of 1000 ms was placed in 
between the rotating stimulus and the test stimulus. In the other block, the retention 
interval was absent. The presentation order of the two blocks was counterbalanced across 
participants.  
 The choice of retention interval length was based on studies using a similar method 
of data analysis. For example, Finke and Freyd (1985) varied the retention interval 
between 500 ms and 2000 ms and found the magnitude of errors to peak within 500 ms 
and only to slowly decay thereafter. Freyd and Finke (1984) used retention intervals of 250 
ms, 500 ms and 750 ms and observed displacement at each. In contrast, a study by Freyd 
and Johnson (1987) found the displacement effect to peak at 250-300 ms and to rapidly 
decline thereafter. However, this latter study used a different methodology in which the 
data was subjected to a quadratic regression. It was therefore expected that in this study a 
displacement effect would not rapidly diminish after 250-300 ms and would still be evident 
at a 1000 ms retention interval. 
 Each block contained three different types of trials: symmetrical experimental trials 
(n=36, 12 male, 12 female, 12 non-biological), asymmetrical experimental trials (n=36, 12 
male, 12 female, 12 non-biological; for half of each group the correct answer was „before‟ 
the end-point, i.e. -10o/+20o, for the other half „after‟ the end-point, i.e. -20o/+10o), and 
catch trials (n=36, 12 male, 12 female, 12 non-biological; for half of each group the correct 
answer was „before‟ the end-point, i.e. -10o/+40o, for the other half „after‟ the end-point, i.e. 
-40o/+10o). The rotation started either from the left profile (anti-clockwise) or from the right 
profile (clockwise), with an equal number of trials for each direction. 
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    Each trial began with a 1000 ms fixation cross at the centre of the screen. This was 
followed by a rotating face/object (duration 640 ms). In trials with a retention interval, the 
rotating stimulus was followed by a blank screen of identical colour to the background of 
the rotating stimulus for 1000 ms. Next, the test stimuli were displayed, and remained on 
screen until a response was made. In trials without a retention interval, the test stimulus 
was presented immediately after the rotating stimulus. The inter-trial-interval was 1000 ms. 
Figure 2.3 shows an example of a trial. 
After completion of the experiment, the participants completed a feedback form. The 
purpose of this was to assess whether participants had been aware of the gaze-
manipulation, to see how they experienced the control object, and to gauge what methods, 
if any, they used to complete the task. For example, they were asked to describe what 
they thought the rotating non-agentive stimulus was and why it was moving.  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.3. Trial procedure for experiment 1a. The trial started with a fixation cross, 
followed after 1000 ms by the rotating stimulus. In half the trials, this was followed by a 
retention interval of 1000ms duration, followed by the test stimulus. In the remaining trials, 
Retention 
interval 
(1000 ms) 
Fixation 
(1000 ms) Start point 
End point 
Test stimulus Rotating 
stimulus  
(640 ms) 
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no retention interval was present, and the test stimulus followed immediately after the 
rotating stimulus. 
Results 
Data reduction 
The overall error rate in the catch trials was 13.9% (SD = 9.1%). The mean reaction 
time was 1378 ms (SD = 387). Those participants whose mean error rate exceeded 20% 
were excluded (n = 6, mean 27.2%, SD = 6.6%). The mean error rate of the remaining 22 
participants was 10.0% (SD = 5.5%). Trials with a response time less than 250 ms and in 
excess of 2SD of each participant mean RT were excluded. This lead to 2.4% of trials 
being excluded (mean = 2837 ms, SD = 896 ms), reducing the mean RT to 1308 ms (SD = 
366 ms).    
The effect of gaze on biological and non-biological motion 
Trials in which the „before‟ stimulus was judged as more similar to the stopping point 
were coded as „0‟, and those in which the „after‟ stimulus was chosen were coded as „1‟. 
The resulting scores thus reflected the mean percentage of trials in which the „after‟ test 
choice was judged as more similar to the stopping angle than the „before‟ test choice. 
These values were entered into a 2 X 2 X 3 X 3 repeated measures ANOVA with Stimulus 
type (biological vs. non-biological), Retention interval (absent vs. present), Gaze direction 
(ahead vs. congruent vs. lagging behind) and Test stimulus (-20o/+10o vs. -10o/+10o vs. -
10o/+20o) entered as the main factors. Since the -40o/+10o and -10o/+40o conditions were 
used as a means to exclude participants, these were not included as levels in the test 
stimulus condition.   
As expected, there was a significant main effect of Test stimulus (F(2, 42) = 157, p < 
.001, ηp
2 = .88) with the percentage of „after‟ responses decreasing as the similarity of the 
„after‟ choice to the moving stimulus‟ end-point decreased. There was no main effect of 
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Retention interval (F(1, 21) = .15, p = .704, ηp
2 = .007). There was a main effect of 
Stimulus type, with the non-biological stimulus eliciting significantly more „after‟ responses 
than the biological stimulus (F(1, 21) = 19.9, p <.001, ηp
2 =.49), and a main effect of Gaze 
direction (F(2, 42) = 13.3, p < .001, ηp
2 = .39). There was a significant interaction between 
Gaze direction and Stimulus type (F(2, 42) = 3.84, p = .029, ηp
2 = .16), and a significant 
interaction between Stimulus type and Test stimulus (F(2, 42) = 9.66, p < .001, ηp
2 = .315). 
None of the other interactions were significant. 
The crucial interaction between Gaze direction and Stimulus type was investigated 
further by conducting one way repeated measures ANOVAs with Gaze direction as the 
main effect for each stimulus type (biological and non-biological) for each test stimulus 
level (Table 2.1).  
 
 Biological Stimulus Non-biological Stimulus 
 Ahead Congruent Lagging Ahead Congruent Lagging 
-40
o
/+10
o
 96.4 (6.9) 95.4 (8.0) 92.9 (9.4) 97.2 (7.6) 96.0 (8.1) 97.7 (6.3) 
-20
o
/+10
o
 79.4 (14.7) 75.3 (16.9) 66.2 (22.0) 82.2 (17.5) 80.2 (18.2) 76.7 (21.8) 
-10
o
/+10
o
 59.0 (15.3) 57.4 (22.2) 40.8 (19.2) 70.5 (22.7) 64.6 (19.4) 58.4 (25.6) 
-10
o
/+20
o
 39.8 (22.5) 35.6 (25.4) 23.0 (16.8) 55.3 (26.9) 48.4 (25.1) 49.5 (27.5) 
-10
o
/+40
o
 11.4 (14.5) 9.9 (11.7) 8.7 (10.3) 28.6 (24.3) 25.3 (23.6) 14.0 (19.8) 
 
Table 2.1. Mean percentage of „after‟ responses for each gaze direction across each level 
of test stimulus for the biological and non-biological stimuli (RI collapsed). The SD of the 
mean percentages is shown between brackets. 
 
The biological stimulus 
For the biological stimulus, there was a significant main effect of gaze direction in 
each of the three test stimulus levels (Figure 2.4). In the -20o/+10o asymmetrical 
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experimental trials (F(2, 42) = 5.76, p = .006, ηp
2 = .22), the gaze-ahead condition elicited 
significantly more „after‟ choices  than the gaze-lagging condition (t(21) = 3.71, p = .001, d 
= .72). However, responses in the gaze-congruent condition did not differ significantly from 
responses in either the gaze-ahead (t(21) = 1.86, p = .08, d = .26) or gaze-lagging 
conditions (t(21) = 1.42, p = .17, d = .47).   
In the symmetrical experimental (-10o/+10o) trials, (F(2, 42) = 15.11, p < .001, ηp
2 = 
.42), the gaze-lagging condition elicited significantly less „after‟ choices  than both the 
gaze-ahead (t(21) = 5.44, p < .001, d = 1.1) and gaze-congruent conditions (t(21) = 3.92, p 
=.001, d = .81), the responses of which did not differ from each other (t(21) = .93, p = .36, 
d = .08).  Because of this difference, the one sample t-tests were conducted for each gaze 
direction condition (p = .017), which showed only responses in the gaze-lagging condition 
to differ significantly from 50% (t(21) = 2.9, p = .008, d = .48), whereas responses in the 
gaze-ahead (t(21) = 2.27, p = .03, d = .59) and gaze-congruent (t(21) = .95, p = .36, d = 
.34) levels did not.  
In the -10o/+20o asymmetrical experimental trials (F(2, 42) = 8.77, p = .001, ηp
2 = .3), 
the mean percentage of „after‟ choices  was significantly greater in the gaze-ahead 
condition than in the gaze-congruent (t(21) = 2.63, p = .016, d = .18) and gaze-lagging 
conditions (t(21) = 4.04, p = .001, d = .86), between which responses did not differ 
significantly from each other (t(21) = 1.88, p = .08, d = .6).  
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Figure 2.4. Mean percentage of „after‟ responses for each gaze direction across the levels 
of the test stimulus for the biological stimulus (RI collapsed). 
 
The non-biological stimulus 
For the non-biological stimulus, there was no main effect of gaze direction in any of 
the test stimulus levels (Figure 2.5). Because of this, the gaze direction levels were 
collapsed in the experimental trials for the one sample t-test. This showed that the mean 
percentage of „after‟ responses was significantly greater than the test value of 50% both 
with (t(21) = 2.66, p = .015, d = .57) and without an RI (t(21) = 3.73, p = .001, d = .8). 
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Figure 2.5. Mean percentage of „after‟ responses for each gaze direction across the levels 
of the test stimulus for the non-biological stimulus (RI collapsed). 
 
For the interaction between Stimulus Type and Test stimulus, one-way ANOVAs with 
Stimulus type as a repeated measures factor show the non-biological stimulus to elicit 
more „after‟ responses in the -10o/+10o (F(1, 21) = 10.31, p = .004, ηp
2 = .33) and -10o/+20o 
(F(1, 21) = 41.07, p < .001, ηp
2 = .66), but not in the -20o/+10o (F(2, 21) = 3.06, p = .095, 
ηp
2 = .13) trials. The different effects of gaze direction between the Stimulus types can 
account for this interaction. The percentage of „after‟ responses for the biological stimulus 
was reduced in the gaze-lagging condition, whereas the non-biological stimulus elicited 
overestimation irrespective of „gaze‟ direction. A higher overall percentage of „after‟ 
responses would therefore be expected for the non-biological stimulus than the biological 
stimulus, especially where the effect of gaze for the latter was strongest.  
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Discussion 
The biological and non-biological nature of the stimuli produced different results. 
There was a significant overall effect of gaze direction for the biological stimulus. That is, 
despite the stopping angle of the head being equivocal (30° from frontal view) in all 
conditions, estimations of how far it had rotated were influenced by the direction of its 
gaze. Specifically, head rotations were underestimated when gaze was looking in the 
opposite direction of motion, as compared to looking straight ahead or in advance of head 
rotation. The equivalent of the gaze manipulation in the non-biological condition had no 
such effect. In the non-biological condition, estimations of the degree of rotation were the 
same irrespective of the visual appearance of the black and white cubes designed to 
mimic the relative positions of the pupil and sclera in the biological condition. This is all the 
more remarkable as the black squares in the non-biological condition were larger and 
considerably more pronounced than the pupils in the biological condition. It supports the 
contention that the biases in estimating head rotation elicited by gaze direction can be 
attributed to social inferences made by the observer regarding the goals and intentions of 
the agent, and are not due to the low-level visual appearance of the pupil shifting within 
the sclera. 
However, whilst the black and white cubes of the non-biological stimulus may have 
imitated the sclera/pupil positions of the eye, they failed to replicate other important 
aspects of gaze processing necessary for the inference of social significance. Firstly, the 
face presents a unique pattern of internal features, with the eyes occupying an important 
place within it (Barton et al., 2003). The vertical orientation of the white cubes in the 
current study failed to replicate this distinctive configuration.  
Secondly, the social significance of gaze direction depends on its spatial meaning, 
which is used by the observer to unambiguously determine where the other person is 
looking. This directional information is processed reflexively, as indicated by studies in 
which the execution of a lateralised manual response, or the detection of a target, was 
69 
 
facilitated if preceded by a spatially congruent, but not by a spatially incongruent, gaze 
direction (Driver et al., 1999; Ricciardelli, Bonfiglioli, Iani, Rubichi, & Nicoletti, 2007). Again, 
the non-biological stimulus did not possess this quality and therefore the observer could 
not determine the „direction‟ of the manipulations in the same way as for the biological 
stimulus. For these reasons, a second experiment was conducted with two new non-
biological stimuli devised to address these issues. 
Experiment 1b 
Method 
Participants 
Thirty-three participants (27 females), with a mean age of 20.3 years (SD = 4.4 
years), took part. All other information is the same as for experiment 1a. 
Apparatus 
All stimuli were created and presented using the same software and hardware as in 
experiment 1a. 
Stimuli 
Horizontal ‘eyes’ stimulus 
The black and white cubes of the non-biological stimulus were placed in a horizontal 
orientation to reflect the position of the eyes in a face. However, even the most 
rudimentary resemblance to a facial configuration is sufficient to evoke the perception of a 
face. In order to implement the design without creating the impression of a face, four 
additional white squares were introduced to disrupt the face-like configuration (Figure 
2.6A).  
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Arrow ‘eyes’ stimulus 
The black and white cubes of experiment 1a were replaced by two arrows. Arrows 
are a symbolic cue of spatial direction (Ricciardelli et al., 2007), and orient an observer‟s 
attention in a similar manner as gaze direction (Frischen, Bayliss, & Tipper, 2007). The 
surface was given a brick texture in order to reinforce the impression of a non-biological 
object (Figure 2.6B).  
For both stimuli, these variable features were superimposed onto the surface of the 
stimulus rather than protruding from it, and the number of fins was reduced from three to 
two. These changes were implemented to better resemble the eyes, nose and chin of the 
biological stimulus in experiment 1a so as to provide a more accurate control.  
Procedure 
There were 192 trials in total, with 96 consisting of symmetrical experimental trials (2 
Stimulus Type X 2 Retention Interval X 3 Gaze Direction X 8 repetitions). The direction of 
motion (left/right) and screen positions of the test stimulus choices were counterbalanced 
across trials. The remaining trials were distributed equally amongst the other levels of Test 
stimulus (24 trials each). All other aspects of the stimuli, experimental design, procedure 
and method of analysis were identical to experiment 1a. 
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Figure 2.6. The two non-biological stimuli used in experiment 1b. (A) The white cubes are 
oriented horizontally. (B) The white cubes are replaced by arrows. Examples show the 
end-points in each „gaze‟ direction condition (i) „gaze‟ ahead, (ii) „gaze‟ lagging and (iii) 
„gaze‟ congruent. For the arrows stimulus, an additional congruent condition was used with 
the arrows pointing down. 
 
Results 
The mean error rate was 13.6% (SD = 9.6%) and the mean RT was 1643 ms (SD = 
548 ms). Participant and trial exclusion criteria were the same as in experiment 1a. 
Participants with a mean error rate of >20% were excluded (n = 7, mean = 29.4%, SD = 
3.7%) resulting in a mean error rate of 9.3% (SD = 5.1%). Of the remaining 26 participants, 
2.6% of trials were excluded (mean = 4712 ms, SD = 2163 ms) resulting in a mean RT of 
1576 ms (SD = 491 ms). 
A 2 X 2 X 3 X 3 repeated measures ANOVA was conducted with Stimulus type 
(horizontal eyes vs. arrows), Retention interval (absent vs. present), Gaze direction (ahead 
A: Horizontal „eyes‟ 
 
B: Arrows 
i ii iii 
i ii iii 
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vs. congruent vs. lagging behind) and Test stimulus (-20o/+10o vs. -10o/+10o vs. -10o/+20o) 
entered as the main effects. As in Experiment 1a, the -40o/+10o and -10o/+40o (catch trials) 
were not included as levels in the test stimulus condition.   
Apart from the expected significant main effect of test stimulus (F(2, 50) = 77.9, p < 
.001, ηp
2 = .76), there were no other significant main effects or any significant interactions. 
Crucially, there was no effect of Gaze direction (F(2, 50) = .813, p = .449, ηp
2 = .032) nor of 
Stimulus type (F(1, 25) = 3.44, p = .075, ηp
2 = .121), and there was no interaction between 
the two (F(2, 50) =  .937, p = .399, ηp
2 = .036) (see Table 2.2 and Figure 2.7).  
With gaze direction and stimulus type collapsed, there was a significant response 
bias in favour of choosing the „after‟ responses both with (t(25) = 3.34, p = .003, d = .66) 
and without an RI (t(25) = 2.69, p = .013, d = .53). 
 
 Horizontal ‘eyes’ Arrows 
 Ahead Congruent Lagging Ahead Congruent Lagging 
-40
o
/+10
o
 97.1 (8.1) 98.1 (6.8) 97.1 (8.1) 97.8 (8.0) 97.1 (8.1) 95.8 (10.1) 
-20
o
/+10
o
 77.2 (20.6) 83.7 (18.2) 76.9 (25.5) 76.3 (23.5) 76.6 (22.9) 76.0 (25.1) 
-10
o
/+10
o
 65.1 (27.0) 68.5 (23.8) 67.2 (25.1) 62.1 (23.2) 59.7 (26.5) 55.8 (25.2) 
-10
o
/+20
o
 42.6 (34.5) 37.8 (29.6) 42.0 (35.2) 32.4 (28.2) 40.1 (28.8) 30.4 (28.9) 
-10
o
/+40
o
 9.9 (16.3) 17.0 (20.9) 19.2 (23.1) 3.8 (9.2) 19.2 (26.7) 11.5 (18.3) 
 
Table 2.2. Mean percentage of „after‟ responses for each „gaze‟ direction across each level 
of test stimulus for the two non-biological stimuli (RI collapsed). SD of the mean 
percentages is shown between brackets. 
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Figure 2.7. Mean percentage of „after‟ responses for each „gaze‟ direction across each 
level of test stimulus for two non-biological stimuli with horizontal „eyes‟ (left) and arrows 
(right) (RI collapsed). 
 
To directly compare these results to those of experiment 1a, the two non-biological 
stimulus types of experiment 1b were collapsed, and entered into a between-subjects 
ANOVA with the biological stimulus of experiment 1a as the second level. Retention 
interval, Test stimulus and Gaze direction were entered as repeated within-subjects 
factors. There was a significant main effect of Gaze direction (F(2, 92) = 18.2, p < .001, ηp
2 
= .28), and crucially this interacted with the between-subjects factor Stimulus type (F(2, 92) 
= 9.62, p < .001, ηp
2 = .17). There were no other significant main effects or interactions, 
apart from a main effect of Test stimulus (F(2, 92) = 176.32, p < .001, ηp
2 = .79).  
Discussion 
The aim of experiment 1b was to incorporate two facets of gaze processing into the 
non-biological stimulus that were absent in experiment 1a: horizontal alignment of the eyes 
and the directional meaning of gaze. The results showed that estimations of object rotation 
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were not influenced by these visual manipulations, neither when oriented to simulate the 
configuration of the eyes in the biological stimulus, nor when they held an analogous 
spatial meaning to that of gaze direction. These results are comparable to those of the 
non-biological stimulus in experiment 1a and therefore further corroborated the main 
conclusion drawn from experiment 1a, which is that social information conveyed by gaze 
direction underlies the variations in estimations of head rotation, not the low level visual 
appearance nor the spatial meaning. 
Overall discussion 
The aims of these experiments were, firstly, to investigate whether the processing of 
social cues that are indicative of an agent‟s intentions mediated the remembered final 
position of an action sequence performed by the agent. Secondly, if such effects are 
influenced by the absence or presence of a RI in the same way that RM for non-biological 
motion is. Thirdly, to verify that variations in estimations of head rotation caused by gaze 
direction are attributable to the social information conveyed by gaze direction regarding the 
agent‟s goals and intentions, and not due to a low level perceptual factor caused by the 
relative positions of the pupil and sclera, or the spatial meaning of gaze direction. 
The social effect of gaze direction 
The results for the biological stimulus were consistent with the central hypothesis. 
Estimations of how far the head had rotated varied as a function of gaze direction. The 
non-biological stimuli were also subject to an anticipatory memory displacement. However, 
the extent of this displacement did not vary as a result of the equivalent „gaze‟ conditions. 
That is, whereas judging the extent of head rotation is influenced by its gaze direction, 
judging the extent to which a cylinder has rotated is not affected by the appearance of 
black and white patterns that are comparable to the appearance of the different gaze 
directions, nor by the direction of arrows superimposed onto its surface that point in the 
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same directions. Therefore, this suggests that the influence of gaze direction on 
estimations of head rotation is not solely due to the differing visual appearance of the gaze 
direction conditions, nor to the purely spatial information they convey. This supports the 
hypothesis that the observed effect can be attributed to the social quality of the stimulus 
and its motion, and to the social information conveyed by the gaze direction. 
The effect of retention interval 
The variations of head rotation estimations were not influenced by the presence or 
absence of an RI. Furthermore, the memory displacement observed for the non-biological 
stimuli was similarly evident both with and without an RI. These findings contradict 
previous research which suggests that, as memory displacements occur in real time, an 
RI, no matter how brief (e.g. 13 ms), is required for distorted estimations of the extent of 
motion to be evident. This has been explicitly investigated for the motion anticipation of 
non-biological stimuli (Bertamini, 1993; Freyd & Johnson, 1987), and indirect evidence 
suggests a similar role for that of biological stimuli (Kourtzi & Shiffrar, 1999). This argues 
against the suggestion that anticipating the motion of biological and non-biological stimuli 
is underpinned by separate cognitive mechanisms, with an RI required for the latter and 
not the former.  
 However, a plausible explanation for this is related to the particular test method used 
in the current study. Previous studies used one test object, which the participant had to 
compare with the remembered end-point. The test stimulus in the current study consisted 
of two objects. This entailed looking at both choices and making a decision, which is a 
more time consuming process. Hence, a considerable delay between test stimulus onset 
and pressing the response key was always present (mean = 1415 ms, SD = 665 ms), 
sufficiently long for displacement to occur, which is consistent with the proposed necessity 
of higher level off-line mechanisms for the anticipatory memory displacement to manifest 
itself.  
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The relative effects of gaze-ahead and gaze-lagging on anticipatory memory displacement 
As the rotation of the head itself is intentional, it was expected that displacement 
would also occur in the gaze-congruent condition. However, there was no significant 
response bias elicited in this condition, suggesting that just the motion of the head itself 
was not subject to an anticipatory memory displacement. This could be because stopping 
rotation of the head occurs near instantaneously with the intention to do so, and is 
therefore not subject to a temporal lag between removing the impetus to move and actual 
cessation of the rotation. However, this is also true of other biological action sequences 
such as walking, for which previous studies have reported a memory displacement effect 
(Graf et al., 2007; Jarraya et al., 2005). It is reasonable to assume that stopping rotation of 
the head is not subject to inertia to the same extent as is walking. Therefore, the lack of 
RM in the gaze-congruent condition may be due to the nature of the action. An alternative 
explanation is that the current method is not sensitive enough, and that memory 
displacement for a rotating head in the absence of additional goal oriented information 
conveyed by the eyes is too small to be evident using the current method.  
It was hypothesised that when the gaze of an agentive stimulus was directed at the 
goal of the action (gaze-ahead condition), participants would overestimate the rotational 
angle of the head, and when gaze was directed opposite to the direction of the goal of the 
action (gaze-lagging condition) participants would underestimated the angle. It was 
assumed that gaze directed at the action goal reflects a larger degree of intentional 
motivation to reach or achieve the goal than gaze that was lagging behind head rotation. 
However, estimations of how far the head had rotated did not differ between the gaze-
ahead and gaze-congruent conditions, but the gaze-lagging condition differed from both. 
Furthermore, it was the gaze-lagging condition that elicited a significant bias to choosing 
the „before‟ response. It suggests that the main effect of gaze direction may lie 
predominantly with the gaze-lagging condition. Apparently participants did not infer any 
greater intentional information when gaze was directed in advance of head rotation. There 
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are at least three possible reasons for this asymmetry. Firstly, as a change in gaze 
direction is a faster and more energy-efficient way to direct attention than a head turn, 
gaze direction typically „leads‟ the motion of the head and other body parts (Bertenthal & 
Von Hofsten, 1998). As a result, gaze-ahead is more perceptually common than gaze-
lagging. Possibly, the atypical configuration of gaze and head movement in the gaze-
lagging condition made it more conspicuous and was „picked up‟ and processed more 
readily. Secondly, even though the deviations of the „ahead‟ and „lagging‟ gaze directions 
from head orientation were 30o either way, there was an asymmetry in the amount of 
sclera visible, with more sclera visible in the gaze-lagging than in the gaze-ahead 
condition. The ratio of dark pixels in the iris to light pixels in the sclera in the gaze-
congruent condition was 1.9 for the male and 2.0 for the female (averaged across both 
eyes) showing that there was more iris visible than sclera. In the gaze-ahead condition the 
amount of sclera and iris was more equal, as the ratio was 1.1 for the male stimulus and 
0.9 for the female. For the gaze-lagging condition, there was far more sclera visible than 
iris, both for the male (0.4) and female stimuli (0.4). Therefore, the visible difference 
between the „lagging‟ and „congruent‟ conditions was greater than that between the 
„ahead‟ and „congruent‟ conditions. The ratio of visible dark pupil with respect to white 
sclera is a determining factor in ascertaining gaze direction (Symons, Lee, Cedrone, & 
Nishimura, 2004). It must be noted, though, that the same would also apply to the 
equivalent „gaze‟ conditions of the non-biological stimulus. The ratio of dark to light pixels 
for the non-biological stimulus in experiment 1a was greater in the gaze-ahead condition 
(1.9) than in both the gaze-congruent (0.6) and gaze-lagging conditions (0.6). The visual 
difference was therefore more noticeable in the gaze-ahead condition, however no effect 
of gaze direction was found. Therefore, should this asymmetry be a factor, it would not 
necessarily refute the notion of a social component to the observed effect. Lastly, the 
difference between gaze-ahead and gaze-congruent may have been too subtle to detect 
using the current method. A more sensitive measure using a set of test stimuli with smaller 
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differences in orientation between the two choices may have elicited an effect. However, 
these factors do not detract from the robust finding of a consistent difference in the 
estimation of the degree of head rotation between the gaze-ahead and gaze-lagging 
conditions.  
Summary 
Overall, these experiments suggested that the gaze direction exerts a strong effect 
on estimations of how far an action has proceeded. Furthermore, the lack of variation 
observed for the non-biological stimuli suggest that this is due to social inferences made 
on the part of the observer regarding the psychological/mental state of the agent. The 
nature of the stimulus itself enables the observer to interpret the motion as intentional. 
Social cues contribute to these inferences and enhance the attribution of goal directedness 
to the action. This informs the observer‟s anticipation of how the action will unfold in the 
immediate future. 
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Chapter 3. The effect of stimulus inversion 
The face inversion effect 
Presenting participants with a face that is oriented upside down (inverted) has been 
found to have a detrimental effect on the perception of faces. The ability to extract 
configural information has been proposed to be impaired when faces are inverted. That is, 
inversion prevents the perceptual system from processing the spatial relations between 
features, and relies only on information gained from the individual features themselves. 
Configural processing entails the combined processing of the features that constitute a 
face, and is distinguished from featural processing whereby the individual components of a 
face are processed separately. Because each face shares the same first order relations 
between the features (two eyes above the nose, with a mouth below), it is necessary to 
process the subtle spatial differences between these features in order to identify 
individuals, and within the same face at different points in time, in order to extract relevant 
social information (Ganel, 2006). Although there are differences in opinion with regards to 
the specific role of configural information in face perception, a common description of 
configural processing entails the integration of the individual components that constitute a 
face and that they are processed in relation to one another (Anaki & Moscovitch, 2007). 
The aim of this experiment was to investigate how the disruption of configural processing 
through stimulus inversion affects the effect of gaze direction on action anticipation. 
 The effect of face inversion on gaze processing 
Given that the disruption of configural information caused by face inversion has been 
found to impair the processing of faces, several studies have investigated the effect of face 
inversion on the processing of gaze direction, in terms of either head orientation, the 
direction of gaze, or the integration of eye gaze with other facial features. 
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Inversion has been found not to influence the encoding of the direction to which a 
head is averted. Behavioural adaptation studies have shown that viewing a head averted 
in one direction will cause the perception of subsequently presented heads to be averted 
in the opposite direction. These adaptation induced after-effects are evident both when the 
stimuli are upright as well as inverted, suggesting that the direction in which a head is 
averted from the observer is encoded in the same way when inverted as when upright (Bi, 
Su, Chen, & Fang, 2009). However, no adaption effects are evident when the adapting 
and test stimuli are in upright and inverted orientations (e.g. measuring the perception of 
an upright head after adapting to an inverted head). This implies that, despite the common 
mechanisms, different neural populations are involved in encoding the direction of upright 
and inverted heads (Fang, Murray, & He, 2007). 
 In terms of the effect of face inversion on the discrimination of eye gaze direction, 
there is evidence that it affects some aspects of gaze discrimination but not others. 
Determining whether two faces had the same horizontal gaze shift is as accurate and fast 
when the faces were inverted than when upright (Mondloch, Geldart, Maurer, & Le Grand, 
2003). Tipples (2005) found that reflexive re-orienting of one‟s spatial attention in response 
to a left or right aversion of another person‟s gaze is not influenced by the orientation of 
the face stimulus. However, it did affect the response to gaze shifts of up and down. As 
such effects are based on gross judgments of gaze aversion (left, right, up, down); 
inversion does appear to impair vertical, but not horizontal, shifts of attention. This may be 
attributable to the larger effect of inversion on processing vertical spatial relations than 
horizontal spatial relations (Goffaux & Rossion, 2007). However, inversion has been found 
to affect fine discriminations of horizontal gaze direction necessary for joint attention, for 
example when discriminating gaze deviations that differ in increments of 0.23o (Jenkins & 
Langton, 2003), or when indicating exactly to where another‟s gaze is fixated 
(Schwaninger, Lobmaier, & Fischer, 2005). Campbell et al (1990) demonstrated this 
dissociative effect of inversion on gaze processing by showing that inversion impaired the 
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detection of small deviations in gaze direction (e.g. 5o) but not detecting larger deviations 
(e.g. 10o or 20o).  
It must also be noted that the detrimental effect of face inversion on gaze processing 
is evident irrespective of the orientation of the face, and also when the eyes are presented 
in isolation (Jenkins & Langton, 2003; Schwaninger et al., 2005). Furthermore, the faster 
detection times for faces with direct gaze than averted gaze evident for upright faces is 
absent when the eyes are inverted in either an upright or inverted face, or when the 
surrounding face is absent (Senju & Hasegawa, 2006). This suggests that the gaze 
processing impairments associated with face inversion are due to an eye inversion effect 
rather than a face inversion effect, and that processing the eyes entails configural 
encoding that is independent of the global configural encoding provided by the context of 
the face (Jenkins & Langton, 2003; Schwaninger et al., 2005).  
The above suggests that discerning whether someone is looking to the left or right, 
either by the direction of their head or their eye gaze, is not affected by face inversion (Bi 
et al., 2009; Tipples, 2005). However, inversion does seem to have a detrimental effect on 
the integration of gaze direction with head orientation. The adaptation effect for head 
aversion observed for upright stimuli is attenuated when the gaze direction is incongruently 
aligned with head direction (Bi et al., 2009). This suggests that the neural populations 
being exploited are sensitive to the direction of someone‟s attention, rather than head 
aversion per se, and that information from both sources is being integrated. However, the 
modulating effect is only apparent when the faces are upright. When inverted, the direction 
of gaze has no effect on the after-effects caused by adaptation to an averted head. 
Therefore, information from the head and eyes is not being processed in relation to one 
another to determine social attention, in keeping with the notion that inversion disrupts the 
ability to integrate the features of a face into a unified configuration. This impairment in 
integrating gaze direction with other facial features was also demonstrated by Ganel et al 
(2005) who showed that inverting the face eliminated the interference effects (evident for 
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upright faces) caused by varying emotional expression when judging whether gaze was 
left, right or direct.  
Summary and hypothesis 
Stimulus inversion affects the processing of faces more than that of non-face stimuli, 
and this is thought to be a consequence of an impaired ability to process the spatial 
relationship between individual features, and therefore to integrate them in relation to one 
another (configural processing). With respect to the processing of gaze direction, inversion 
prevents fine discrimination of where someone‟s gaze is fixated, and whether they are 
looking up or down, but it does not affect judgments of whether they are looking left or 
right. Furthermore, inversion does not impair processing of whether the head is averted to 
the left or right, but does prevent the integration of gaze direction with head orientation.  
The aim of experiment 2 is therefore to investigate if the integration of gaze direction with 
action perception is impaired when the stimuli are inverted, and if this attenuates the effect 
of gaze direction on action anticipation. As perception of head orientation is not affected by 
inversion, participants should be able to compare the remembered final angle of the 
rotating stimulus with the test stimuli as accurately as when upright. Similarly, as inversion 
does not impair judgment of whether gaze is directed to the left or right, participants will be 
able to perceive the gaze direction of the stimulus as well as when the stimuli is upright. 
However, as inversion affects configural processing of faces, and therefore the integration 
of facial features, participants will not be able to relate the direction of gaze with the 
direction in which the head is rotating.  As such, the goal oriented information conveyed by 
gaze direction will not be attributed to the movement of the head, and estimations of head 
rotation will not vary as a function of gaze direction.  
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Experiment 2 
Method 
Participants 
Participants (N = 31, 23 females), with a mean age of 27 years (SD = 10.9 years), 
were recruited and screened following the same criteria as used in experiment 1a and 1b. 
Apparatus 
All stimuli were created and presented using the same software and hardware as in 
experiment 1a and 1b. 
Stimuli 
Rotating stimulus 
The stimuli in the upright condition were the same as in experiment 1a and 1b. For 
the inverted condition, the frames were inverted and retained the same size and position 
on screen as the upright stimulus (Figure 3.1).  
Test stimulus 
The moderate trials were not included in this experiment, leaving three levels of the 
test stimulus condition (experimental trials [-10o/+10o], catch „after‟ trials [-40o/+10o], catch 
„before‟ trials [-10o/+40o]). In addition, as the previous experiments had consistently shown 
the retention interval to have no effect, this factor was removed and all trials were 
presented without the retention interval.  
Procedure 
The experiment was a 2 X 3 X 3 repeated measures factorial design, with 8 
repetitions, totalling 144 trials. The faces were upright in 72 of these trials, and inverted in 
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the remaining 72. In both of the orientation conditions, the three levels of gaze direction 
were presented for 24 trials. The three test stimulus levels were distributed equally (8 trials 
each) for each of the gaze direction conditions. Participants completed two blocks of 72 
trials each, with each experimental condition presented in a pseudo-random order across 
trials. Task instructions were the same as in the previous experiments, and no mention of 
the experimental manipulations were made. Participants initially completed several 
practice trials representative of the range of experimental manipulations (Figure 3.1). 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1. Trial procedure in the inverted condition. This example shows the female 
stimulus in a symmetrical experimental trial rotating from the left in the gaze-ahead 
condition. 
Results 
Error analysis 
Initially, the errors in the catch trials were entered into a two-way ANOVA with 
Orientation (upright vs. inverted) and Catch trial type (correct answer is the „before‟ choice 
Fixation  
(1000 ms) Start point 
End point 
Test stimulus 
Rotating 
stimulus  
(640 ms) 
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vs. the „after‟ choice) as within subjects factors. This showed that there was a main effect 
of catch trial type (F(1, 30) = 4.44, p = .044, ηp
2 = .129), with more errors made when the 
correct answer was the „before‟ choice (mean = 19.0%, SD = 21.7%) than when it was the 
„after‟ choice (mean = 9.1%, SD = 12.8%). There was no main effect of orientation (F(1, 
30) = .121, p = .73, ηp
2 = .004) and no interaction between orientation and catch trial type 
(F(1, 30) = .207, p = .652, ηp
2 = .007). Therefore, stimulus orientation had no effect on 
errors, suggesting that inversion did not impair the accuracy of head rotation judgments.  
Comparing the effect of gaze direction between the upright and inverted conditions 
The mean error rate in the catch trials was 14.1% (SD = 12.1%). Participants with a 
mean error rate of 20% or more were excluded. This resulted in the exclusion of nine 
participants (mean = 29.1%, SD = 10.3%). The resulting mean error rate of the remaining 
22 participants was 7.9% (SD = 5.6%). The mean reaction time was 1882 ms (SD = 713 
ms). Trials with a response time less than 250 ms or greater than 2SD above each 
participant‟s mean RT were excluded. Of the remaining participants, 3.6% of trials were 
excluded, resulting in a mean RT of 1693 ms (SD = 571 ms).   
The data were entered into a two-way ANOVA with Orientation (upright vs. inverted) 
and Gaze direction (ahead vs. congruent vs. lagging) as within subjects factors. Again, as 
the catch trials were used to exclude participants, the analyses were conducted for the -
10o/+10o trials only. This analysis revealed a significant main effect of Gaze direction (F(1, 
21) = 3.93, p = .027, ηp
2 = .158) with the gaze-ahead condition eliciting significantly more 
„after‟ responses than the gaze-lagging condition (t(21) = 3.01, p = .007, d = .37), but that 
the gaze-congruent condition did not differ from either the gaze-ahead (t(21) = 1.11, p = 
.279, d = .15) or gaze-lagging conditions (t(21) = 1.66, p = .112, d = .19). Furthermore, 
neither of the gaze conditions differed significantly from 50% (ahead: t(21) = .185, p = 
.855, d = .04; congruent: t(21) = .82, p = .422, d = .17; lagging: t(21) = 1.9, p = .071, d = 
.07). There was no main effect of orientation (F(1, 21) =.728, p = .403, ηp
2 = .034), and, 
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crucially, the interaction between Gaze direction and Orientation was also not significant 
(F(1, 21) = 1.07, p = .353, ηp
2 = .048).  
The non-significant interaction between Gaze direction and Orientation suggests that 
the effect of gaze direction on estimations of head orientation was not affected by stimulus 
inversion. To further investigate a possible modulatory effect of orientation, one-way 
ANOVAs with Gaze direction (ahead vs. congruent vs. lagging) entered as a repeated 
measures were conducted for the two orientation conditions separately (Table 3.1 and 
Figure 3.2).   
These showed a significant effect of Gaze direction for the upright condition (F(2, 42) 
= 3.91, p = .028, ηp
2 = .16) but not for the inverted condition (F(2, 42) = 1.02, p = .369, ηp
2 
= .046). Paired sample t-tests between the three gaze direction levels in the upright 
condition (αBon = .0167) showed that there was a significant difference between the gaze-
ahead and gaze-lagging conditions (t(21) = 2.72, p = .013, d = .5), but that the gaze-
congruent condition did not differ from either the gaze-ahead (t(21) = .926, p = .365, d = 
.14) nor the gaze-lagging condition (t(21) = 1.8, p = .086, d = .3). One sample t-tests 
showed that only the gaze-lagging condition differed from the test value of 50% (t(21) = 
2.68, p = .014, d = .08), whereas the gaze-ahead (t(21) =.159, p = .875, d = .03) and gaze-
congruent conditions (t(21) = .712, p = .484, d = .15) did not. As there was no effect of 
gaze direction in the inverted condition, the conditions were collapsed for the one sample 
t-test which showed no significant difference from 50% (t(21) = .723, p = .478, d = .15). 
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Figure 3.2. Mean percentage of „after‟ responses in the experimental trials for each level of 
Gaze direction when stimuli were either upright or inverted.  
 
Discussion 
The effect of gaze direction on estimations of head rotation observed in the previous 
experiments was proposed to be due to the integration of the action (head rotation) and 
the social cue (gaze direction) conveying the underlying intention. The aim of this study 
was to dissociate the processing of the action and the social cue by inverting the stimuli. 
As such, it was hypothesised that the ability to integrate the gaze direction of the agent 
with their head rotation would be impaired, and that the goal-oriented information 
conveyed by the eyes would not be attributed to the action.  
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The effect of gaze for upright faces 
When the stimuli were upright, there was a significant effect of gaze direction, with 
estimations of how far the head had rotated being greater when gaze was directed in 
advance of head rotation than when lagging behind head rotation. Furthermore, the gaze-
lagging condition elicited a significant response bias, whereby the stopping point was 
judged as more similar to a head oriented 10o before than a head oriented 10o after the 
stopping point. This pattern of results replicated those observed in experiment 1a, 
emphasising the robustness of the gaze effect on action anticipation.  
However, the effect was only observed between the gaze-ahead and gaze-lagging 
conditions, whereas the gaze-congruent condition did not differ significantly from either of 
the other gaze conditions. Furthermore, the overall effect size (0.16) was considerably 
smaller than that obtained in experiment 1a (0.42). The observed effect may have been 
weaker due to the fewer number of trials (symmetrical experimental trials after exclusions) 
upon which the analyses were conducted in this experiment (495) compared to experiment 
1a (959). Nevertheless, gaze is a meaningful cue to the goal of the action only when 
articulated from head orientation. Therefore, the role of gaze in the anticipation of head 
rotation derives from its incongruence with head orientation rather than its congruence, 
and a difference between the two incongruent conditions is sufficient to uphold the 
conclusion that anticipation of how an action will proceed is mediated by the gaze direction 
of the actor. 
The effect of gaze for inverted faces 
In contrast to the upright condition, there was no effect of gaze direction on 
estimations of head rotation when the stimuli were presented in an inverted orientation. 
Estimations of how far the head had rotated did not differ between the different gaze 
direction conditions. Extensive research has demonstrated that inversion impairs face 
processing, and to some extent the processing of bodies too, by disrupting the ability to 
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integrate and process the individual features in relation to one another. The absence of an 
effect of gaze direction is therefore most likely attributable to an inability to relate the 
direction of gaze with the rotation of the head. The disruption of configural information has 
previously been found to impair the processing of information conveyed by both the face 
and body (Loucks & Baldwin, 2009; Maurer et al., 2002; Pavlova & Sokolov, 2003). 
However, it must be noted that configural processing is not exclusively employed for the 
perception of social stimuli, but is necessary for the perception of any type of stimulus for 
which the observer must rely on the spatial relationships between features. The finding of 
an inversion effect in the current experiment does not therefore preclude the possibility 
that the mechanisms employed to integrate the gaze and actions of others are also 
necessary for the configural processing of non-social stimuli. 
This lack of an effect cannot be attributed to an inability to accurately process the 
orientation of the head. Previous research has shown that the orientation of inverted heads 
is processed in the same way as that of upright heads (Bi et al., 2009). Furthermore, the 
error rates for the inverted condition were no different from those in the upright condition. 
This suggests that participants were as accurate in comparing the stopping angle of the 
rotating stimulus with the angles of the two test stimulus choices, irrespective of whether 
they were upright or inverted. Furthermore, it is also not likely due to an inability to 
discriminate in which direction the eyes of the rotating stimulus are looking. Although 
inversion of the eyes has been found to impair the fine discrimination of different gaze 
directions (Campbell et al., 1990; Jenkins & Langton, 2003; Schwaninger et al., 2005), and 
to affect judgments of whether the eyes are looking up or down (Tipples, 2005), it does not 
impair the processing of left/right judgments required in this study (Mondloch et al., 2003; 
Tipples, 2005). Therefore, participants would still perceive the different gaze direction 
conditions despite the inversion. However, the eye region was displaced vertically between 
the two orientation conditions. In the upright condition, the horizontal midline of the eye 
region was 0.8o of visual angle above the horizontal midline of the screen, in the inverted 
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orientation it was the same distance below it. In principle, this may have predicated a 
differential allocation of attention toward the eye region, but since the differences were 
small, this is unlikely. 
It must be noted, though, that the differential effect of gaze direction as a function of 
head orientation was apparent only when the two conditions were analysed separately, 
whereas there was no significant interaction between gaze direction and stimulus 
orientation. The simple main effect analyses test if the effect of gaze direction is different 
from zero. However, the omnibus F-test investigates if the effect of gaze direction is 
different between the two orientation conditions. Therefore, the effect of gaze direction did 
not differ significantly between the two orientation conditions, yet did differ significantly 
from zero when in the upright orientation but did not differ significantly from zero when in 
the inverted orientation. Although this presents a logical contradiction, the different 
analyses test different hypotheses (difference from zero vs. difference between 
conditions), and so this contradictory result may be a consequence of the weak effect of 
gaze direction observed in the upright condition. As such, it must be emphasised that the 
conclusions drawn from these results remain tentative.  
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Chapter 4. The influence of emotional expression on the effect of gaze direction 
when anticipating the actions of others 
Gaze direction is often not observed in isolation but in concert with other social cues. 
The information conveyed by these other cues can both enhance and refine the 
information obtained from the eyes. Of these, emotional facial expression shares an 
intricate relationship with gaze direction, both being manipulated by changes in facial 
features, and conveying similar motivational information. The aim of this chapter is 
investigate if the effect of gaze direction on action anticipation is influenced by the 
emotional expression of the agent.  
The interaction between gaze direction and emotional expression 
Several studies have shown that the processing of gaze and expression interacts, 
with the perception of and behavioural response to one cue affected by the quality of the 
other. For instance, emotional expression can affect the perception and response to gaze 
direction. The time taken to discriminate gaze direction is prolonged when the expression 
of the face varies (Ganel et al., 2005; Graham & LaBar, 2007), whilst an averted gaze is 
more likely to be perceived as looking at the observer if the expression is angry or happy 
than when neutral or fearful (Lobmaier et al., 2006). Conversely, emotional expression has 
implications for the social significance of a specific gaze direction. As such, a great deal of 
research has sought to establish if joint attention abilities are affected by the expression of 
the gazer. The reflexive tendency to orient one‟s own spatial attention to where another 
person is looking has been found to be enhanced when they are expressing fear (De Jong, 
van Engeland, & Kemner, 2008; Tipples, 2006). However, several studies have not found 
such an enhancement (Hietanen & Leppanen, 2003), whilst other have found it only in a 
sample who are high in trait anxiety (Mathews, Fox, Yiend, & Calder, 2003) or when the 
task requires an affective evaluation of the target (Pecchinenda, Pes, Ferlazzo, & 
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Zoccolotti, 2008). Disgust (Pecchinenda et al., 2008) and happy faces (Hori et al., 2005) 
have also been observed to potentiate joint attention (although Hietanen & Leppanen, 
2003 found this not to be the case), whilst no effect has been observed in response to 
angry faces (Bonifacci, Ricciardelli, Lugli, & Pellicano, 2008; Hietanen & Leppanen, 2003). 
There is also evidence that the joint attention abilities in the first year of life are enhanced 
by happy expression (Striano & Stahl, 2005), although De Groote et al (2007) found no 
effect of expression and Flom and Pick (2005) found joint attention to be more likely in 
response to neutral expressions than happy or sad.  
The effect of expression on the processing of gaze is mirrored by an effect of gaze 
on the perception and response to emotional expressions. Just as variations in expression 
impair the discrimination of gaze, so too does varying the gaze direction slow 
discrimination times of emotional expressions (Ganel et al., 2005; Graham & LaBar, 2007). 
Angry faces are detected faster and perceived with greater intensity when the expresser‟s 
social attention is directed toward the observer rather than away, whilst an averted gaze 
enhances the detection and perception of fearful faces (Adams & Kleck, 2005; Hess, 
Adams, & Kleck, 2007; Sander, Grandjean, Kaiser, Wehrle, & Scherer, 2007), although 
Bindemann et al (2008) contest that this effect is task and stimulus specific. Furthermore, 
the on-screen duration of an angry face is perceived as longer if the gaze is mutual rather 
than averted (Doi & Shinohara, 2009). 
The integrative nature of expression and gaze influences the processing of other 
social behaviours. For example, the positive evaluation afforded to objects that other 
people look at is enhanced if they are expressing happiness but reduced if they are 
expressing disgust (Bayliss et al., 2006). This also extends to the evaluations of the 
person themselves. Someone whose gaze direction consistently predicts the location of a 
target is perceived as more trustworthy if they are smiling than if they are angry (Bayliss, 
Griffiths, & Tipper, 2009). Furthermore, as early as the second year of life, infants will 
anticipate that an adult will grasp an object if they are looking at it whilst smiling (Phillips, 
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Wellman, & Spelke, 2002), and infants themselves are more likely to approach an object in 
response to this (Repacholi, 1998). The interdependency between the processing of gaze 
direction and expression is reflected in a modulation of neural activity. Measurements of 
ERPs indicate that cortical activity is modulated by both gaze and expression, but that the 
time course of this occurs relatively late, at around 270 ms (Klucharev & Sams, 2004). 
Such an effect is evident in the first year of life, with a greater response for angry and 
happy expressions with a direct gaze than an averted gaze (Striano, Reid, & Hoehl, 2006), 
but no modulation to fearful faces by gaze direction (Hoehl & Striano, 2008). Furthermore, 
ERP responses to objects are greater if they have been looked at by an adult with a fearful 
expression than if with a neutral expression (Hoehl, Wiese, & Striano, 2008).  
Neuroimaging studies have revealed cortical areas that are responsive to both gaze 
direction and emotional expression, and that the activity of these areas is modulated by 
specific combinations of the two. Activity in the STS has been observed in response to 
emotional expressions (Critchley et al., 2000; Narumoto, Okada, Sadato, Fukui, & 
Yonekura, 2001), in keeping with its role in processing dynamic facial information (Haxby 
et al., 2000), although it shows no ability to discriminate between expressions (Phillips et 
al., 1998). Nevertheless, there is greater activity in the STS in response to fear 
expressions with an averted gaze than with a direct gaze (Hadjikhani, Hoge, Snyder, & de 
Gelder, 2008), and a PET study by Wicker et al (2003) revealed that judging if someone 
was happy or angry elicited greater activity in the anterior STG when their gaze was direct 
than when averted. The amygdala is another area implicated in processing both gaze and 
expression, and exhibits activity in response to several different emotional expressions, 
most notably fear, sadness, anger and disgust (Blair, Morris, Frith, Perrett, & Dolan, 1999; 
Phillips et al., 1998; Whalen et al., 2001), but not happy expressions (Adolphs, 1999; 
Morris et al., 1998). The activity of the amygdala has been found to be greater for angry 
expressions that are looking at the observer (Sato, Yoshikawa, Kochiyama, & Matsumura, 
2004), and for fear expressions that are directed away (Hadjikhani et al., 2008). However, 
94 
 
Adams et al (2003) found the opposite, with greater amygdala activity for fearful faces with 
a direct gaze and for angry faces with an averted gaze. Although Hadjikhani et al (2008) 
point to task and stimulus differences that could account for these apparently discrepant 
findings, Adams et al (2003) attributed them to the ambiguity inherent when gaze and 
expression contradicted each other, necessitating an increased involvement of the 
amygdala in accordance with its role in assessing the emotional significance of 
environmental stimuli (Blair, 2003).  
However, this modulation of activity cannot be conclusively attributed to the same 
neuronal populations. Engell and Haxby (2007) showed that gaze and expression elicited 
spatially discrete patches of activity in the STS, with an area of partial overlap. Similarly 
separate coding of gaze and expression has been observed in cell populations in the 
amygdala of macaque monkeys (Hoffman, Gothard, Schmid, & Logothetis, 2007). This 
suggests the presence of distinct cell populations encoding either expression or gaze in 
both areas, although the existence of cells encoding both in the area of overlap cannot be 
refuted. 
Models of the interaction between gaze and expression 
The Shared Signal Hypothesis has been proposed as a functional account of the 
interaction between gaze direction and emotional expression (Adams et al., 2006; Adams 
& Franklin, 2009; Adams & Kleck, 2005). Processing (in terms of discrimination times, 
perceived intensity) of either gaze direction or emotional expression is enhanced when the 
other cue conveys the same social information. For example, direct gaze and expressions 
of anger or happiness are characteristic of a disposition to approach a stimulus, whereas 
averted gaze and expressions of fear, sadness or disgust are characteristic of a 
disposition to avoid a stimulus. 
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The shared signal hypothesis does not posit a solution to the problem created when 
cues contradict each other and induce ambiguity. However, another model, called the 
Fuzzy Logical Model of Perception (FLMP) proposes that in the event of an agent‟s social 
cues conveying ambiguous social information, judgments of their behavioural intention will 
be based on the least ambiguous cue (Ellison & Massaro, 1997). This is because social 
cues are integrated by a multiplicative process acting on continuous rather than discrete 
information. The information conveyed by social cues is rarely categorical but is often 
vague, ambiguous or imprecise. In order to draw definite conclusions from this complex 
information, the FLMP assumes that each social cue is evaluated independently and 
assigned a „truth‟ value representing the probability that it belongs to a particular category 
prototype that is stored in long term memory, such as a particular emotional expression. 
These probabilities are then multiplied to give an overall probability to which the integration 
of the components fits any number of alternatives. These alternatives are then assessed to 
select the most likely fit to a stored prototype, which is then converted into a response. 
This results in reducing the uncertainty at each successive stage. Because the integration 
is multiplicative, the contribution of one cue to the overall probability depends on the 
contribution of the other cue. This contrasts with additive models, whereby the contribution 
of one cue remains the same irrespective of the value of the other. Both the SSH and the 
FLMP predict the same when both cues convey the same information, that of an enhanced 
ability to process either cue or the overall intention. However, as the truth value of one cue 
is reduced, and therefore becomes more ambiguous, the FLMP predicts that the 
contribution of the other cue to the integrated probability increases. 
Ellison and Massaro (1997) found support for the FLMP when integrating facial 
features in classifying emotional expressions. Participants were presented with a face 
whose brow varied along five levels between up and down, and whose mouth varied along 
five levels between up and down. Participants had to indicate if the face was expressing 
happiness or anger. The frequency of happy responses was maximal when both brow and 
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mouth were upturned and the frequency of angry responses was maximal when both brow 
and mouth were downturned. As the brow turned downwards, the frequency of happy 
responses was unaffected so long as the mouth was turned upwards. Therefore, 
increasing the ambiguity of the expression by making the brow more neutral increased the 
reliance on the mouth as a cue to the expression of the stimulus. Similarly, Massaro and 
Egan (1996) found support for the integration of emotional information from the face and 
voice. When both face and voice were angry, the proportion of angry responses was close 
to 1. Changing the voice to either neutral or happy, and thus increasing the ambiguity of 
the overall stimulus did not affect judgments. Therefore, observers relied more heavily on 
the emotional information conveyed by one cue (the face) as the match of the other cue to 
the angry prototype decreased. This was not simply due to an exclusive processing of 
facial information, as the ability to identify anger from the voice alone was also high. 
In terms of gaze direction and emotional expression, several studies have 
highlighted a role for gaze direction in resolving ambiguity caused by emotional 
expression. For instance, gaze can help identify the referent of another person's emotional 
expression (Hanna & Brennan, 2007; Repacholi, 1998), and can be used as a cue to 
someone‟s disposition when their facial expression is neutral (Adams & Kleck, 2005), or 
when the expression is rendered ambiguous via morphing procedures (Graham & LaBar, 
2007). The use of gaze to disambiguate behaviour is evident early in development. When 
the intentions underlying an observed action are unclear, 9 month olds will attend more to 
the actor‟s gaze than when the intentions are easily discernable (Phillips et al., 1992).  
Summary and Hypothesis 
Attributing the goals and motivations of others is based on an array of social cues, of 
which gaze direction is just one. An individual‟s emotional expression affords the observer 
with additional information with which to infer someone‟s intentions and anticipate the 
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actions they are most likely to make in the immediate future. The conjoint role of gaze 
direction and emotional expression in such inferences is emphasised by the comparable 
processing characteristics and developmental emergence in the abilities to process them, 
as well as the shared cortical regions implicated in doing so. Furthermore, the conjunction 
of gaze and expression can enhance these attributions when the information conveyed by 
both cues is congruent. However, when the information conveyed by one cue is 
ambiguous, the FLMP predicts that the contribution of the remaining cue to such 
attributions will increase. 
The aim of this experiment was to investigate the role of gaze direction on the 
anticipation of other‟s actions in situations when the emotional expression of the agent 
conveyed either an ambiguous or unambiguous motivation. This was achieved by 
combining a rotation toward the observer with an emotional expression conveying either a 
motivation to approach (happy, angry) or to avoid (fear, disgust). When the rotation of the 
head is toward the observer with an expression of approach, the meaning of both the 
action and the expression are congruent and the goal of the action is unambiguously to 
move toward. However, when the head rotates toward the observer with an expression of 
avoidance, the meaning of the action is ambiguous as the direction of movement and the 
motivation expressed are incongruent with one another. This contention is supported by a 
study by Adams, Ambady, Macrae and Kleck (2006), who presented fearful and angry 
faces that subsequently either increased or decreased in size, making them appear to 
move toward or away from the observer, respectively. Participants had to detect the 
motion as quickly as possible. It was found that the angry faces primed motion toward the 
observer (shorter RTs), while fearful faces did not. This suggests that observers 
associated and expected a face with an approach expression to move toward them, but 
did not for a face expressing an avoidance emotion. It is therefore expected that for 
approach expression, there would be no need to scrutinize gaze direction to clarify 
information, and it should not influence estimations of the degree of head rotation.  For 
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avoidance expressions, the observer should involuntary prioritise the processing of the 
agent‟s gaze direction to try and resolve the ambiguity. If this were the case, then the 
anticipations that the observer makes regarding the agent‟s actions will be influenced by 
their gaze direction.   
Experiment 3 
Method 
Participants  
Participants (N = 30, 26 females) had a mean age of 23.2 years (SD = 8.2) and were 
recruited and screened using the same procedures as described in the previous 
experiments.  
Apparatus 
Stimuli were created and presented to participants using the same hardware and 
software as in previous experiments.  
Stimuli 
No non-agentive stimulus was presented, with only the agentive stimulus (one male, 
one female) presented. 
Rotating stimulus 
The movement of the rotating stimulus was the same as in previous experiments. 
The rotation began from either the left or right profile. Gaze direction varied along three 
levels as in previous experiments (gaze-ahead, gaze-congruent, gaze-lagging). In 
addition, the face expressed one of four facial expressions throughout the rotation (anger, 
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happy, fear and disgust). The first two reflect an approach-oriented motivation, the last two 
an avoidance-oriented motivation (see Figure 4.1).  
Test stimulus 
There were five levels of test stimulus, as the asymmetrical experimental trials of 
experiment 1a were reinstated. These depicted the stimulus of the rotating display with a 
congruent gaze and neutral expression at varying orientations from the end-point of the 
rotation. The size and positions of the stimuli on screen were the same as in previous 
experiments. No retention interval was presented in between the rotating and test stimuli in 
any of the trials. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.1. The emotional expressions conveyed by the rotating stimulus. The stopping 
point of the rotating stimuli conveyed an approach (A) or an avoidance motivation (B). The 
approach motivation was represented by Angry (i) and Happy (ii) expression, and the 
avoidance motivation was represented by Fear (iii) and Disgust (iv) expressions.  
 
Procedure 
The trial procedure and experimental set up was the same as in previous 
experiments. Participants completed 192 trials (Figure 1) over three blocks (10 minutes 
each). The gaze and motivation conditions (2 X 3 levels) contained 96 symmetrical 
experimental trials (16 repetitions), 48 asymmetric experimental trials (8 repetitions) and 
A: Approach motivation 
i: Angry                     ii: Happy 
B: Avoidance motivation 
iii: Fear                       iv: Disgust 
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48 catch trials (8 repetitions). The correct answer in the asymmetric experimental trials and 
catch trials was „before‟ in half the trials and „after‟ in the other half. The sex of the stimulus 
(male, female), direction of rotation (from the left or right) and position of the „before‟ and 
„after‟ choices (left, right) were counterbalanced across trials. Written and verbal 
instructions were given, in which no reference was made to the gaze and expression 
manipulations, nor were participants told that the test choices were oriented either side of 
the final angle. It was emphasised that accuracy was more important than speed, but that 
responses were to be made within 3 seconds.  
Results 
Data reduction 
The mean error rate in the catch trials was 14.9% (SD = 11.7%) and the mean RT 
was 1837 ms (SD = 484 ms). Nine participants were excluded due to high error rates 
(>20%), with a mean percentage of errors of 29.2% (SD = 7.7%) leaving 21 participants in 
the analysis (mean errors 8.73%, SD = 6.61%). Next 4.7% of trials were removed due to 
RTs being less than 250 ms, or greater than 2SD of each participant‟s mean (mean = 3908 
ms, SD = 1034 ms) resulting in a mean RT of 1662 ms (SD = 365 ms).    
Responses to the binary choice of either the „before‟ or „after‟ test head were coded 
as „0‟ (before) or „1‟ (after), providing a score for each participant of the mean percentage 
of „after‟ responses (overestimation). These percentage scores were entered in a 2 X 3 X 3 
ANOVA with Motivation (Approach vs. Avoid), Gaze direction (Ahead vs. Congruent vs. 
Lagging) and Test-stimulus (-20o/+10o vs. -10o/+10o vs. -10o/+20o) as within-subjects 
factors (see Table 4.1 and Figure 4.2). As participant exclusion created ceiling 
performance in the catch trials, these were not included as levels in the Test-stimulus 
condition.  
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 Approach Avoidance 
 Ahead Congruent Lagging Ahead Congruent Lagging 
-40
o
/+10
o
 96.4 (9.0) 93.7 (11.8) 97.6 (7.5) 96.4 (12.0) 97.6 (10.9) 95.2 (12.8) 
-20
o
/+10
o
 76.2 (21.1) 78.6 (19.8) 81.0 (23.6) 74.2 (23.6) 72.2 (23.6) 66.7 (28.5) 
-10
o
/+10
o
 56.2 (18.2) 52.0 (23.0) 50.5 (19.9) 65.0 (16.6) 52.6 (17.1) 46.8 (19.7) 
-10
o
/+20
o
 36.5 (33.0) 20.2 (19.8) 28.6 (27.3) 34.5 (32.9) 34.1 (25.8) 23.4 (27.5) 
-10
o
/+40
o
 10.7 (18.7) 11.9 (19.5) 13.1 (24.5) 13.9 (15.9) 11.9 (18.7) 11.5 (19.1) 
 
Table 4.1. Mean proportion of „after‟ responses elicited by the different gaze direction 
conditions in the five test stimulus levels when the stimulus expressed either an approach 
or avoidance emotion.  
 
There was a significant main effect of Test-stimulus (F(2, 40) = 76, p < .001, ηp
2 = 
.792), reflecting the decreasing percentage of „after‟ responses as the „after‟ choice 
became increasingly different from the end-point (all comparisons p < .001). There was no 
significant main effect of Motivation (F(1, 20) = .562, p = .462, ηp
2 = .027). There was a 
significant main effect of Gaze direction (F(2, 40) = 6.27, p = .004, ηp
2 = .239), with the 
gaze-ahead condition eliciting significantly more „after‟ responses than the gaze-lagging 
condition (t(20) = 3.22, p = .004, d = .45). The gaze-congruent condition did not differ 
significantly from either the gaze-ahead (t(20) = 2.22, p = .038, d = .375) or gaze-lagging 
conditions (t(20) = 1.22, p = .238, d = .152). There was a significant interaction between 
Test-stimulus and Motivation (F(2,40) = 3.28, p = .048, ηp
2 = .141) and, importantly, a 
significant interaction between Motivation and Gaze direction (F(2, 40) = 4.03, p = .025, ηp
2 
= .168). The interaction between Test-stimulus and Gaze direction was not significant (F(4, 
80) = .97, p = .429, ηp
2 = .046) nor was there a significant three-way interaction (F(4, 80) = 
1.33, p = .267, ηp
2 = .062). 
102 
 
Modulation of the effect of gaze direction by motivation 
The crucial interaction between gaze direction and motivation was significant. Since 
the symmetrical condition (-10o/+10o) was most sensitive to a possible interaction effect, 
while the asymmetrical conditions (-20o/+10o and -10o/+20o), in which a correct answer 
was present, were far less sensitive, the symmetrical trials we analysed separately in a 
two-way ANOVA with Gaze and Motivation as factors.  
The 3 X 2 ANOVA on the symmetrical trials revealed a significant main effect of 
Gaze direction (F(2, 40) = 8.18, p = .001, ηp
2 = .29), with the percentage of „after‟ 
responses being significantly higher in the gaze-ahead condition than the gaze-congruent 
(t(20) = 3.5, p = .002, d = .5) and gaze-lagging conditions (t(20) = 3.83, p = .001, d = .68), 
which did not differ from each other (t(20) = 1.05, p = .31, d = .2). Furthermore, the 
proportion of „after‟ responses was significantly greater than 50% in the gaze-ahead 
condition (t(20) = 2.96, p = .008, d = .65), but did not differ from 50% in either the gaze-
congruent (t(20) = .582, p = .567, d = .13) or gaze-lagging conditions (t(20) = .328, p = 
.746, d = .07). There was no main effect of Motivation (F(1, 20) = 1.19, p = .288, ηp
2 = 
.056) but there was a significant interaction between Motivation and Gaze direction (F(2, 
40) = 3.85, p = .03, ηp
2 = .161). 
The effect of gaze for the avoidance expressions 
One way ANOVAs were performed to further investigate the interaction between 
gaze direction and motivation in the symmetrical and asymmetrical experimental trials. In 
the symmetrical trials, when the agent displayed an avoidance expression, there was a 
significant main effect of Gaze direction (F(2, 40) = 14.3, p < .001, ηp
2 = .417). The gaze-
ahead condition elicited significantly more „after‟ responses than gaze-congruent (t(20) = 
4.21, p < .001, d = .74) and gaze-lagging conditions (t(20) = 4.79, p < .001, d = 1), which 
did not differ from each other (t(20) = 1.59, p = .128, d = .31). Responses were significantly 
biased in favour of the „after‟ choice in the gaze-ahead condition (t(20) = 4.14, p = .001, d 
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= .9, tested with respect to 50% level), but there were no significant response biases in the 
gaze-congruent (t(20) = .696, p = .494, d = .15) or gaze-lagging conditions (t(20) = .736, p 
= .47, d = .16).  
To investigate if the effect of gaze direction for the avoidance condition was present 
for both of the expressions (fear and disgust) or if it was driven by a large effect in one 
expression but not the other, the effect of gaze was entered into a within-subjects ANOVA 
along with Expression (fear vs. disgust). As expected there was a significant main effect of 
gaze direction (F(2, 40) = 14.4, p < .001,  ηp
2 = .418) but no main effect of Expression (F(1, 
20) = .353, p = .559, ηp
2 = .017), nor an interaction between Expression and Gaze 
direction (F(2, 40) = .139, p = .871, ηp
2 = .007). Therefore the effect of gaze did not differ 
significantly between the fear and disgust expression conditions (Figure 4.3).    
The effect of gaze for the approach expressions 
When the agent displayed an approach expression in the symmetrical trials, there 
was no main effect of Gaze direction (F(2, 40) = 1.04, p = .363, ηp
2 = .049). Because of 
this, the gaze direction conditions were collapsed to test for the presence of a response 
bias with respect to 50% level. The responses did not differ significantly from 50% (t(20) = 
.763, p = .454, d = .17). Again, a two-way ANOVA was conducted with Gaze direction and 
Expression (angry vs. happy) as within-subjects factors. There was no effect of Gaze 
direction (F(2, 40) = 1.07, p = .352, ηp
2 = .051), but there was a main effect of Expression, 
with the percentage of „after‟ responses significantly greater in the happy condition than in 
the angry condition (F(1, 20) = 6.48, p = .019, ηp
2 = .245). However, there was no 
significant response bias with respect to the 50% level for either the angry (t(20) =.135, p = 
.894, d = .03) or happy conditions (t(20) = 1.575, p = .131, d = .34), There was no 
interaction between Gaze direction and Expression (F(2, 40) = .246, p = .783, ηp
2 = .012).  
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Figure 4.2. The mean percentage of „after‟ responses elcitied by each gaze direction for 
each test stimulus type when the expression of the agent was of either approach or 
avoidance. 
 
 
Figure 4.3. The mean proportion of „after‟ responses elicited by each gaze direction 
condition for the individual emotional expressions in the symmetrical experimental (-
10o/+10o) trials. 
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In the asymmetrical experimental trials where the „after‟ choice was correct, there 
was no main effect of Gaze direction (F(2, 40) = .115, p = .892, ηp
2 = .006), Motivation 
(F(1, 20) = 3.91, p = .062, ηp
2 = .163), nor an interaction between them (F(2,40) = 1.03, p = 
.367, ηp
2 = .049). Similarly, when the „before‟ choice was correct, there were no main 
effects of Gaze direction (F(2 ,40) = 1.72, p = .193, ηp
2 = .079) or Motivation (F(1, 20) = 
.635, p = .435, ηp
2 = .031) or an interaction (F(2, 40) = 2.59, p = .088, ηp
2 = .115). 
Interaction between Motivation and Test-stimulus  
There was an interaction between Test-stimulus and Motivation. However, one way 
AVOVAs with Motivation as a within subjects factor did not reveal a significant main effect 
in the symmetrical trials (F(1, 20) = 1.02, p = .324, ηp
2 = .049), nor in either the 
asymmetrical trial conditions when the „after‟ (F(1, 20) = 3.79, p = .066, ηp
2 = .159) or 
„before‟ choice was correct (F(1, 20) = .4, p = .534, ηp
2 = .02). 
Discussion 
The aim of this experiment was to investigate if the emotional expression of the 
agent affects the role of gaze direction in anticipating the actions of others. Specifically, as 
gaze direction can be utilised as a means to resolve ambiguity created by emotional 
expressions, estimations of how far the head had rotated would be differentially modulated 
by gaze direction depending on the uncertainty generated by the expression. Expressions 
that conveyed a motivation to either approach or avoid were used as a means to 
manipulate such ambiguity. An action that approached the observer with an avoidance 
expression (fear, disgust) constituted an ambiguous stimulus. Determining which course of 
action the agent will make therefore necessitates a reliance on gaze direction, which would 
modulate estimations of how far the action proceeded. Conversely, an approaching action 
coupled with an approach expression (happy, anger) is unambiguous, therefore gaze 
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direction would not afford any greater specificity regarding the goals of the agent, and no 
modulation of action anticipation would be observed as a function of gaze direction.  
The observed results confirm the hypothesis. When the expression of the stimulus 
conveyed an avoidance motivation there was a significant effect of gaze direction. When 
the gaze of the agent was directed ahead of the direction of rotation, participants were 
significantly biased to judging the test head oriented 10o after the stopping angle as being 
more similar to the head at the end of the video clip than the test head oriented 10o before 
it. Furthermore, the proportion of these responses was significantly greater than when 
gaze was congruent with head orientation, or looking in the opposite direction to that of 
head rotation, neither of which elicited a significant response bias. This pattern of results 
was equally strong for both the fear and disgust expressions individually. Importantly, such 
variation as a function of gaze direction was not observed when the stimulus expressed 
approach emotions of angry or happiness. No responses biases (with respect to the 50% 
level) were observed and there were no differences between the three gaze direction 
conditions.  
However, estimations of how far the head had rotated were influenced by the 
expression. The happy condition elicited a greater proportion of „after‟ responses than the 
angry condition. This suggests that the observer anticipated that the action was more likely 
to continue in that direction if the agent expressed happiness than if expressing anger, 
irrespective of the direction of gaze. This supports the contention that the combined 
approach cues of the action and the expression (or at least happy expressions) conveyed 
sufficient information with which to reliably attribute the motivations of the agent without 
necessitating the use of gaze. However, the lack of a response bias for either expression 
precludes any firm conclusions. 
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The integration of gaze and expression 
The results largely replicate those of experiments 1a and 2 and support the 
contention that the anticipation of biological action sequences assimilates social 
information conveyed by dynamic facial cues in order to incorporate inferences as to the 
agent‟s goals and motivations. However, this experiment extends these findings by 
showing that such an effect is context specific. That is, rather than being mandatory, the 
use of gaze as a means to anticipate behaviour is selectively deployed based on the 
context provided by other social cues, especially when the intentions conveyed by such 
cues are vague. This is consistent with several lines of research showing that, firstly, the 
direction of another person‟s visual attention is used to resolve ambiguities caused by 
emotional expression, and that secondly, the interaction between social cues causes the 
meaning of one to depend on the meaning of the other. 
As for the nature of this integration, the results reflect the predictions of the FLMP in 
which the perception of social cues is a non-holistic and non-additive feature-based 
process. Furthermore, the processing of such cues proceeds independently, and in 
parallel with one another, prior to integration. This is consistent with studies indicating that 
gaze direction and expression are indeed processed separately and are integrated at a 
relatively late stage (Graham & LaBar, 2007; Klucharev & Sams, 2004). Some models of 
emotion recognition have incorporated the fuzzy nature of emotions (Fiorentini & Viviani, 
2009; Russell, 1997). This experiment extends the reach of the FLMP to encompass not 
only the integration of social cues for the purposes of perceptual categorisation of emotion 
(Ellison & Massaro, 1997; Massaro & Egan, 1996), but also the attribution of goals and 
intentions to the actions of others. The facial expression of approach combined with the 
face rotating toward the observer already exhibited a high degree of correspondence with 
the goal-prototype of approach, which was attributed to the agent. The gaze cue was not 
needed to reach this decision, i.e. there was no need to prioritise gaze processing. 
However, in case of avoidance expressions, there were equivalent degrees of 
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correspondence with the goal-prototypes of both approach (the action) and avoidance (the 
expression), which meant the behavioural intention remained unclear. Consequently, 
processing of the gaze cue was prioritised to try and clarify the intention. 
Comparison with previous experiments 
The effect of gaze observed in the experiments 1a and 2 can also be understood 
within this framework. The stimuli employed possessed a neutral expression throughout 
the presentation duration. In light of the lack of motivational information conveyed by the 
neutral facial expression, gaze direction became the most informative cue regarding the 
goal/intention of the action. Consequently, judgments of head rotation were influenced by 
gaze direction. The significant difference between the two conditions in which gaze was 
incongruently aligned with head orientation (both overall and just in the avoidance 
condition) is consistent with previous experiments; however the precise pattern of results 
is less reliable. The estimations in the gaze-ahead condition were significantly higher than 
in the gaze-congruent condition, and from 50%, suggesting that the effect of gaze was due 
to an overestimation of the degree of head rotation in the gaze-ahead condition. This 
pattern of results differs from experiment 1a in which the effect of gaze was due to 
underestimation of the degree of rotation when gaze was directed in the opposite direction 
to that of head rotation. 
Critical evaluation of possible alternative explanations 
In principle several alternative explanations can be offered to account for the 
observed results. Firstly, fear expressions require greater attention to the eye region 
(Bindemann et al., 2008; Smith et al., 2005) which may have facilitated an effect of gaze 
compared to happy expressions, for which attention is biased to the mouth region (Smith 
et al., 2005). However, determining anger expressions also relies on the eye region 
(Adolphs et al., 2005), for which no effect of gaze was found, suggesting selective 
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allocation of attention to the eyes cannot account for the observed results. Secondly, the 
fear condition may have elicited a gaze effect as the distinctive widening of the eyes 
characteristic of fear expressions increases the conspicuousness of the gaze signal 
(Tipples, 2005), in contrast to happy expressions in which the eyes are narrowed (Mehu, 
Little, & Dunbar, 2007). However, this does not account for the effect obtained for the 
disgust expression, which is similarly characterised by a squinting of the eyes. 
Furthermore, whilst not explicitly controlled for, inspection of the maximum on screen size 
of the eye showed only marginal variation between expressions (between 0.006o and 0.01o 
in height, and between 0.026o and 0.03o in width). Nevertheless, whilst in combination 
these factors may have played a role, none of them alone can account fully for the 
findings.  
Conclusion 
Overall, the results of this experiment are consistent with those of the previous 
experiments. Anticipations of how an action will proceed in the immediate future are 
influenced by social cues. This emphasises the reliability of the effect and supports the 
hypothesis that information regarding the goals and intentions of the actor are incorporated 
into the representation of the action itself, and facilitate predictions of their behaviour. The 
novel contribution of this experiment is that the influence of social cues is not obligatory. 
Whilst information conveyed by gaze may be processed in the same way, it is not always 
exploited for the purpose of action anticipation. The determining factor identified in this 
study is that of the specificity of information conveyed by other social cues, namely 
emotional expression. The necessity of using gaze direction is heightened when the 
combination of the action and the facial expression is either uninformative regarding the 
motivations of the actor (such as when possessing a neutral expression) or is ambiguous 
(as when expressing fear or disgust), whereas gaze direction seems redundant as a cue 
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when clear motivational information is conveyed (such as an expression of happy or 
anger). 
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Chapter 5. The effect of intentional attribution from gaze and expression on reflexive 
joint attention abilities and the influence of individual differences. 
The experiments so far have investigated the contribution of social cues in 
anticipating how another person‟s behaviour will unfold in the immediate future. That is, 
the role that gaze direction and emotional expression play in predicting the end-point of the 
action currently being observed. This form of social cognition has been referred to as 
motor empathy, and is distinguished from other components of social cognition such as 
the ability to represent another‟s emotional state (emotional empathy) or their intentions, 
beliefs, and knowledge (cognitive empathy) (Blair, 2005). These latter forms of empathy 
enable an observer to anticipate the behaviour of others over longer periods of time, for 
example in future social interactions. The aim of this study was to assess the role of social 
cues in these other forms of empathy by investigating if specific combinations of gaze 
direction and emotional expression behaviour are used to infer the prosocial or antisocial 
disposition of another individual. Moreover, if this information is retained over a larger time 
period to influence anticipations of their behaviour in a future social interaction, specifically 
the speed with which they follow another person‟s gaze direction. 
Attributing intentions from social cues 
Emotional expressions are one means by which an observer can gauge the altruistic 
or deceptive intentions of others. Specifically, the expressions of happiness and anger 
convey a prosocial and antisocial disposition respectively, and have been found to 
influence decision making in cooperative exchanges in economic games of trust and 
fairness (Allen & Courchesne, 2001; Schmidt & Cohn, 2001; van Dijk, van Kleef, Steinel, & 
van Beest, 2008). Smiling elicits attributions of generosity and cooperation (Mehu, Little et 
al., 2007; Scharlemann, Eckel, Kacelnik, & Wilson, 2001), and those who do so are 
afforded greater degrees of trust and fairer allocations of resources in games requiring 
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reciprocated cooperation in order to increase mutual pay-offs (Brown & Moore, 2002; 
Mehu, Grammer, & Dunbar, 2007; Scharlemann et al., 2001). Conversely, those likely to 
defect on such exchanges can be denoted by facial expressions of fear or anger 
(Vanneste, Verplaetse, Van Hiel, & Braeckman, 2007). The faces of those depicted at the 
moment of defecting on another‟s cooperation are processed implicitly and automatically, 
as evidenced in the automatic orienting of attention to such faces (Vanneste et al., 2007), 
and observers are better able to recall and discriminate the identity of such defectors than 
those who reciprocated another‟s cooperation (Brown & Moore, 2002; Verplaetse, 
Vanneste, & Braeckman, 2007; Yamagishi, Tanida, Mashima, Shimoma, & Kanazawa, 
2003). These effects are obtained despite the irrelevance of the stimulus differences to the 
demands of the task, but require that such stimuli are obtained in situations of real 
financial stakes and not from simulated interactions. As such, these cues are used in a 
variable and context dependant nature. Moreover, they are processed and acted upon 
swiftly and accurately by a sophisticated perceptual system that can discriminate real from 
simulated cues. The necessity of doing so could mean the difference between benefiting 
from a reciprocal exchange, and incurring a cost by having one‟s own cooperative actions 
defected on (Mehu, Grammer et al., 2007). 
Spatial orienting of attention in response to gaze direction 
Managing costs and benefits in social interactions by inferring the prosocial or 
antisocial intentions of others extends beyond situations of resource distribution. Reacting 
appropriately to the gaze behaviour of others is similarly advantageous (Emery, 2000), and 
orienting attention to where another is looking (joint attention) facilitates locating and 
learning about potentially threatening or beneficial stimuli and language acquisition 
(Charman et al., 2000; Hadjikhani et al., 2008). The importance of this is reflected in the 
reflexive and automatic orienting of one‟s spatial attention in the direction that another 
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person is looking (Frischen et al., 2007). Cueing of attention by gaze direction is 
distinguished from other cues in that it has ecological relevance that other symbolic cues 
lack. A peripheral target is preceded by a centrally presented gaze that is either averted to 
the location that the target will appear at (valid cue) or averted to a location that it will not 
appear at (invalid cue). Even though the gaze cue is non-predictive of target location, 
target processing is facilitated, in terms of detection or localization, when the gaze cue is 
valid than if invalid. 
The time course of the gaze cueing effect can be measured by varying the delay 
between onset of the cue and onset of the target (Stimulus Onset Asynchrony, SOA). The 
minimum SOA at which a gaze cueing effect is reliably observed is 100 ms, and there is 
evidence that it may occur before this (Hietanen & Leppanen, 2003). It is also evident at 
SOAs as long as 1005 ms (Friesen & Kingstone, 2003; Ristic et al., 2005) with inconsistent 
reports of an effect at 1200 ms (Frischen & Tipper, 2004; Tipples, 2008). The rapid onset 
of such an effect is characteristic of the automatic stimulus driven orienting of attention in 
response to exogenous cues, but its length is characteristic of the top-down mechanisms 
of voluntary orienting of attention in response to endogenous cues, suggesting gaze 
cueing to be subject to both obligatory and voluntary processes at different time courses 
(Friesen, Ristic, & Kingstone, 2004). An initial involuntary reflex to follow another‟s gaze 
emerges early, but diminishes as a slower voluntary control of attention orienting emerges 
later (Friesen et al., 2004).  
Spatial predictability of the gaze cue 
Evidence for the automatic nature of the gaze cueing effect comes from studies that 
explicitly manipulate the spatial predictability of the gaze cue with respect to target 
location. Participants are expected to exhibit a greater gaze cueing effect when the 
probability that the target will appear at the gazed at location is predictive (> 50%), and 
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should not follow the gaze cue when cue target congruency is counter-predictive (< 50%). 
The magnitude of the gaze cueing effect should therefore reflect the likelihood of the target 
appearing at the gazed at location and be either potentiated or attenuated. However, these 
studies suggest that cueing of spatial attention is not mediated by varying the spatial 
contingencies between gaze direction and target location. Explicitly informing participants 
that the cue-target congruency rate will be 80% does not increase the speed with which 
targets at the cued location are processed (Driver et al., 1999; Friesen et al., 2004; Ristic 
et al., 2005; Tipples, 2008). Similarly, cueing of attention in the direction of gaze direction 
persists when the likelihood of the target appearing in that location is only 20% (Downing, 
Dodds, & Bray, 2004; Kuhn & Kingstone, 2009). Only after SOAs in excess of 600 ms do 
processing times of the target reflect the likelihood that the gaze cue was directed in that 
location (Friesen et al., 2004; Kuhn & Kingstone, 2009; Tipples, 2008). This suggests that 
immediately after observing an averted gaze, participants cannot help but orient attention 
in that direction, and only after 600 ms can voluntary processes act on explicit knowledge 
to control orienting of attention (Friesen et al., 2004; Tipples, 2008).  
Bayliss and Tipper (2006) sought to investigate if the spatial predictability of specific 
identities could be implicitly learnt during the course of the cueing experiment. They 
presented four identities, two of which were non-predictive (50% congruency), one who 
was predictive (80% congruency) and one who was counter-predictive (20% congruency). 
Participants were not explicitly aware of the varying gaze target contingencies of the four 
identities. It was anticipated that an equivocal cueing effect would be evident at the start, 
with the magnitude of the gaze cueing effect varying between the identities by the end 
(predictive > non-predictive > counter-predictive). However, this was not found. Although 
there was a gaze cueing effect overall, the predictive and counter-predictive identities did 
not elicit an effect that was different from that of the non-predictive identities. However, 
subsequent attributions of trustworthiness were greater for the predictive identity, and 
recall for the face of the counter-predictive identity was greater than for the predictive 
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identity, reflecting the memory bias exhibited for the face of those defecting in social 
exchanges (Yamagishi et al., 2003). 
The effect of individual differences in empathising, systemising and autistic traits on the 
gaze cueing effect  
Despite its relevance in social interactions, the extent to which attention is oriented in 
response to the gaze direction of others shows considerable individual variation, with 
some individuals showing no gaze-cuing effect at all (Frischen et al., 2007). The nature of 
this variation is associated with individual differences in the ability to empathise, which 
enables social information to be processed in order to understand and interpret the 
behaviour of others in terms of intentionality. Baron-Cohen et al (2004) devised the 
empathising quotient (EQ) to assess an individual‟s propensity to empathise. An 
individual‟s empathising skills shows an inverse relationship with their ability to systemise 
(Carroll & Yung, 2006; Wheelwright et al., 2006), which enables the rules and lawful 
principles governing the behaviour of systems to be deduced.  Wheelright et al (2006) 
devised an equivalent self-assessment measure for systemising called the systemising 
quotient (SQ-R). An extreme asymmetry between empathising and systemising is 
characteristic of those with disorders along the autistic spectrum, who show abnormal 
deficits in empathising, but greatly enhanced systemising abilities. As autism represents 
an extreme phenotype of traits that are present in the normal population, those who exhibit 
more of these traits, as measured by the Autistic-Spectrum Quotient (AQ; Baron-Cohen, 
Wheelwright, Skinner, Martin, & Clubley, 2001), show a significant but smaller gaze cueing 
effect than those who exhibit few of these traits (Bayliss, di Pellegrino, & Tipper, 2005; 
Bayliss & Tipper, 2005). However, studies investigating the presence of a gaze cueing 
effect in those with high functioning autism have found mixed results. Some studies have 
demonstrated an absence of spatial orienting in response to a non-predictive gaze cue 
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(Johnson et al., 2005; Ristic et al., 2005), whilst others have found that gaze cueing effect 
remains intact in such populations (Chawarska, Klin, & Volkmar, 2003; Kemner, Schuller, 
& van Engeland, 2006; Kylliainen & Hietanen, 2004; Senju, Tojo, Dairoku, & Hasegawa, 
2004; Swettenham, Condie, Campbell, Milne, & Coleman, 2003; Vlamings, Stauder, van 
Son, & Mottron, 2005). 
Several authors have proposed that those with autism are capable of computing and 
following another‟s direction of gaze, but do so in a way that is qualitatively different from 
that of non-autistic people (Nation & Penny, 2008). Driver et al (1999) refer to this as 
mechanistic versus mentalistic processing, while Ristic et al (2005) call it the feature 
correspondence versus social reading hypotheses (see also Jellema & Perrett (2005) for a 
description of this distinction applied to biological motion in general). In essence, gaze 
processing in typically developing individuals is accompanied by a psychological 
component that appreciates the perceptual experience, goals and intentions of the gazer. 
It is this comprehension of the social meaning that distinguishes it from other, non-social, 
types of cue. However, for autistic individuals, gaze is devoid of any social meaning and 
can be based solely on the association between the low level visual appearance of the 
pupil shifting within the sclera and the target location. This is supported by De Jong et al 
(2008) who found that, even though those with ASD exhibited a gaze cueing effect, it was 
based on local featural information from high spatial frequencies, whereas those without 
ASD used global information from low spatial frequencies. Furthermore, whilst the gaze 
cueing effect for the typically developing control group was modulated by the emotional 
expression of the stimulus, it was not for the ASD group. Further studies have suggested 
that gaze direction cues the attention of autistic individuals in a manner comparable to that 
of other non-social cues, such as arrows. In TD individuals, gaze cues to the observer‟s 
right side elicit a greater cueing effect than those to their left side, yet no such laterality 
effects are observed in response to arrows cues. In contrast, those with ASD show no 
laterality effects in response to either gaze or arrows (Vlamings et al., 2005). Furthermore, 
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the response times of TD individuals is slower to gaze cues than to arrow cues, but the 
response times in ASD individuals is equivalent for both social and non-social cues 
(Chawarska et al., 2003; Vlamings et al., 2005). 
Two studies have assessed the effect of spatial predictability on the gaze cueing 
effect of those with high autistic traits. Bayliss and Tipper (2006) found that no effect of 
spatial predictability was observed for those who scored either high or low on the AQ. 
However, these participants were taken from the general population and therefore did not 
have abnormally high levels of autistic traits. Ristic et al (2005) tested those with high 
functioning autism and found that, whilst they showed no gaze cueing effect in response to 
a non-predictive gaze cue, they did orient attention in response to a predictive gaze cue. 
Furthermore, this was evident at SOAs typically thought to be indicative of automatic 
mechanisms that are not modulated by spatial predictability in non-autistic individuals. This 
makes sense in light of their proficiency in processing systematic regularities, as they 
would be more sensitive to the probabilistic nature of gaze cues, and therefore to its 
spatial predictability.  
Hypotheses 
The aim of this study was to investigate if emotional expression and gaze direction 
contribute to an observers attributions of whether the individual has a prosocial or 
antisocial disposition, and if these inferences affect subsequent cueing of spatial attention 
in response to their gaze direction. Specifically, the gaze cueing effect in response to a 
prosocial identity should be greater than in response to an antisocial identity. Furthermore, 
this difference should be greater for those who are more sensitive to social information 
(high empathisers, low in autistic traits) than those who are less sensitive to social 
information (low empathisers, high in autistic traits). Conversely, those who exhibit a 
greater sensitivity to systematic regularities (high systemisers, high in autistic traits) will 
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show a greater gaze cueing effect in response to identities whose gaze is spatially 
predictive of target location. 
Participants will initially complete a learning phase consisting of repeated exposure 
to three identities. Through a combination of changes in gaze direction and emotional 
expression, participants will learn that one identity has a prosocial disposition toward the 
observer, the second has an antisocial disposition toward the observer, and the gaze 
direction of the third is spatially predictive of target location. The three identities will then 
be used in a subsequent gaze cueing study with a non-predictive gaze cue (the test 
phase). The use of a separate learning phase was deemed necessary for two reasons. 
Firstly, Bayliss and Tipper (2006) did not find implicit learning of spatial contingencies 
during the course of a gaze cueing experiment. An effect of learning may be maximised if 
it occurs before hand. Secondly, emotional expressions have been previously utilised in 
gaze cueing studies, but in order to imply the gazer‟s emotional reaction to the target, not 
to the observer (Hori et al., 2005; Tipples, 2006). The stimuli therefore had a neutral 
expression in the gaze cueing paradigm.  
Experiment 4 
Method 
Participants 
Participants (N = 95, 48 females, mean age = 20.7 years, SD = 1.9 years) were all 
students at the University of Hull, UK, and gave written informed consent prior to taking 
part. All had normal or corrected-to-normal vision. 
Apparatus 
All stimuli were presented using e-Prime software (Psychology Software Tools, Inc) 
on a 21 inch monitor (100 Hz refresh rate) from which participants sat approximately 50 
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cm. All stimuli were created using Poser 7 animation software (Curious Labs, Inc & e 
frontier, Inc). Prior to completing the experimental phase participants were administered 
online versions of the AQ (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001), EQ (Baron-Cohen & Wheelwright, 
2004) and SQ-R (Wheelwright et al., 2006). Each took 10 minutes to complete and was 
scored automatically. 
Stimulus 
Learning phase 
The learning phase consisted of repeated exposure to video clips of three different 
identities. The gaze direction of the agents varied with a smooth and continuous motion 
within a 30o range during the course of the video clip. Gaze was either initially fixated at 
the observer (0o) at the start of the clip and was horizontally averted 30o by the end, or 
began at a 30o aversion from mutual gaze and was looking at the observer (0o) at the end 
of the clip. The stimulus was oriented facing the observer throughout and depicted from 
the top of the shoulders upwards. The subtended angle of the stimulus‟s width varied 
depending on the character used but ranged from between 11.8o to 19.7o, whilst the height 
of all the characters was 18.1o. For all three identities, a red square was positioned to the 
left or right of the stimulus along the horizontal midline. The red square was of a height 
and width of 2.1o, the inner edge of which was positioned 6.9o from the centre of the 
screen and between 1.3o and 0.9o from the edge of the face stimulus (depending on the 
character). Three learning conditions were created by making the gaze aversion either 
socially or spatially meaningful (detailed below, see Table 5.1 and Figure 5.1). Each of the 
different conditions was assigned to a specific identity, which were counterbalanced 
across participants and presented in a random order during the learning phase. A total of 
four identities were used (2 males and 2 females), however each participant was only 
exposed to three of them which was also counterbalanced across participants. 
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Predictive identity 
In this condition, the direction of gaze movement was spatially congruent with the 
position of the target. The gaze movement towards or away from the observer occurred on 
the same side of the screen as the position of the red square. The spatial relationship of 
the gaze behaviour with the target position was therefore predictive. The aim was that the 
participant would associate the gaze behaviour of this identity with the correct location of 
the target. The expression of this identity was neutral throughout.  
Positive identity 
For this condition, the direction of gaze was not spatially contingent on the position of 
the target. That is, the gaze movement was to the same side of the screen as the targets 
position as often as it was to the opposite side. However, the change in gaze direction was 
accompanied by a change in emotional expression, thus making it socially contingent to 
the observer. A gaze movement away from the observer accompanied a change from 
happy to angry, and a gaze movement toward the observer accompanied a change from 
angry to happy. Because of this, a positive social disposition to the observer was implied, 
as the happy expression was directed at the observer and the angry expression was 
directed away. 
Negative identity 
Like the socially positive condition, the relationship between the gaze behaviour and 
target location was spatially non-predictive and meaningless. However, the relationship 
with the change in expression was reversed, such that a gaze movement away from the 
observer coincided with an expression change from angry to happy, and a gaze movement 
toward the observer coincided with an expression change from happy to angry. This 
therefore implied a negative social disposition to the observer, as the angry expression 
was directed at the observer, and the happy expression was directed away. 
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 Gaze Movement Expression Gaze – Target Congruency 
Identity 1: Predictive Direct – Away 
Away - Direct 
Neutral 
Neutral 
100% 
100% 
Identity 2: Positive Direct – Away 
Away - Direct 
Happy – Angry 
Angry - Happy 
50% 
50% 
Identity 3: Negative Direct – Away 
Away - Direct 
Angry – Happy 
Happy – Angry 
50% 
50% 
 
Table 5.1. The gaze behaviour in relation to the emotional expression and target position 
for the three identities. 
 
 
 
Figure 5.1. Stimuli in the learning phase for the Predictive (A), Positive (B) and Negative 
(C) identities. For all identities the gaze changed from averted to direct (i) or from direct to 
averted (ii). For the predictive identity, the expression was neutral throughout but the gaze 
A: Predictive 
B: Positive 
C: Negative 
i 
i 
i 
ii 
ii 
ii 
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direction was always congruent with target location. For the positive and negative identities 
the expression changed from happy to angry or from angry to happy. For the positive 
identity, the happy expression was always directed toward the observer whereas the angry 
expression always directed away from the observer. For the negative identity, the angry 
expression was always directed at the observer whereas the happy expression was 
always directed away from the observer. The target appeared at the gazed at location in 
half the trials (shown) and on the opposite side in the remaining half. 
Testing phase 
The test phase consisted of a reflexive social orienting paradigm involving the three 
identities previously observed in the learning phase. A centrally presented face with gaze 
averted towards either the left or right of the screen preceded the appearance of a 
peripheral target along the horizontal midline either in a location congruent with the 
direction of gaze (valid) or on the opposite side of the screen (invalid).The orientation of 
the face and shoulders and its size on screen was the same as in the learning phase. The 
expression of each face was neutral and the extent of gaze aversion was 30o from a 
mutual gaze (0o). The target was a red square, the size and appearance of which was the 
same as that of the target in the learning phase, both on screen and in relation to the face 
stimulus. 
Procedure 
Learning phase 
Participants were required to watch each video clip and press the spacebar when the 
eyes stopped moving. This task ensured that the stimuli were attended to throughout. 
Participants observed 96 trials (32 each of the positive, negative and predictive identities). 
The movement of gaze direction was on the left in half of the trials, and on the right in the 
remaining half (distributed evenly across the conditions). Each trial began with a blank 
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screen of 1500ms duration (which also served as the ITI) after which the video clip was 
presented. This consisted of 20 static frames presented in quick succession, with the first 
frame on screen for 750ms and all subsequent frames for 50ms (1.7 seconds total 
duration), with the final frame on screen until a response was made or 3 seconds had 
elapsed. There were 24 additional trials in which the gaze did not move (8 for each 
identity). These were catch trials in which the participant was not required to make a 
response, and were used to assess performance. The social or spatial contingency of the 
identity was maintained in these catch trials. The static gaze of the socially meaningful 
identities remained fixated at the observer and was combined with either an expression 
change from either angry to happy (positive) or happy to angry (negative). For the spatially 
predictive identity, the gaze remained averted to the same side as the target position. The 
total 120 trials were split into two blocks of 60 lasting approximately 10 minutes. 
Testing phase  
Participants observed 144 trials in total (48 each for socially positive, 48 for socially 
negative and 48 for spatially predictive) lasting approximately 10 minutes (Figure 5.2). 
Each trial of the test phase began with a fixation cross (500 ms) followed by the gaze cue 
consisting of a face with gaze averted to the left or right. The duration of the gaze cue 
before onset of the target was either 300 ms or 800 ms. The target appeared on 96 of the 
trials, 48 on the side of the screen congruent with the direction of gaze, 48 on the 
incongruent side, thus ensuring that the gaze cue was non-predictive of the target‟s 
location. Participants were required to make a speeded response by pressing the 
spacebar as soon as they saw the target. The design was a 3 (Identity) X 2 (SOA) X 2 
(Validity) design with each iteration represented by 8 trials. On the remaining 48 trials (16 
per identity) the target did not appear and participants were not required to make a 
response.  
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Figure 5.2. Trial procedure for the gaze cueing paradigm used in the test phase. A fixation 
cross (A) was followed by the presentation of a face with gaze averted to the left or right 
(B). After either 300 or 800 ms a red target appeared either at the gazed at location (C: 
Valid) or on the opposite side of the screen (D: Invalid).  
 
Results 
Questionnaire data and group allocation 
The results of the questionnaires are summarised in Table 5.2. Bivariate correlation 
analysis (Spearman‟s rho, two-tailed, N = 95) showed that the scores on the AQ were 
negatively correlated with EQ scores (rho = -.288, p = .005) and were positively correlated 
with SQ scores (rho = .384, p < .001). The relationship between EQ and SQ-R scores was 
negative but not significant (rho = -.095, p = .359).  
There were two methods of group allocation used. The first was based on AQ scores 
(Figure 5.3 left panel). Participants scoring equal to or less than the median AQ score of 
15 were allocated to the low AQ group (n = 47, mean = 11.6, SD = 2.6) and those scoring 
higher than 15 were allocated to the high AQ group (n = 48, mean = 19.2, SD = 2.6). The 
AQ groups differed significantly on scores on the AQ (t(94) = -14.2, p < .001), EQ (t(94) = 
2.16, p = .033) and SQ-R (t(94) = -3.44, p = .001). The second method of group allocation 
was determined by the asymmetry between EQ and SQ scores (following the method of 
(Goldenfeld, Baron-Cohen, & Wheelwright, 2005; Wheelwright et al., 2006). Scores were 
A: Fixation 
(1500 ms) 
B: Gaze cue  
(300 or 800 ms) 
C: Target (Valid) 
(max 3 seconds) 
D: target (Invalid) 
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first normalised by subtracting the mean score from the participant‟s score and dividing the 
result by the maximum possible score obtainable (EQ = 80, SQ-R =150). Figure 5.3 (right 
panel) shows these normalised scores plotted against each other. The difference between 
these new scores (normalised SQ-R – normalised EQ) were divided by 2 producing a new 
value D. Where D had a negative value, the participant‟s score was asymmetric in favour 
of empathising, whilst a positive valued denoted an asymmetry biased toward systemising. 
There was a significant positive correlation between D values and AQ scores (Spearmans 
rho =.458, p < .001, N = 95, two-tailed), suggesting that as a participants asymmetry 
became increasingly biased towards systemising, then the number of autistic traits they 
exhibited also increased, in keeping with the positive relationship between AQ scores and 
SQ-R scores and the negative relationship between AQ scores and EQ scores. Previous 
studies have defined the balanced group as those participants scoring a D value of less 
than 0.1 and higher than -0.1, with those scoring -0.1 or less defined as empathisers, and 
those scoring 0.1 or more defined as systemisers. However, when applied to the current 
sample, this resulted in highly uneven group sizes (systemisers = 23, balanced = 54, 
empathisers = 19). Therefore, a different method was favoured in which those participants 
whose D value was -0.05 or less were allocated to the empathising group (n =31), those 
with a D value of 0.05 or more to the systemising group (n = 31), and those in between -
0.05 and 0.05 to the balanced group (n = 33). The AQ, EQ and SQ data for all groups are 
summarised in Table 5.2. 
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  AQ Group EQ/SQ-R Asymmetry Group 
 All 
(N = 95) 
Low 
(n = 47) 
High 
(n = 48) 
E > S 
(n = 31) 
B 
(n = 33) 
S > E 
(n = 31) 
AQ 15.5 (4.6) 11.6 (2.6) 19.2 (2.6) 13.3 (3.8) 15.0 (4.5) 18.3 (4.1) 
EQ 43.2 (11.4) 45.7 (11.0) 40.7 (11.1) 54.3 (6.0) 41.4 (8.1) 33.5 (8.7) 
SQ-R 50.3 (20.5) 43.3 (14.0) 57.0 (23.6) 36.9 (12.0) 47.9 (15.3) 66.6 (22.5) 
 
Table 5.2. Mean (SD) scores on the AQ, EQ and SQ-R for all participants, and separately 
for the low and high AQ groups and for the Empathising, Balanced and Systemising 
groups.   
 
 
 
Figure 5.3. The distribution of the three Empathising - Systemising asymmetry groups 
when normalised EQ scores are plotted against normalised SQ-R scores. X-axis: 
Normalised EQ scores, Y-axis: Normalised SQ-R scores. 
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Data reduction 
Error rates in the learning phase (mean = 3.1%, SD = 11.3%) and test phase (mean 
= 0.6%, SD = 0.9%) were averaged (mean = 1.8%, SD = 5.6%). Participants with an 
average error rate in excess of 5% were excluded (n = 5, mean = 17.1%, SD = 18.5), 
leaving 90 participants (mean = 1.0%, SD = 2.2%, Low AQ = 46, High AQ = 44, E > S = 
31, B = 30, S > E = 29).  The mean RT in the test phase was 342 ms (SD = 41 ms). Catch 
trials and incorrect trials were excluded, as were trials where responses were made less 
than 100 ms or above 2SD of each participant‟s mean RT (n = 4.4%, mean = 567 ms, SD 
= 148 ms), resulting in a new mean RT of 332 ms (SD = 38 ms). 
Spatial orienting in response to gaze direction 
To verify the presence of a cueing effect, the data were initially subject to a 2 X 2 
ANOVA with Validity and SOA entered as within-subjects factors. This showed that there 
was no significant effect of SOA (F(1, 89) = .498, p = .482, ηp
2 = .006). Response times 
were significantly faster in valid trials than invalid trials (F(1, 89) = 16.5, p < .001, ηp
2 = 
.156). There was a significant interaction between SOA and Validity (F(1, 89) = 6.31, p = 
.014, ηp
2 = .066), due to the valid trials eliciting significantly faster response times than the 
invalid trials at an SOA of 300 ms (t(89) = 4.62, p < .001, d = .2) but not at an SOA of 800 
ms (t(89) = 1.473, p = .144, d = .05) (Figure 5.4). 
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Figure 5.4. Mean target detection times when the gaze cue correctly predicted (valid) and 
incorrectly predicted (invalid) target location for the 300 ms and 800 ms conditions 
separately. The effect of gaze cueing can be measured by subtracting target detection 
times in the valid trials from those in the invalid trials (300 ms SOA: mean = 7.2 ms, SD = 
14.9 ms; 800 ms SOA: mean = 2.0 ms, SD = 12.9 ms). 
 
The effect of AQ group and stimulus identity on the cueing effect at 300 ms SOA 
As the focus of this study was to investigate if the extent of the gaze cueing effect 
differed between identities, the response times in the valid trials were subtracted from 
those in the invalid trials. This provided a measure of the magnitude of the cueing effect. 
This was entered into a two-way ANOVA with identity (positive vs. negative vs. predictive) 
as a within subjects factor and AQ Group (low vs. high) as a between subjects factor. 
There was no significant main effect of identity (F(2, 176) =.43, p = .65, ηp
2 = .005) and no 
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significant main effect of AQ Group (F(1, 88) = 1.59, p = .21, ηp
2 = .018). There was a 
significant interaction between identity and AQ Group (F(2, 176) = 3.3, p = .038, ηp
2 = .036) 
(Figure 5.5). 
Paired sample t-tests (αBon = .0167) showed that for the low AQ group, the cueing 
effect in response to the negative identity was significantly less than that in response to the 
positive identity (t(45) = 2.76, p =.008, d = .5). The cueing effect elicited by the predictive 
identity did not differ from that elicited by either the positive (t(45) = .18, p = .858, d = .04) 
or negative identities (t(45) = 1.84, p = .073, d = .41). For the high AQ group the cueing 
effect did not differ between any of the identities (positive vs. negative: t(43) = .951, p = 
.347, d = .2; positive vs. predictive: t(43) = .486, p = .629, d = .1; negative vs. predictive: 
t(43) = 1.21, p = .231, d = .3).   
The effect of AQ group and stimulus identity on the cueing effect at 800 ms SOA  
There was no significant effect of identity (F(2, 176) = .061, p = .94, ηp
2 = .001) nor 
was there a significant effect of AQ group (F(1, 88) = .196, p = .659, ηp
2 = .002). There was 
a significant interaction between identity and AQ group (F(2, 176) = 3.611, p = .029, ηp
2 = 
.039) (Figure 5.5).  
Paired sample t-tests showed that for the low AQ group there was no differences in 
the gaze cueing effect between the different identities (positive vs. negative: t(45) = .743, p 
= .461, d = .2; positive vs. predictive: t(45) = 1.07, p = .289, d = .2; negative vs. predictive: 
t(45) = 1.81, p = .078, d = .4). For the high AQ group the gaze cueing effect in response to 
the positive identity did not differ from either the negative (t(43) = 1.23, p = .227, d = .3) or 
predictive identities (t(43) = .728, p = .471, d = .2). The difference between the negative 
and predictive identities was significant at p = .05 but did not survive the bonferroni 
adjustment (t(43) = 2.12, p = .04, d = .4).  
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Figure 5.5. Mean gaze cueing effect elicited by each of the stimulus identities for the low 
AQ and High AQ groups when the SOA was either 300 or 800 ms. Error bars represent +/- 
1 standard error of the mean. 
 
The effect of empathising/systemising asymmetry and identity 
The same analysis was conducted after participants were grouped according to their 
D value (see Figure 5.6), which is a measure of the degree of asymmetry they exhibit in 
terms of empathising and systemising (E > S vs. Balanced vs. S > E). At 300 ms SOA, 
there was no significant main effects of identity (F(2, 174) = .436, p = .65, ηp
2 = .005) or of 
D group (F(2, 87) = 1.27, p = .285, ηp
2 = .028), nor was there a significant interaction 
(F(4,174) = .459, p = .766, ηp
2 = .01). At 800 ms SOA, there were similarly no significant 
main effects of identity (F(2, 174) = .45, p = .956, ηp
2 = .001) or of D group (F(2, 87) = .127, 
p = .881, ηp
2 = .003). However, there was a significant interaction (F(4, 174) = 3.56, p = 
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.008, ηp
2 = .076). One way ANOVAs with identity as a within subjects factor were 
conducted for each identity group.  
There was no main effect of identity for either the Empathising group (F(2,60) = 1.37, 
p = .262, ηp
2 = .044) or Balanced group (F(2,58) = 1.88, p = .162, ηp
2 = .061). There was a 
significant main effect of identity for the Systemising group (F(2,56) = 4.68, p = .013, ηp
2 = 
.143). Paired sample t-tests showed that the gaze cueing effect in response to the 
negative identity did not differ from that in response to the positive (t(28) = 1.31, p = .2, d = 
.3) or predictive identities (t(28) 1.81, p =.081, d = .5). The gaze cueing effect elicited by 
the Predictive identity was significantly greater than that elicited by the positive identity 
(t(28) = 2.97, p = .006, d = .8).  
 
 
 
Figure 5.6. Mean gaze cueing effects for the three empathising/systemising asymmetry 
groups in response to the three stimulus identities with an SOA of either 300 or 800ms. 
Error bars represent +/- 1 standard error of the mean. 
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Correlation analysis 
The effect of individual differences in autistic traits and empathising/systemising 
asymmetries was further explored by conducting a correlation analysis (Spearman‟s Rho, 
two-tailed) between the magnitude of the cueing effect in response to the three identities 
and a participant‟s AQ score and D value (Figure 5.7). 
With an SOA of 300 ms (N = 90), AQ scores were positively correlated with the 
cueing effect in response to the negative identity (rho = .305, p = .003), but not the positive 
(rho = -.005, p = .962) or predictive identities (rho = .053, p = .616). D values showed no 
significant relationship with the cueing effect for either the positive (rho = .085, p = .423), 
negative (rho = -.031, p = .769) or predictive identities (rho = .077, p = .47). 
With an SOA of 800 ms, (N = 90), there was a significant positive correlation 
between AQ and the cueing effect elicited by the predictive identity (rho = -.275, p = .009) 
but not with the positive (rho = -.085, p = -.071) or negative identity (rho = -.160, p = .131). 
Furthermore, D values also positively correlated with the cueing effect for the predictive 
identity (rho = .239, p = .024) but not the positive (rho = -.202, p = .056) nor negative 
identities (rho = -.131, p = .219). 
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Figure 5.7. The relationship between gaze cueing and individual differences in 
empathising, systemising and autistic traits. The size of the cueing effect (invalidRT – 
validRT) is plotted against AQ score (left column) and D value (right column) for the 
Positive (A), Negative (B) and Predictive (C) identities with an SOA of 300 (filled circle, 
solid line) and 800 ms (empty circle, dashed line).   
A 
B 
C 
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Discussion 
The aim of this study was to dissociate two styles of gaze processing that are related 
to individual differences. The size of the gaze cueing effect in response to a specific 
identity should depend on whether the observer anticipates their behaviour to be prosocial, 
antisocial or predictive. These attributions were manipulated by varying either social or 
spatial contingencies for different identities in an initial learning phase. These identities 
were then used in a subsequent gaze cueing experiment, in which participants were 
required to detect a peripheral target after observing a non-predictive gaze cue averted in 
either a congruent or incongruent direction. It was expected that reflexive cueing in 
response to the gaze direction of the three identities would vary according to what the 
observer had learnt during the learning phase. Specifically, it was expected that the gaze 
cueing effect for those who score highly on empathising measures and low on autistic 
traits would be affected by attributions derived from emotional expressions. In contrast, the 
gaze cueing effect in those who exhibit greater systemising skills and autistic traits would 
be more affected by the spatial predictability of the gaze cue.  
Firstly a discussion of the data related to individual differences in empathising, 
systemising and autistic traits. The relationships between the scores support previous 
studies. Baron-Cohen‟s (2002) empathising-systemising model proposes that autism is 
characterised by a concurrent impairment in empathising skills and an enhanced ability to 
systemise, and that this inverse relationship is evident in the normal population (Carroll & 
Yung, 2006; Wheelwright et al., 2006). Accordingly, scores on the AQ were significantly 
correlated with scores on the EQ and SQ-R, with those exhibiting more autistic traits 
showing greater systemising abilities and fewer empathising abilities. However, although 
empathising and systemising did show a negative correlation, this was not significant. The 
direction of the relationship is consistent with previous research. Its non-significance may 
depend on sample size. Those finding a significant correlation used samples of 1761 
(Wheelwright et al., 2006) and 278 (Baron-Cohen & Wheelwright, 2004) participants, 
135 
 
exceeding that of the current study (95), and of Carroll and Kin Yung (2006) whose non-
significant finding was from a sample of 20. 
Furthermore, in none of the analyses was there a differential effect of 
empathising/systemising asymmetry or autistic traits on the gaze cueing effect. However, it 
must be kept in mind that all participants were taken from the general population and 
would therefore not have abnormal deficits in empathising or excessive autistic traits. An 
individual‟s degree of asymmetry in empathising and systemising was relative to the rest of 
the sample, and not derived from an absolute diagnostic criterion. Baron-Cohen et al 
(2001) has proposed that an AQ score in excess of 32 is indicative of clinical levels of 
autistic traits. However no participant in this study exceeded this score. Abnormal deficits 
in empathising may therefore be required if an effect of individual differences on the 
differential cueing effect is apparent.  
The gaze cueing effect 
Overall there was a significant gaze cueing effect, with target detection times faster if 
the preceding gaze cue was averted in a direction congruent with the target than if averted 
in an incongruent direction. This agrees with previous research and confirms that the 
current stimuli and method were successful at eliciting such an effect. However, the 
interaction with SOA showed that the gaze cueing effect was significant only when the 
delay between gaze cue onset and target onset was short (300 ms) and not when it was 
long (800 ms). Previous studies have found the gaze cueing effect to be evident at both 
short and long SOAs, even though they may be the result of either automatic or voluntary 
processes, respectively. Furthermore, the significant effect observed with an SOA of 300 
ms was only small (7.3 ms) which is in contrast to the larger effects found in other studies 
(typically 10 - 20 ms). This suggests that the current method may not have been optimal in 
eliciting a gaze cueing effect. Conversely, the smaller effects observed here may have 
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been due to the modulations observed in response to the experimental manipulations. 
These are discussed below. 
Also, there was no main effect of SOA. Previous studies of gaze cueing have 
frequently found that RTs are significantly shorter at longer SOAs than shorter SOAs. This 
reflects a foreperiod effect whereby the onset of the gaze cue prepares the observer for 
the onset of the target. In the current experiment, the RT in the 800 ms SOA condition 
(mean = 331.9 ms, SD = 39.6 ms) was indeed less than that in the 300 ms SOA condition 
(mean = 336 ms, SD = 39.8 ms), but this was not significant (F(1, 89) = .498, p = .482, ηp
2 
= .006). As the foreperiod effect is such a robust finding in studies of spatial attention 
cueing, it is therefore unknown as to why the difference in RTs between the two SOA 
conditions was not significant, and is a weakness of the results.   
The effect of stimulus identity on the gaze cueing effect 
With an SOA of 300 ms, the gaze cueing effect of the low AQ group in response to 
the negative identity was significantly smaller than in response to the positive identity, and 
was marginally smaller than in response to the predictive identity. Furthermore, the gaze 
cueing effect elicited by the negative identity correlated significantly with AQ scores. The 
cueing effect in response to the predictive and positive identities did not correlate with AQ 
scores and were not significantly different from one another. Even though AQ scores were 
positively correlated with SQ-R scores and negatively correlated with EQ scores, there 
was no effect of identity on the gaze cueing effect for either of the empathising/systemising 
asymmetry groups, nor did the gaze cueing effects correlate with measures of 
empathising/systemising asymmetry. These differences suggest an effect of attributing the 
intentions of the individual in a previous social interaction (a learning phase) from social 
cues that denote prosocial or antisocial intentions (happy or angry expression). 
Furthermore, that this effect is affected by individual differences in autistic traits and 
asymmetries in empathising and systemising. Those with a better ability to „pick up‟ the 
137 
 
meaning of social contingencies implicitly learned that one identity held a negative 
disposition towards them, and consequently showed a smaller gaze cueing effect. Those 
with more autistic traits did not pick up on such cues, and the cueing effect was the same 
as for the other identities. 
However, it is not possible to determine from the difference between the positive and 
negative identities at 300 ms SOA in the low AQ group whether or not the positive identity 
elicited an enhancement of the gaze cueing effect or if the negative identity elicited an 
attenuation of the gaze cueing effect. The fact that the negative identity was marginally 
different to the predictive identity, and that the positive and predictive identities did not 
differ suggests that the effect of learning was due to a reduction of the gaze cueing effect 
for the negative identity. This is further supported by the finding that AQ scores only 
correlated with the gaze cueing effect for the negative identity. Nevertheless, if the gaze 
cueing effect for the negative identity was reduced in the low AQ group, then it was 
expected that the gaze cueing effect to the positive identity would be enhanced. This may 
be indicative of a biased sensitivity to detecting potential antisocial intentions in others 
rather than prosocial intentions. Memory recall for identities implied to be untrustworthy is 
better than for those implied to be trustworthy, both when such attributions are based on 
spatial predictability of gaze direction or from emotional expression (Bayliss & Tipper, 
2006; Yamagishi et al., 2003). Therefore the effect obtained for the negative but not for the 
positive identity may reflect a greater tendency to avoid individuals who may incur a cost in 
social interactions than to promote engagement with those whose interactions may be 
beneficial.  
With an SOA of 800 ms, the cueing effect elicited by the positive and negative 
identities did not differ in either of the AQ groups or empathising/systemising asymmetry 
groups, and did not correlate with any of the measures of autistic traits or 
empathising/systemising asymmetry. However, the gaze cueing effect for the predictive 
identity was marginally larger than for the negative identity for the high AQ group (although 
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this did not meet the significance threshold) and correlated with AQ score. In the 
systemising group the predictive identity elicited a cueing effect that was significantly 
greater than for the positive identity, and the size of the cueing effect for the predictive 
identity correlated with the magnitude of this asymmetry. Those with a greater ability to 
process systematic regularities were better able to detect the spatial congruency between 
the target location and the gaze direction of the predictive identity. This supports the notion 
that higher AQ individuals would learn the probabilistic patterns of a spatially predictive 
gaze cue. They therefore showed a greater cueing effect in response to the predictive 
identity. However, this contradicts the bias highlighted above, that the gaze cueing effect is 
more affected by negative rather than positive intentions. A comparison with a spatially 
counter-predictive identity would enable the investigation of whether such a bias also 
exists for spatial predictability. 
As with the findings at 300 ms SOA, it is not possible to establish whether the effect 
observed for the systemising group at 800 ms SOA was due to an enhancement of gaze 
cueing for the predictive identity or a reduction of gaze cueing for the positive identity. 
Again though, as the gaze cueing effect for the predictive identity differed marginally from 
that of the negative identity and also correlated with the degree of empathising/systemising 
asymmetry, it suggests that those who are more sensitive to spatial regularities showed an 
enhancement of the gaze cueing effect in response to the spatially predictive identity. 
However, future studies would have to compare the gaze cueing effects to a baseline in 
order to establish if the observed effects were due to enhancement or reduction. This 
could be achieved by including a novel identity in the test phase with which to compare the 
gaze cueing effect to that of the other identities, or to use the three identities in a gaze 
cueing study prior to the learning phase and then compare this to the gaze cueing effects 
in response to the identities after the learning phase to establish the effects of learning. 
A possible alternative explanation for the enhanced gaze cueing effect observed at 
800 ms SOA in the systemising group for the predictive identity could be attributable to the 
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“unique pattern of attention function and dysfunction” (Allen & Courchesne, 2001, p105) 
that characterises the broader autistic phenotype. That is, those with autism posses a 
narrow attentional focus that manifests in several areas of attentional functioning. Of 
relevance to the current study, they exhibit an impaired ability to disengage attention and 
an enhanced selective attention ability (although this may be impaired under specific 
circumstances). It can only be assumed that as the systemising group exhibit a greater 
degree of autistic like traits that they also possess, albeit to a lesser degree, the same 
attentional strengths and weakness as those with autism. A narrow attentional focus would 
result in a slower ability to disengage attention from the face stimulus toward the target 
and also a better ability to ignore the gaze cue and detect the target. In invalid trials, a 
slower disengagement of attention would mean they had not oriented attention to the 
invalid spatial location by the time the target appeared on the opposite side of the screen. 
This would result in a faster target detection time than low systemisers whose attention 
would have been oriented by the gaze cue to the incorrect spatial location. Enhanced 
selective attention abilities would mean they were better able to ignore the gaze cue and 
detect the target when it appeared. This would also result in a decreased RT in invalid 
trials for the systemising group compared to the other groups whose attention would have 
been oriented in the direction of the gaze cue. However, there was no effect of group for 
RTs in invalid trials for the predictive identity at 800 ms SOA (F(2,89) = 2.15, p =.123, ηp
2 = 
.047). In valid trials, an inability to disengage attention would have slowed the orienting of 
attention away from the face once the target appeared whilst the other groups would have 
had no such impairment. An enhanced selective attention ability would have enabled them 
to ignore the gaze cue (which they knew to be non-predictive) which would have impaired 
target detection times compared to the other groups who followed the gaze cue. In either 
case, the RTs for systemising group should be slower in valid trials than the other groups. 
Indeed there was a significant effect of group for RTs in the valid trials (F(2,89) = 4.87, p = 
.01, ηp
2 = .101). However, this was due to the systemising group having a quicker RT than 
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the empathising group (t(58) = 3.79, p = .000, d = 1) whereas the balanced group did not 
differ from either the empathising (t(59) = 1.59, p = .118, d = .4) or systemising groups 
(t(57) = 1.27, p = .207, d = .4). As the systemising group was quicker to detect the target 
than the empathising group on valid trials, this implies that the gaze cue of the predictive 
identity facilitated target detection in the systemising group, and that the greater cueing 
effect observed in this group was not due to a general inability to disengage attention from 
the face or enhanced selective attention abilities. This conclusion is further supported by 
correlating the size of the cueing effect elicited by the predictive identity at 800 ms SOA 
with scores on two subscales of the AQ designed to measure different facets of an 
individual‟s attentional focus. Spearman‟s rho correlations (n = 89) revealed no significant 
relationship between the cueing effect in this condition and either the ability to switch 
attention (r = .114, p = .3) or an individual‟s attention to detail (r = .045, p = .682). Despite 
these non significant relationships, future studies of the effect of autistic like traits on gaze 
cueing should specify the nature of the relationship with the specific sub-scales of the AQ 
to ensure that any observed effect can be attributed to social deficits rather than 
differences in generalised attentional abilities. 
   The task in the learning phase did not necessitate explicit processing of such 
contingencies and the participants were unaware that they would encounter these 
identities again in the test phase. Therefore the participants had no motivation to learn the 
social or spatial contingencies, and indeed debriefing of participants afterwards revealed 
they had not noticed that each identity had an idiosyncratic pattern of gaze and expression 
behaviour. This suggests that these attributions were automatic and implicit. That is, 
participants were unaware of the effect that the motion of the social cues had on their 
inferences made to the agent. These involuntary attributions then became evident in the 
response to the gaze direction of the identity in the cueing paradigm. The experimental 
manipulations of gaze direction and identity were again incidental to completion of the 
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task. Nevertheless, the influence they had on response times suggests an automatic 
influence of identity on reflexive gaze cueing. 
Two different styles of gaze processing? 
The group differences in gaze cueing in response to the predictive identity agree with 
the results of Ristic et al (2005) who found that those with high functioning autism showed 
a gaze cueing effect if the gaze-target congruency was 80% predictive but not when non-
predictive (50%) (although many other gaze cueing studies show intact gaze orienting in 
when gaze is non-predictive e.g. Chawarska et al., 2003; Kemner et al., 2006; Kylliainen & 
Hietanen, 2004; Senju et al., 2004; Swettenham et al., 2003; Vlamings et al., 2005). The 
current study shows that such sensitivity is carried over to future social interactions to 
influence cueing in response to a non-predictive cue, in much the same way that the gaze 
direction of familiar people can be remembered, and influences cueing, three minutes after 
initial exposure (Frischen & Tipper, 2006). The influence of either spatial predictability or 
social disposition supports the proposed distinction between those on different ends of the 
autistic spectrum in gaze processing style (Driver et al., 1999; Nation & Penny, 2008; 
Ristic et al., 2005). Those with higher autistic traits and systemising skills, and lower 
empathising skills, are thought to afford gaze with less social salience and process the 
gaze cue in a manner comparable to that of other non-social cues such as arrows. As 
such, they were more likely to alter their gaze following behaviour in light of the non-social 
manipulation (spatial predictability) rather than the social manipulation. Those with fewer 
autistic traits and better empathising skills comprehend gaze in social terms of the 
attentional state of the gazer. They therefore altered their gaze following behaviour in light 
of the social disposition of the gazer (the interaction between gaze and expression). 
 A novel contribution of this study is that the different influence of social or spatial 
manipulations was also evident in the different time courses at which the effects emerged. 
Effects of social manipulations were only apparent with an SOA of 300 ms, whilst the 
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effects of spatial manipulations were evident with an SOA of 800 ms. Previous studies 
have shown that cueing effects that emerge within around 600 ms are the result of rapid 
reflexive and automatic processes whereas those after 600 ms are largely voluntary. An 
effect of spatial predictability has not been previously found at SOAs less than 600 ms and 
the current results support this. This suggests that the automatic gaze cueing is not 
modulated by prior knowledge of the spatial predictability of the gaze cue. However, this 
makes the modulation observed at 300 ms by the social manipulations interesting, in that 
the automatic gaze cueing effect can be modulated by information regarding the gazer‟s 
intentions. Such information regarding the gazer‟s past interactions with oneself may 
therefore be afforded with greater importance and be incorporated into the reflexive 
reactions to the social behaviour of others. In contrast, the non-social information 
regarding the gazer‟s past interactions with the target only affect voluntary responses to 
their behaviour. 
The integration of identity information with gaze information 
The modulation of the gaze cueing effect in the test phase in response to stimulus 
identity necessitated integration of identity and gaze direction information. In the 
neurocognitive model proposed by Haxby and Hoffman (2000), dynamic properties of 
faces, such as gaze and expression, are processed separately from that of invariant facial 
features, such as identity. However, previous gaze cueing studies in both humans and 
monkeys attest to the integration of identity with gaze processing to modulate the gaze 
cueing effect in light of the familiarity or social status of the gazer (Deaner, Shepherd, & 
Platt, 2007; Frischen & Tipper, 2006). It makes sense for identity and gaze to be integrated 
somewhere down the line, as the meaning of gaze direction can be affected by the person 
whose gaze it is. This is supported by studies showing that STS activity (traditionally 
thought to process dynamic facial attributes) is sensitive to identity, and that the FFA 
(traditionally implicated in identity processing) is sensitive to gaze direction (George, 
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Driver, & Dolan, 2001). Therefore the separate role of the STS and FFA are relative rather 
than categorical, with both areas involved in processing gaze and identity, but with the 
former occurring more in the STS and the latter more in the FFA (Calder & Young, 2005).  
Conclusion 
Gaze direction and emotional expression contribute to an observers inferences as to 
the intentions of that individual and can be carried over into future social interactions. An 
observer subsequently adapts their response to the other person‟s social behaviour in light 
of these attributions, in this case the establishment of joint attention in response to their 
averted gaze. The social relationship between the gazer and observer as well as the 
spatial relationship between the gazer and the target contribute to the speed with which 
they will subsequently follow that individuals gaze direction. However, adapting one‟s 
response in light of the individuals gaze and expression is more likely in those who are 
more sensitive and better able to process social information (those with few autistic traits 
and systemising abilities but higher empathising abilities). Furthermore, such modulation 
takes effect in the rapid and reflexive response to other‟s behaviour. Conversely, those 
who are less sensitive to social information but more sensitive to systematic regularities 
and detecting lawful patterns (high AQ and systemising skills but low empathising skills), 
show a greater sensitivity to the spatial predictability of the individuals gaze direction, and 
this was evident in the later emerging response traditionally assumed to be more under 
voluntary control. 
This highlights a difference in gaze processing style between those who process 
gaze in terms of the psychological state of the gazer, and those who process merely the 
visual properties of gaze in a manner comparable to that of non-social cues (e.g. arrows). 
The former is characteristic of those sensitive to social information, and as such their 
orienting response to gaze direction incorporated information regarding the social 
intentions of the identity. The latter is characteristic of those who afford gaze with less 
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social salience, but who are more sensitive to gaze as a probabilistic cue to target location, 
and whose orienting response to gaze direction was sensitive to the spatial predictability of 
the identity. 
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Chapter 6. General Discussion 
An implicit understanding of others‟ behaviour is possible simply from observing their 
actions. This understanding is facilitated by the processing and integration of social cues 
which convey the behavioural intentions and possibly the mental/emotional state of the 
actor. The aim of this thesis was to investigate the role of the integration of social cues 
with action perception in ascribing goals and intentions to the behaviour of others, and how 
it may contribute to an anticipation of how they will act in the immediate future. 
Experiments 1 to 3 (Chapters 2 to 4) investigated how gaze cues influence action 
anticipation in the immediate future (motor empathy). Previous research has established 
that the end-point of an action is encoded during observation of the action itself and that, 
when using either priming or RM methods, this becomes evident as either a facilitated 
processing of postures that occur after the end of the action, or as a displacement in 
memory for the final position of the movement (Freyd & Miller, 1992; Graf et al., 2007; 
Jarraya et al., 2005; Thornton & Hayes, 2004; Verfaillie & Daems, 2002). 
Experiment 1 (Chapter 2) sought to establish a social cue related anticipation of 
movement (for short SCRAM), whereby the anticipated end-point is modulated by the gaze 
direction of the actor during the action. Indeed, estimations of how far a head had rotated 
were affected by the gaze direction. The stopping point of a rotating head was 
underestimated when its gaze direction was lagging behind head rotation. Control 
conditions established that this was not due to the visual appearance of the location of the 
pupil within the sclera, nor to the role that gaze plays in specifying spatially directional 
information. It therefore required a higher level interpretation of gaze direction, leading to 
the inference of the behavioural intention (or mental state) of the actor. That is, a 
representation of the goals and intentions of the agent was assimilated into the 
representation of the action itself. Furthermore, this was an automatic process as 
processing of gaze direction was not necessary for performing the task. It must be noted 
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though that the control stimuli were comparable only in size and colouration but were not 
perceptually similar. Ideally, further experiments would include a control stimulus that was 
more akin to the biological stimulus to fully control for these variables.  
Experiment 2 (Chapter 3) replicated this finding but introduced a further condition in 
which the stimulus was spatially inverted in order to disrupt the integration of the action 
and the gaze direction. As predicted, gaze direction had no effect on estimations of head 
rotation when the stimulus was inverted, confirming the necessity of a conjoint 
representation of social cues and action perception in the SCRAM effect. However, this 
conclusion is speculative as a differential effect of gaze direction between the orientation 
conditions was only evident in separate ANOVAs and not in an interaction analysis. 
Experiment 3 (Chapter 4) demonstrated that the SCRAM effect is context 
dependant. Gaze was not used when the facial expression of the actor was of an 
approach motivation (happy or angry expression). However, it was when an avoidance 
motivation was expressed (disgust or fear expression). These results show that the use of 
gaze direction to determine the likely end-point of an action is strongest when other cues 
related to the goals of the agent are ambiguous.  
Experiment 4 (Chapter 5) extended this principle by demonstrating that gaze can be 
integrated with expression to implicitly learn the social relevance of another‟s emotional 
expression. Moreover, it showed that such information is retained and employed in order 
to modify one‟s own responses to those individuals in an unrelated social interaction. 
However, this effect very much relied on the individual‟s ability to empathise and process 
social information. Those who showed few autistic traits and who were better able to 
empathise were less likely to engage in joint attention with an identity whose gaze and 
expression behaviour had previously conveyed an antisocial disposition to the observer. In 
contrast, those who showed more autistic traits and who were better able to systemise 
were more likely to engage in joint attention with an identity whose gaze behaviour had 
previously correctly predicted the location of a target.     
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The nature of the SCRAM effect 
In principle, there are weak and strong versions of the hypothesis that the perception 
of head rotation is affected by social cues. The weak version states that, because gaze is 
likely to be articulated from head orientation when making a goal directed action, an effect 
of gaze direction on estimations of head rotation would be most evident when they are 
incongruently aligned. In support of this, a reliable and robust difference between the 
gaze-ahead and gaze-lagging conditions was found in all three experiments, as well as in 
several of the pilot studies. That is, estimations of how far the head had rotated were 
consistently greater when gaze was directed in advance of head rotation than when 
lagging behind head rotation. This supports the contention made by several authors that a 
static picture of an incongruently aligned head and gaze implies motion and conveys 
increased social saliency as a result (Conty et al., 2006; Hietanen, 1999; Vuilleumier et al., 
2005). However, as yet, this proposal has never been explicitly tested. The current results 
provide initial encouraging evidence that incongruent head and gaze orientation conveys 
dynamic information from which an observer can infer motion cues. 
However, even though a static posture of an incongruent gaze and head orientation 
may imply motion, it does not specify the future direction of motion. Participants may infer 
that the head will either rotate towards the target to align it with gaze direction, or that the 
gaze will be redirected to align it with head direction. In the current experiments, the 
immediate perceptual history was provided by the rotating head and so inferences as to 
the future direction of motion were unambiguous. This is relevant because whether 
participants under or overestimated the degree of head rotation would be suggestive of the 
how gaze was used to anticipate motion when incongruently aligned with head orientation. 
This can be considered the strong version of the hypothesis, whereby the gaze-ahead and 
lagging conditions differed not only from each other but also from the 50% mark indicative 
of a response bias, and from the gaze-congruent condition in which no additional goal-
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oriented information was conveyed by gaze direction. However, this pattern of results was 
not consistent across the experiments. In experiment 1a (see also pilot 4 in the appendix), 
the gaze-lagging condition was found to be significantly different from the gaze-congruent 
condition and elicited a significant response bias, whereas this was not so for the gaze-
ahead condition. This suggests that participants under-estimated the degree of head 
rotation in the gaze-lagging condition. Conversely, in experiment 3 (see also pilot 2 in the 
appendix) it was the gaze-ahead condition that elicited a significant response bias and 
which differed from the gaze-congruent condition, while the gaze-lagging condition did not 
differ from gaze-congruent. Despite these inconsistencies, the pattern of results 
consistently showed a trend for the gaze-ahead condition to be always above 50% and the 
gaze-lagging condition always below 50%, with the gaze-congruent condition always in 
between them. Furthermore, if one condition differed from the gaze-congruent condition 
then it differed from 50% as well. Nevertheless, the exact nature of the SCRAM effect 
cannot be confidently asserted: does the gaze-ahead condition lead to overestimation or 
does gaze-lagging lead to under estimation? 
Comparison with previous studies of RM 
The finding of a memory displacement for the final position of an action sequence 
compliments previous research into the anticipation of biological motion. However, in each 
of the current experiments the rotation of the head itself was insufficient to cause a 
displacement effect. When the face was neutrally expressive with a congruent gaze, and 
therefore conveying no (additional) intentional information other than that attributed to the 
biological motion itself, no response bias was observed (the mean percentage of „after‟ 
responses did not differ from 50%). This may either be due to the fact that the 
methodology used was perhaps not sensitive enough to detect the displacement, or to the 
fact that the type of action used was not influenced by momentum in the same way that 
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the type of actions used in previous studies are (e.g. walking, see discussion of 
experiment 1). Further experiments are necessary to establish why the action itself was 
not subject to a memory displacement effect (see below). Despite several previous studies 
incorporating gaze direction into studies of action anticipation (Adams et al., 2006; Freyd & 
Miller, 1992; Jellema et al., 2009; Nummenmaa et al., 2009; Thornton & Hayes, 2004), the 
experiments reported here are the first to demonstrate that social cues mediate the 
remembered final position of a biological action sequence.  
This dovetails nicely with the extensive body of literature describing similar memory 
displacements for non-biological motion. The need to infer causality, understand motions 
and generate predictions is not confined to the social domain. Anticipating the motion of 
non-biological objects is mediated by inferences of the physical dynamics causing and 
constraining the motion (momentum, gravity, friction). Just as in the SCRAM effect, cues of 
the dynamics underpinning the motion are assimilated with the observation of the motion 
itself. These representations are of a similarly high level as they involve concepts that 
cannot directly be observed, but are inferred from cues that are apparent during the 
movement.  
These parallels beg the question of whether the two processes are underpinned by 
the same or different cognitive mechanism(s). Hubbard (2006) proposed that the 
displacement of non-biological motion is the result of a two factor process. Firstly, the 
kinematics and dynamics of the object‟s motion are represented as a functional analogue 
by means of a second order isomorphism (Shepard & Chipman, 1970). This produces a 
default displacement based, not upon objective physical principles, but on the observer‟s 
subjective interpretation of those principles. Secondly, this displacement can be modulated 
by the context in which the motion is embedded, such as the type of object and the 
presence of stimuli, which modulate the displacement. The displacement of biological 
motion as a function of social cues observed here concords with this model and could be 
the product of a similar isomorphism. The action itself is subject to a displacement 
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(although not observed in the current studies), but when contextualised in terms of goal-
directedness by the gaze direction, this displacement is modulated. 
However, the dynamics being inferred are fundamentally different. Non-biological 
objects are inherently inanimate and incapable of intentionality, whereas in the case of 
biological objects, which are animate and possess intentionality, motion is self-propelled 
and motivated by the goals and objectives of the actor. This dichotomy maps onto Baron-
Cohen‟s (2006) distinction between empathising and systemising. Empathising is a 
process employed for the attribution of intentions to agents for understanding, predicting 
and reacting appropriately to the behaviour of others. In contrast, systemising assimilates 
the physical dynamics of movement to comprehend the behaviour of non-biological 
objects. However, it is not suggested if, how, or when these systems diverge (Currie & 
Ravenscroft, 1997; Gopnik, 2003; Leslie, 1994). In principle, the understanding and 
prediction of biological and non-biological motion could be underpinned by the same 
cognitive capacities. For example, the MT/MST network, which is implicated in processing 
motion, is also sensitive to extrapolating motion cues from static pictures of both non-
biological objects (Senior et al., 2000) and biological objects (Kourtzi & Kanwisher, 2000; 
Lorteije et al., 2006; 2007).  
However, other areas are involved in processing biological motion and social cue 
processing which are not sensitive to the movement of non-biological stimuli, suggesting 
that the two domains could exploit different dedicated cognitive substrates. The neural 
substrates for the anticipation of biological motion can be speculated about with more 
confidence than that for non-biological motion. A likely network of regions necessary for 
the kind of social computations performed in the current task is formed by the Superior 
Temporal Sulcus (STS), in conjunction with areas in the medial temporal lobe (amygdala) 
and the mirror neuron areas. The STS is sensitive to biological action sequences, and is 
able to extrapolate beyond what is immediately observable to encode actions based on the 
most likely end-point. This is evident in cell populations which continue firing when the 
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action becomes occluded from view (Baker et al., 2001; Saxe et al., 2004) and others that 
respond to static pictures of implied motion (Jellema & Perrett, 2003a). The STS is 
specifically implicated in representing the direction of attention of others, based on a range 
of bodily cues, such as gaze direction, head orientation with respect to trunk, and whole 
body orientation (Perrett et al., 1989). The cell responses to these cues tend to be 
governed by a hierarchical principle, such that gaze direction can overrule head 
orientation, which in turn can overrule bodily orientation, in determining other‟s direction of 
attention (Perrett, Hietanen, Oram, & Benson, 1992). Furthermore, STS cell populations 
show the ability to integrate action perception and gaze direction to selectively code the 
goal-directedness of specific actions (Jellema et al., 2000; Perrett et al., 1985), in keeping 
with its general role in comprehending the social meaning of other people‟s behaviour 
(Redcay, 2008). Through its connections with the emotional processing areas of the 
amygdala, which in turn also responds selectively to another‟s direction of gaze (Calder, 
2007), observed actions are afforded an emotional salience that enhances their subjective 
relevance. This information could be used to predict the outcomes of actions and infer 
intentions by feeding it to neurons in the intraparietal lobule and area F5 of the premotor 
cortex that fire when performing goal-directed actions. These areas form the mirror neuron 
system, where observing an action activates areas involved with its execution (Rizzolatti & 
Craighero, 2004). This system has been proposed to enable an observer to embody and 
„simulate‟ the actions of others, as if one were preparing to perform the action themselves, 
providing a conduit by which their goals and intentions can be accessed (Gallese, 2006).  
Deducing whether the processes enabling anticipation of biological and non-
biological motion are completely independent is not possible from the data reported here. 
The results of experiment 2 are suggestive of independence, as no effect of gaze direction 
was found when the stimuli were inverted. As inversion has been found to 
disproportionately impair the processing of social stimuli (such as faces and bodies, e.g. 
Diamond & Carey, 1986) more than non-social stimuli (such as houses and dot patterns, 
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e.g. Husk et al., 2007; Tanaka & Farah, 1991) it could be said that this manipulation 
revealed a mechanism involved exclusively in the perception of social stimuli. However, no 
non-biological stimulus was used in this study. Furthermore, no variation was observed for 
the upright non-biological stimulus in experiment 1. Presumably, inverting the non-
biological stimulus would also elicit no variation and it would therefore not be possible to 
conclude that inversion affects only the biological stimulus. 
The dissociation between empathising and systemising in social cue processing was 
further elucidated in experiment 4. Those individuals who are better at empathising were 
more prone to infer the emotional disposition or intentions of an agent by learning the 
associations between gaze direction and emotional expression and the meaning it 
conveys than those who were less empathetic. This is not to say that those who are less 
sensitive to social information were not capable of learning gaze direction contingencies. 
They were more likely to base their inference on the statistical reliability with which gaze 
was congruent with target location, in keeping with their greater sensitivity to systematic 
regularities. This suggests that both cognitive systems can be deployed for the processing 
of social cues, but that they lead to different interpretations of the agents goals and 
intentions, and thus differing anticipations of their behaviour. That is, empathising enables 
a psychological interpretation of social cues and actions in terms of their social meaning, 
and provides access to the mental state of the agents. Systemising, on the other hand, 
leads to a mechanistic representation of social behaviour caused by a more literal 
description of immediately observable visual information.  
The role of social cue processing in Theory of Mind 
Representing the mental/emotional states of others is the hallmark of ToM, and 
includes the comprehension of the other person‟s beliefs and knowledge, and to 
understand that they may differ from one‟s own and from reality (second order 
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intentionality). The ability to predict behaviour and respond appropriately based on this 
information is arguably one of the most significant social functions that it enables. ToM 
relies in part on the accurate processing and interpretation of social cues, therefore 
integrating them with action perception may contribute to full scale ToM. That said, there is 
every possibility that the use of social cues in order to predict behaviour is evident before 
the age at which full scale ToM develops. Infants are sensitive to social cues and 
biological motion soon after birth (Farroni et al., 2002; Simion et al., 2008). Moreover, 
children are able to generate expectancies regarding the reaching behaviour of others 
based on gaze and expression by the second year of life (Phillips et al., 2002), well before 
the emergence of a fully formed ToM (approximately 4 years). Tomasello and Rokoczy 
(2003) propose that the ability to interpret others‟ behaviour in terms of more basic, but no 
less psychological, concepts such as goal-directedness, desire and emotions emerges 
early in life. Furthermore, that this is the foundation upon which more sophisticated social 
cognition is built. The tasks described in the current experiments may therefore represent 
the functioning of more rudimentary socio-cognitive abilities.  
A similar stance can be taken on the evolution of ToM. ToM is considered to be an 
adaptive cognitive mechanism that permits the processing of vast amounts of dynamic 
social information (Dunbar, 1992, 1995, 1998). This is necessary in order for us to inhabit 
the complex social networks that characterize human sociality, for which there have been 
strong selection pressures (Brune & Brune-Cohrs, 2006). However, many other primate 
species live in groups as a response to the same selection pressures, and have evolved 
sophisticated social skills as a result. Their societies differ from those of humans, though, 
in that they are less spatially and temporally distributed, and the regularity with which 
individual group members are encountered is more frequent. Social information does not 
therefore need integrating over space and time and is processed in a more expedient 
manner (Barrett, Henzi, & Dunbar, 2003). Again, this is based on perceptual information 
that is immediately available, including social cues and action perception. Moreover, there 
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is evidence that some primate species use gaze direction to predict which object a 
conspecific is most likely to interact with (Call & Tomasello, 1998; Santos & Hauser, 1999; 
Scerif et al., 2004) in the same way that human children do. It would therefore be expected 
that non-human primates would also be able to integrate social cues and action perception 
in order to perform the tasks described in these experiments. However, whether this would 
indicate that they have a concept of even the most basic psychological states of others 
remains open to debate. Call (2001) argues that they are capable of representing schemas 
of intention and deducing the goals and intentions underpinning the behaviour of others 
(1.5 level intentionality). However, many researchers are critical of assuming that identical 
behaviours across species are affirmative of identical cognitive processes causing them 
(Barrett, Henzi, & Rendall, 2007; Heyes, 1998; Povinelli, Bering, & Giambrone, 2000). 
They point to low level processes of learned associations between behavioural and 
contextual cues and contingencies that explain the social behaviour of non-human 
primates equally well. In the current experiments, forming an association between 
observable social cues and the trajectory of an action would enable a probabilistic 
judgment of how an action is most likely to continue without invoking a representation of 
goals and intentions. It therefore remains contestable as to whether or not similar 
behaviours in non-human primates can be attributed to comparable social processes. 
Nevertheless, despite these divergent views, there is a consensus that such abilities 
represent a homologous ability that serves as a crucial evolutionary precursor to the 
evolution of ToM in humans.   
Future research 
The results reported here are promising, yet there are several unanswered 
questions, which should propagate future research. As noted previously, there are 
individual differences in the general population in the ability to process social information 
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and in the ability to empathise. The effect of gaze direction on action anticipation should 
therefore correlate with an individual‟s propensity to empathise with others. If such a 
relationship were found, this would add weight to the contention that the SCRAM effect is 
due to social inferences. What‟s more, this ability to empathise is proposed to show an 
inverse relationship with the ability to systemise. Those whose cognitive style is 
asymmetric in favour of systemising are expected to show an enhanced ability to 
anticipate the motion of non-biological objects based on physical dynamics. Thus, future 
research could exploit this double dissociation to see if displacement of biological and non-
biological motion is correlated with placement on the systemising-empathising spectrum. 
This is most likely to be evident in those occupying positions higher up on the autistic 
spectrum, who are characterised by an extreme cognitive bias in favour of systemising.  
Unlike previous research, the current experiments did not find a memory 
displacement for the action itself, irrespective of the direction of gaze. This may be 
because the amount of displacement may have been too small for the current method to 
have detected. A more sensitive measure may pick up on such displacement. An 
alternative test stimulus could be to present single test heads that differ from the final 
position in 1o increments, and ask participants whether it is at the same or a different angle 
as the stopping point. This would pick up smaller amounts of memory displacement. 
Moreover, the amount of memory displacement in the gaze-congruent condition could then 
be compared to the memory displacement when gaze is incongruent with head orientation. 
Measuring the difference in estimation errors between the gaze-congruent and gaze 
lagging/ahead condition would provide an estimate of the extent to which gaze direction 
contributes to the memory displacement and thus to action anticipation. The role of gaze 
direction could further be elucidated by varying the degree to which gaze direction is 
averted from head orientation and measuring the extent of the memory shift. That is, does 
the memory displacement increase monotonically with increases in gaze aversion, or is it 
affected merely by a categorical description of gaze direction (e.g. left or right)?  
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The inference of motion is possible from just static structural information regarding 
the relative positions of body parts (implied motion). There is evidence that this also 
applies to the articulation of gaze and head orientation (see above). It is therefore 
plausible that the effect of gaze direction on estimations of head rotation would be possible 
from implied motion. After observing a static image of a head with an incongruent gaze 
direction, subsequent estimations of the head angle should show a comparable influence 
of gaze direction as reported in the current experiments. This would also be compatible 
with what is known about the neural substrates of action perception in being sensitive to 
the degree of articulation depicted in static body postures. 
It would also seem pertinent to measure the gaze behaviour of the participant as 
well. Kerzel (2005, 2006) has proposed that memory displacements for objects translating 
across a screen are the result of ocular-motor overshoot. The observer tracks the moving 
object with their gaze (smooth pursuit) but such eye movements continue after the object 
has disappeared, causing the final position of the object to be misremembered. No such 
smooth pursuit is necessary for the head rotation used in the current study. In fact, this 
may have caused the lack of displacement for gaze-congruent condition, although 
previous research has established a RM effect for objects rotating in depth (Munger & 
Minchew, 2002; Munger, Solberg, Horrocks et al., 1999). Nevertheless, gaze aversion 
does cause an automatic shift of attention in a congruent direction (Driver et al., 1999). 
Therefore, the observed displacements caused by gaze direction may result from 
participants orienting their attention in the same direction. For example, in the gaze-ahead 
condition, the observer‟s attention may similarly have been averted ahead of head rotation, 
causing the final angle to be distorted in a congruent direction. This does not refute the 
notion that the observed effects are due to action anticipation, but reveals a mechanism 
which may contribute to it. Furthermore, monitoring of participant eye movements would 
confirm the role that gaze direction plays when the expression is either ambiguous or 
unambiguous (Chapter 4). That is, as gaze direction is afforded a greater degree of 
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relevance when the expression is of avoidance, it would be expected that participants 
would monitor the eye region more closely than when the expression was of approach. For 
these reasons, it would be advantageous to monitor the gaze behaviour of the participant 
during the task. 
The observed effect rests on the ability to integrate gaze and action in order to infer 
the goal of the agent and anticipate their actions. However, the attributions made to the 
rotating stimulus must be carried over to the test stimulus in order for an effect to be 
evident. The use of a congruent gaze in the test stimulus may therefore have impaired the 
full extent of the effect. If the observer infers the agent‟s goal from the gaze direction 
during presentation of the rotating stimulus, then observing them with a congruent gaze in 
the test stimulus may create the impression that the agent no longer has that goal, and 
may have reduced the magnitude of the memory displacement caused by gaze direction. 
Averting the gaze of the test stimulus so that it is congruent with that of the rotating 
stimulus may therefore potentiate the effect. But, as note before, it may also itself cause 
an RM effect due to the implied motion.  
A related point would be the effect of changing the stimulus identity between the 
rotating stimulus and the test stimulus. If the inferences made were truly psychological in 
nature, then they would also be identity specific. That is, the attributions made regarding 
the goals of the rotating stimulus would not be transferable to the test stimulus if its identity 
was different. On the other hand, the observation of a SCRAM effect across different 
identities would suggest that maybe it is due to less sophisticated processes that do not 
encompass the full social context in which they are presented. 
Conclusion 
Social stimuli occupy a prominent position in everyday life and this is reflected in the 
sophisticated cognitive mechanisms that are employed in processing such information. 
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Moreover, successful navigation of the social world relies on predicting other people‟s 
behaviour. The ability to go beyond what is immediately observable in order to infer the 
future behaviour of others is therefore a burgeoning field of research. The studies reported 
here make a valuable contribution to this rapidly developing field by showing a robust and 
reliable effect in which the information conveyed by gaze and expression is assimilated 
into the representation of the action itself, and contributes to the observer‟s inferences as 
to how the action is most likely to continue. In this way, predicting how others will behave 
encompasses not only an analysis of the kinematics of their actions but also the intentional 
dynamics that underpin the movement.  
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Appendix: Pilot studies 
Four pilot studies were conducted which aimed to establish the presence of an effect 
of gaze direction on estimations of how far a head had rotated, whilst also evaluating the 
efficacy of different stimuli and methods that would best elicit a displacement effect.  
Pilot study 1 
Method 
Participants 
Participants (N = 12) were all students at the University of Hull, UK, and participated 
in exchange for course credit. All had normal or corrected to normal vision, and gave 
written informed consent prior to taking part. 
Apparatus 
All stimuli were presented on a 21 inch monitor (100 Hz refresh rate) using E-Prime 
software (Psychology Software Tools, Inc) from which participants sat approximately 50 
cm away.  
Stimuli 
The stimuli were created from the Human ID Effort at the University of South Florida 
(2002), a database of 3D face images obtained from laser-scanned models (access 
courtesy of Dr. Hong Liu, University of Hull). One identity was selected and its gaze 
direction was manipulated using Corel graphics suite.  
Rotating stimulus 
The rotating stimulus consisted of a head that rotated 60o along the vertical axis from 
a profile view (90o from full front view) to a semi-profile view (30o from full front view). 
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Motion was induced by presenting 16 static frames at 4o interpolations for 40 ms each 
(total duration 640 ms, 93.75o per second). This was fast enough to induce an impression 
of smooth continuous motion. The gaze direction of the rotating head varied horizontally 
along three levels: (1) In advance of head rotation in the direction of motion (gaze-ahead); 
(2) looking straight ahead throughout the rotation (gaze-congruent); (3) lagging behind 
head rotation in the opposite direction of motion (gaze-lagging). The subtended angle of 
the stimulus‟s height was 16o, and its width varied between 10.1o at the start of the rotation 
to 11.1o at the end. The head rotated from the left profile in all trials (Figure 7.1).  
 
 
 
Figure 7.1. The rotating stimulus. The head rotated from a profile view (A) to a 30o 
orientation from full front view. The gaze direction was either in advance of head 
orientation (B: gaze-ahead), looking straight ahead (C: gaze-congruent), or lagging behind 
head rotation (D: gaze-lagging). 
B 
A 
D 
C 
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Test stimulus 
The test stimulus consisted of a static image of the head, the angle of which varied 
along three levels in relation to the stopping point of the rotating stimulus: (1) 20o before it; 
(2) 0o identical to it; (3) 20o after it (Figure 7.2). Participants were required to judge whether 
the stopping point of the rotating stimulus was before or after the test stimulus. In levels 1 
and 3 of the test stimulus condition, the correct answer was „before‟ and „after‟ 
respectively. These trials served as catch trials, with poor performance assumed to 
indicate insufficient attention to the task demands and were used as a participant selection 
criterion. In level 2, there was no correct answer as the test stimulus and the stopping 
point of the rotating stimulus were the same. It was hypothesised that memory 
displacement would be revealed by a consistent response bias, with a predominance of 
„after‟ responses indicative of overestimation, and a predominance of „before‟ responses 
indicative of underestimation. These were designated as experimental trials. Where 
responses were, on average, evenly distributed between „before‟ and „after‟, this was 
assumed to be an accurate estimation of head rotation. The test stimulus was either 
presented in the right or left half of the screen, with the inner edge at a subtended angle of 
3.5o from the centre of the screen. This, along with the retention interval, served to disrupt 
any visual persistence of the rotating stimulus from facilitating similarity judgments with the 
test stimulus.  
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Figure 7.2. Examples of the test stimuli used in pilot 1. The orientation of the test stimulus 
was positioned along the motion trajectory of the rotating stimulus either (A) 20o before it 
(50o from full front view), (B) at the same angle as the stopping point (30o from full front 
view), or (C) 20o after the stopping point (10o from full front view). Positions were 
presented at the left (shown) and right of the screen. 
 
Procedure 
Participants were instructed they would see a face rotate along the vertical axis 
towards them, and that this would be followed by a static picture of the same face. Their 
task was to indicate if the stopping point of the rotating stimulus was oriented at an angle 
before or after the static face. No reference was made to the gaze direction of the 
stimulus. It was stressed that reaction times were not important, but that answers should 
be made within 3 seconds. Participants completed several practice trials representative of 
the range of experimental manipulations before commencing the experiment. 
Each trial (Figure 7.3) began with a fixation cross at the centre of the screen (1500 
ms). This was followed by the rotating stimulus after which a blank screen was presented 
for 1000 ms (retention interval), and then the test stimulus, which remained on screen until 
a response was made. Responses were made by pressing one of two keys on the 
keyboard („z‟ = before, „m‟ = after, labeled accordingly). The experiment was a 3 X 3 
factorial design with Gaze direction and Test stimulus as the main factors. Each iteration 
B: 0o A: -20
o C: +20o 
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was repeated 10 times, leading to a total of 90 trials taking approximately 8 minutes to 
complete.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.3. Trial sequence for pilot study 1. A fixation of 1500 ms was followed by the 
rotating stimulus (640 ms). After a retention interval of 1000 ms, the test stimulus was 
presented which remained on screen until a response was made.  
 
Results 
The mean error rate was 10.0% (SD = 10.5%). The mean reaction time was 1607 
ms (SD = 404 ms). Participants were excluded from the analysis if their mean error rate 
exceeded 20%. This led to the removal of one participant (error rate of 36.7%). The 
subsequent mean error rate was 7.6% (SD = 6.6%). Trials were excluded based on 
reaction time. Responses made less than 250 ms or in excess of 2SD above each 
participants mean reaction time were excluded from the analysis resulting in a new mean 
reaction time of 1491 ms (SD = 372 ms). 
 
 
Retention 
interval 
(1000 ms) 
End point 
Start point 
Fixation 
(1000 ms) 
Rotating 
stimulus  
(640 ms) 
Test stimulus 
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 Ahead Congruent Lagging 
-20
o
 95.1 (7.6) 92.7 (12.7) 90.3 (9.1) 
0
o
 59.4 (18.1) 51.6 (17.8) 44.8 (20.2) 
+20
o
 6.9 (10.7) 4.7 (7.4) 9.5 (12.8) 
 
Table 7.1. Mean percentage of „after‟ responses (SD) for each gaze direction for each 
level of test stimulus. 
 
Responses were coded as either 1 for „after‟ or 0 for „before‟, which were averaged 
and expressed as the mean percentage of „after‟ responses. These were entered into a 
two-way repeated measures ANOVA with Gaze direction and Test stimulus as the main 
factors. As expected there was a significant main effect of Test stimulus (F(2, 20) = 
171.59, p < .001, ηp
2 = .95). However, there was no main effect of Gaze direction (F(2, 20) 
= 2.69, p = .092, ηp
2 = .21) nor was there an interaction between Gaze direction and Test 
stimulus (F(4, 40) = 2.5, p = .058, ηp
2 = .2). One sample t-tests conducted on the 
experimental trials showed that neither the gaze-ahead (t(10) = 1.73, p = .11), gaze-
congruent (t(10) = .31, p = .77), nor the gaze-lagging (t(10) = .85, p = .42) differed from the 
test value of 50 indicative of no response bias. No response bias was evident when the 
gaze direction conditions were collapsed (t(10) = .489, p = .635). 
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Figure 7.4. Mean Percentage of „after‟ responses for each gaze direction across each test 
stimulus level. 
 
Discussion 
The results showed no significant difference in estimations of head rotation between 
the gaze directions. Participants were no more likely to judge the stopping point of the 
rotating head as before or after a head at an identical angle if its gaze direction was either 
in advance of head rotation or in the opposite direction. Furthermore, the non-significant 
difference of each gaze direction from 50% suggested there were no biases to over or 
underestimate the degree of rotation. That is, the frequency that participants judged the 
stopping point to be before or after the test stimulus was on average equal. This lack of 
response bias remained when the gaze direction conditions were collapsed, suggesting 
that the motion of the head was not subject to a RM effect. 
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 However, the means for the respective gaze directions were in the predicted 
direction (gaze-ahead > gaze-congruent > gaze-lagging). In addition, the ANOVA elicited p 
values that were close to significance and moderate effect sizes for both the overall effect 
of Gaze direction and the interaction with Test stimulus. A second pilot study was therefore 
conducted with a different test stimulus. 
Pilot Study 2 
Method 
Participants 
Participants‟ (N = 21) details are the same as for pilot study 1.  
Apparatus 
Hardware and software for the creation and display of stimuli were the same as for 
pilot study 1. 
Stimuli 
The rotating stimuli were the same as in pilot study 1. 
Test stimulus 
The test stimulus in pilot study 2 was modified from a single stimulus to a two-
alternative forced-choice paradigm consisting of two static heads side by side. Each test 
choice was at a different angle of orientation. Participants were required to choose which 
was at an angle most similar to the final angle of the rotating stimulus. One of the choices 
was oriented before (-) the stopping point (at an angle contained within the previously 
observed motion trajectory) and the remaining choice was after (+) the stopping point 
(oriented at an angle extrapolated along the path of motion beyond the stopping point). 
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The difference in angular orientation between each test choice and the stopping point was 
equivalent in all trials. However, between trials the difference was varied along four levels 
(Figure 7.5): (1) 20o; (2) 15o; (3) 10o; (4) 5o. As such, there was no correct answer, as the 
orientation of neither the „before‟ or „after‟ choice was more similar to that of the stopping 
point of the rotating stimulus. It was expected that the absence of a correct answer would 
elicit a response bias that would reveal a memory displacement, and that the effect would 
be greater as the ambiguity of the answer increased (that is, there would be a more equal 
distribution of „before‟ and „after‟ choices where the difference between the choices was at 
its greatest, and a more biased distribution where the differences between the test choices 
was closest). A bias to selecting the „after‟ choice as more similar than the „before‟ choice 
would be indicative of overestimation, and was hypothesised to occur when gaze direction 
was in advance of head orientation. A reversed bias would be indicative of 
underestimation and was expected when gaze was looking in the opposite direction. The 
absence of a response bias would be indicative of an accurate estimation of head rotation. 
 
 
 
Figure 7.5. Examples of test stimuli in pilot study 2. The deviation of each test choice from 
the stopping point of the rotating stimulus varied along four levels, from (A) 20o, to (B) 15o, 
(C) 10o and (D) 5o. 
Procedure 
Participants were instructed that their task was to indicate which of the two static 
faces was at an angle most similar to the final angle of the rotating face. The trial 
procedure was the same as for pilot study 1. There were 120 trials in total with each level 
A: -/+20o B: -/+15o C: -/+10
o D: -/+5o 
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of gaze direction and test stimulus (3 X 4) presented 10 times. The left/right screen 
positions of the test stimulus choices were counterbalanced across trials. Participants 
chose either the head on the left or right of the screen as being at an angle more similar to 
the end-point of the rotating stimulus („1‟ = left, „0‟ = right, labelled accordingly). The 
experiment lasted approximately 10 min. All other procedural information is the same as 
for pilot study 1. 
Results 
The mean reaction time was 1437 ms (SD = 522 ms). Trial exclusions based on 
reaction time used the same criterion as pilot study 1 and resulted in 4.37% of trials being 
excluded, resulting in a mean reaction time of 1339 ms (SD = 523 ms). Responses were 
coded and analysed in the same way as for pilot study 1. 
 
 Ahead Congruent Lagging 
-/+20
o
 65.3 (26.0) 46.5 (31.0) 47.1 (30.2) 
-/+15
o
 64.0 (16.2) 46.6 (24.6) 46.0 (30.7) 
-/+10
o
 64.8 (19.2) 55.4 (24.8) 47.6 (27.0) 
-/+5
o
 54.6 (25.3) 49.0 (26.1) 39.6 (26.6) 
 
Table 7.2. Mean percentage of „after‟ responses (SD) for each gaze direction for each 
level of test stimulus. 
 
A two-way repeated measures ANOVA with Gaze direction and Test stimulus 
entered as the main factors (Table 7.2, Figure 7.6) revealed no main effect of Test 
stimulus (F(3, 60) = 2.53, p = .066, ηp
2 = .11). The magnitude of difference between the 
test choices and the stopping point of the rotating stimulus had no effect on judgments as 
to which of the choices was more similar. However, there was a significant effect of Gaze 
direction (F(2, 40) = 10.2, p < .001, ηp
2 = .34). Paired sample t-tests between the three 
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gaze conditions (Bonferroni p = .017) showed that the mean percentage of „after‟ 
responses was significantly greater in the gaze-ahead condition than in either the gaze-
congruent (t(20) = 2.98, p = .007) or gaze-slower conditions (t(20) = 3.55, p = .002), which 
did not differ from each other (t(20) = 1.75, p = .096). One sample t-test with a test value of 
50 show only the gaze-ahead condition to differ significantly from 50% (t(20) = 3.03, p = 
.007) with no response bias evident for the gaze-congruent (t(20) = .117, p  = .91) and 
gaze-lagging conditions (t(20) = .826, p = .419). However, the effect of Gaze direction was 
not affected by the difference between the test choices and the stopping point, as there 
was no interaction between Gaze direction and Test stimulus (F(6, 120) = 1.4, p = .22, ηp
2 
= .065).  
 
 
 
Figure 7.6. Mean Percentage of „after‟ responses for each gaze direction across each test 
stimulus level. 
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Discussion 
The results show that memory displacement of an action sequence was modulated 
by gaze direction. Judgments as to how far a head had rotated were overestimated when 
gaze was looking in advance of head rotation, compared to when looking straight ahead or 
in the opposite direction, and to the 50% criterion of no response bias. This is consistent 
with the hypothesis that anticipating the future movements of an agent is enhanced when 
gaze direction conveys the goal of the action. Furthermore, this result proved robust 
across all of the test stimulus levels. At first sight, it may appear that the amount of 
memory displacement elicited when gaze was directed in advance of head rotation 
encompasses the full range of test stimulus deviations (i.e. up to 20o). However, this 
seems implausible and cannot be verified with the current methodology. A memory 
displacement of just 1o would make the „after‟ test choice appear more similar to the 
stopping point than the before choice, irrespective of the distance between the choices. 
For example, if participants overestimated the degree of rotation by just 1o, then technically 
the test choice that was 20o after the stopping angle would be perceived as more similar 
than the test choice that was 20o before the stopping angle, and would lead to a greater 
proportion of „after‟ responses. However, it could not be concluded that the participant 
overestimated the degree of rotation by the full 20o. The test stimulus was therefore further 
modified in a third pilot study to include conditions where the deviation of the test choices 
from the stopping point was asymmetrical. That is, one of the test choices was closer to 
the stopping point than the other. Errors in the presence of a correct answer would 
suggest the extent of memory displacement, such that selecting the farthest choice would 
imply that the amount of memory displacement is within the range between the stopping 
point and the test choice. Furthermore, error rates provide a criterion by which to assess 
participant reliability in task performance. This criterion was absent from pilot study 2 and 
was a shortfall of the design. The inclusion of test stimuli with asymmetric deviations from 
the stopping point of the rotating stimulus reintroduced a means of participant selection, as 
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well as enabling an estimation of the extent of memory displacement elicited by variation in 
gaze direction. 
Pilot Study 3 
Method 
Participants 
Participant‟s (N = 9) details are the same as for pilot studies 1 and 2. 
Apparatus 
Hardware and software for the creation and display of stimuli were the same as for 
pilot studies 1 and 2. 
Stimuli 
The stimulus source and the rotating stimuli were the same as for pilot studies 1 and 
2. 
Test stimulus 
The test stimulus retained the two-forced choice design of pilot study 2. However, 
they were positioned closer together on screen, such that the inner edges lay at the centre 
of the screen and the outer edges subtended at an angular width of 11.5o. As the test 
choices were now in the same field of view, the need to make saccades between the two 
test choices was removed. This was expected to reduce the amount of memory 
degradation for the stopping point by decreasing the amount of time between offset of the 
rotating stimulus and a response being made. One of the test choices was oriented at 10o 
either before or after the stopping point of the rotating stimulus, with the remaining choice 
oriented 10o, 20o or 30o in the opposite direction. This yielded five levels of test stimulus: 
172 
 
(1) -30o/+10o; (2) -20o/+10o; (3) -10o/+10o; (4) -10o/+20o; (5) -10o/+30o (Figure 7.7). Again, 
participants were required to choose which test choice was at an angle most similar to the 
final angle of the rotating stimulus by pressing one of two keys on the keyboard („1‟ = left, 
„0‟ = right, labelled accordingly). As in pilot studies 1 and 2, it was expected that an effect 
of memory displacement would be most evident where each test choice was equivalently 
similar to the stopping point, and there was no correct answer (-10o/+10o). As such, these 
were termed the symmetrical experimental trials. In the remaining trials, there was a 
correct answer. In those levels where the test choices were at their most asymmetrical (-
30o/+10o, -10o/+30o), it was assumed the correct answer was sufficiently unambiguous to 
elicit very few errors. Therefore, these trials were used as catch trials with which to assess 
participant performance. In the remaining trials where the correct answer was less 
ambiguous, it was expected that more errors would be made. These were called 
asymmetrical experimental trials. The pattern of errors may reveal biases caused by the 
gaze direction of the rotating stimulus, such that the gaze-lagging condition may elicit 
errors where the „after‟ test choice is correct (-20o/+10o) and the gaze-ahead condition may 
elicit errors where the „before‟ answer is correct (-10o/+20o).  
 
 
 
Figure 7.7. Examples of test stimuli in Pilot 3. A: Symmetrical experimental trials where 
neither answer was more similar to the end-point of the rotating stimulus. B & C: 
Asymmetric experimental trials where the „after‟ (B) and „before‟ (C) test choices were 
more similar. D & E: Catch trials where the „after‟ (D) and „before‟ (E) test choices were 
more similar. 
A: -10o/+10o B: -20o/+10o C: -10o/+20o D: -30o/+10o E: -10o/+30o 
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Procedure 
There were 108 trials in total, 36 trials for the symmetrical experimental condition, 36 
trials for asymmetrical experimental condition, and 36 trials for the catch condition, with the 
three gaze direction levels being represented by 12 trials each. The position of the test 
choices were counterbalanced across the trials. For the asymmetrical experimental trials 
and catch trials, the number of trials was distributed evenly between those where the „after‟ 
test choice was correct and those where the „before‟ test choice was correct. Participant 
instructions and trial procedure were the same as for pilot study 2. The experiment lasted 
approximately 9 minutes. 
Results 
The mean error rate was 8.6% (SD = 8.5%). No participants were removed due to 
poor performance (mean error rate of >20%). The mean reaction time was 1217 ms (SD = 
270 ms). Responses made less than 250ms or in excess of 2SD above each participants 
mean reaction times were removed resulting in 4.1% of trials being excluded, and a 
subsequent mean reaction time of 1162 ms (SD = 245 ms). The data were coded and 
analysed as in pilot studies 1 and 2. 
 
 Ahead Congruent Lagging 
-30
o
/+10
o
 92.6 (12.1) 94.1 (12.2) 90.7 (12.1) 
-20
o
/+10
o
 78.5 (22.2) 79.6 (21.7) 74.4 (21.5) 
-10
o
/+10
o
 56.4 (21.0) 49.2 (22.3) 54.0 (21.0) 
-10
o
/+20
o
 27.8 (16.5) 23.3 (19.1) 19.3 (17.5) 
-10
o
/+30
o
 11.9 (13.4) 5.6 (8.3) 10.4 (14.1) 
 
Table 7.3. Mean percentage of „after‟ responses for each gaze direction across each level 
of test stimulus. 
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A two way repeated measures ANOVA with Gaze direction and Test stimulus 
entered as the main factors showed the expected main effect of Test stimulus (F(4, 32) = 
82.67, p < .001, ηp
2 = .91), but no main effect of Gaze direction (F(2, 16) = .63, p = .55, ηp
2 
= .07), nor an interaction between Gaze direction and Test stimulus (F(8, 64) = .38, p = 
.93, ηp
2 = .05). One sample t-tests with a test value of 50 revealed there to be no response 
biases in the symmetrical experimental trials that would indicate a memory displacement in 
either the gaze-ahead (t(8) = .91,  p = .39), gaze-congruent (t(8) = .113, p = .91) or gaze-
lagging conditions (t(8) = .57, p = .58). These levels were collapsed to investigate the 
presence of an overall displacement effect, but this too was not significant (t(8) = .51, p = 
.63). 
 
 
 
Figure 7.8. Mean percentage of „after‟ responses for each gaze direction across each level 
of test stimulus. 
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Discussion 
The manipulations of gaze direction in pilot study 3 failed to elicit any variation in 
how far participants estimated the head to have rotated. These results do not support the 
hypothesis, and stand in contrast to the findings of the previous pilot studies, in particular 
to those of pilot study 2 in which an identical experimental condition (-10o/+10o) elicited a 
strong effect of gaze direction. However, the number of trials contributing to the respective 
analyses were not equivalent, with pilot study 2 drawing from 630 trials and the 
experimental trials of pilot study 3 only consisting of 324 trials. The non-significant result in 
the current study may therefore be due to a lack of power. It must also be noted that 
reaction times did not decrease appreciably by placing the two test choices closer together 
on the screen, and this is supported by a non-significant difference in reaction times 
between the experimental trials of pilot study 3 and the equivalent trials of pilot study 2 
(one-way independent measures ANOVA F(1, 28) = .29, p = .594, ηp
2 = .01). 
 A fourth pilot study was therefore conducted in which the methodology of pilot study 
3 was replicated with a larger sample. An additional factor of retention interval was also 
included, whereby all trials were presented both with and without the blank screen of 1000 
ms in between offset of the rotating stimulus and onset of the test stimulus. Previous 
research has shown that the magnitude of RM increases with the length of retention 
interval up to 250 ms, after which the effect levels off. In Pilot study 4, it was expected that 
any re-occurrence of RM, and it‟s modulation due to changes in the gaze direction of the 
rotating stimulus, would be absent when the RI was zero. 
Pilot Study 4 
Method 
Participants 
Participant‟s (N = 15) details are the same as for previous pilot studies. 
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Apparatus 
Hardware and software for the creation and display of stimuli were the same as for 
previous pilot studies. 
Stimuli 
The stimuli in pilot study 4 were created using different software (Poser 6 animation 
software, Curious Labs, Inc. & e frontier, Inc) than for previous pilot studies. This provided 
more accurate and realistic stimuli than used in pilot studies 1 to 3 in several ways. Firstly, 
the stimuli were more naturalistically human, whereas the previous stimuli suffered from 
flaws in the rendering of the features. Secondly, the stimuli were more comprehensive, in 
that it was possible to now present the back of the head and also other body parts such as 
the neck and shoulders, which was not possible in previous pilot studies. Thirdly, it was 
now possible to present two different characters, one male and one female, to afford the 
experiment with more variation. Finally, and most importantly, the software enabled highly 
accurate manipulations of the rotation of the head and the variations in gaze direction, 
such that each could now be quantified and specified to within 1o. The eyes in the gaze-
ahead and gaze-lagging conditions were now oriented at 30o from the orientation of the 
head, with the gaze-congruent condition showing no deviation from head orientation (0o). 
These parameters provided for a more conspicuous variation in gaze direction than in the 
previous pilot studies. 
Rotating stimulus 
The nature of rotation was the same as for the previous pilot studies (Figure 7.9). In 
addition, the rotating head was placed within the context of the body by making the top 
part of the shoulders visible. These remained fixed at a 45o angle away to the observers 
left throughout the rotation. The subtended angle of the stimulus‟ width was between 11.5o 
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and 9.2o for the male, and between 10.3o and 9.2o for the female stimulus. The height of 
both was 14.8o.  
 
 
 
Figure 7.9. The rotating stimulus of pilot study 4 using stimuli created in Poser 6. As in the 
previous pilot studies, the head rotated 60o from a full left profile view (A), and the gaze 
direction was either in advance of head orientation (B: gaze-ahead), looking straight ahead 
(C: gaze-congruent), or lagging behind head rotation (D: gaze-lagging). 
 
Test stimulus 
The nature of the task performed by the participant, and the levels of test stimulus 
orientation were the same as for pilot study 3 (Figure 7.10). The subtended angle of the 
width of the test stimulus between the outer edges was 22.3o for the male stimulus and 19o 
for the female stimulus. 
A C 
B 
D 
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Figure 7.10. Examples of test stimuli in pilot study 4. A: Symmetrical experimental trials 
where neither answer was more similar to the end-point of the rotating stimulus. B & C: 
Asymmetrical experimental trials where the „after‟ (B) and „before‟ (C) test choices were 
more similar. D & E: Catch trials where the „after‟ (D) and „before‟ (E) test choices were 
more similar. 
 
Procedure 
Participant instructions were the same as for pilot studies 2 and 3, except that 
responses were made by pressing the „J‟ and „L‟ buttons for „left‟ and „right‟ respectively 
(labelled accordingly). Participants completed a total of 120 trials, lasting approximately 10 
minutes. The combinations of gaze direction and test stimulus (3 X 5) were presented four 
times for each of the male and female stimuli. These were conducted in two blocks of 60 
trials, one with a retention interval (1000 ms) in between the rotating stimulus and test 
stimulus, and one without. The order of these blocks was counterbalanced across 
participants. 
Results 
The mean error rate was 16.9% (SD = 14.0%) and the mean reaction times was 
1171 ms (SD = 273 ms). Those participants with a mean error rate exceeding 20% were 
excluded (n = 5, mean error rate = 33.3%, SD = 9.1%) reducing the error rate to 8.8% (SD 
= 6.8). Trials with a response time less than 250ms or in excess of 2SD above each 
A: -10o/+10o B: -20o/+10o C: -10o/+20o D: -30o/+10o E: -10
o/+30o 
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participant mean were removed from the analysis, leading to 4.8% of trials being excluded, 
resulting in a mean reaction time of 1127 ms (258 ms).  
 
 Retention Interval Absent Retention Interval Present 
 Ahead Congruent Lagging Ahead Congruent Lagging 
-30
o
/+10
o
 87.5 (24.3) 86.7 (18.5) 81.7 (21.1) 83.3 (18.8) 95.0 (10.5) 90.8 (21.7) 
-20
o
/+10
o
 80.0 (23.0) 70.0 (19.7) 65.0 (26.9) 72.5 (23.3) 65.0 (31.6) 57.5 (39.2) 
-10
o
/+10
o
 69.2 (31.7) 48.3 (34.2) 32.5 (30.0) 62.5 (24.3) 49.2 (29.3) 12.5 (21.2) 
-10
o
/+20
o
 30.8 (32.9) 41.7 (34.7) 33.3 (33.3) 25.0 (21.9) 18.3 (26.9) 15.8 (18.2) 
-10
o
/+30
o
 7.5 (16.9) 0.0 (0.0) 2.5 (7.9) 10.0 (12.9) 2.5 (7.9) 7.5 (12.1) 
 
Table 7.4. Mean percentage of „after‟ responses for each gaze direction across each level 
of test stimulus both with and without retention interval. 
 
The „before‟ and „after‟ responses were coded in the same way as in pilot study 3 
and entered into a three-way repeated measures ANOVA with RI, Gaze direction and Test 
stimulus as the main effects (2 X 3 X 5). There was no significant main effect of RI (F(1, 9) 
= 1.4, p = .27, ηp
2 = .14), nor did this interact with either Gaze direction (F(2, 18) = .19, p = 
.83, ηp
2 = .02) or Test stimulus (F(4, 36) = 2.33, p = .08, ηp
2 = .21). There was the expected 
effect of Test stimulus (F(3, 36) = 81.4, p < .001, ηp
2 = .9), a significant main effect of Gaze 
direction (F(2, 18) = 7.2, p =  .005, ηp
2 = .45), and significant interaction between the two 
(F(8, 72) = 4.9, p < .001, ηp
2 = .35). With RI collapsed due to its lack of influence on the 
results, one-way repeated measures ANOVAs were conducted with gaze direction as the 
main effect for each of the symmetrical and asymmetrical experimental trial conditions of 
test stimulus (see Table 7.4 and Figure 7.11, an effect was not sought in the catch trials as 
performance in these trials was used as a means to exclude participants). This showed a 
significant effect of gaze direction in the symmetrical experimental trials (F(2, 18) = 15.24, 
p < .001, ηp
2 = .629), which paired sample t-tests showed to be due to the gaze-lagging 
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condition being significantly different from both the gaze-ahead (t(9) = 6, p < .001) and 
gaze-congruent conditions (t(9) = 3.24, p = .01), which did not differ from each other (t(9) = 
2.1, p = .06). Furthermore, one-sample t-test showed that, whilst the gaze-congruent 
condition did not differ significantly from the test value of 50 (t(9) =.23, p = .83), the mean 
percentage of „after‟ responses in the gaze-lagging condition was significantly less than 
50% (t(9) = 3.84, p = .004), whereas those for the gaze-ahead condition approached 
significance but did not survive the Bonferroni correction (t(9) = 2.48, p = .035). There was 
no significant effect of gaze direction in either the „after‟ (F(2, 18) = 1.79, p = .2, ηp
2 = .17) 
or „before‟ asymmetric experimental trials (F(2, 18) = .27, p = .76, ηp
2 = .03). 
 
 
Figure 7.11. Mean percentage of „after‟ responses for each gaze condition across each 
level of test stimulus (RI collapsed). 
 
181 
 
Discussion 
The results of pilot study 4 are the most emphatic of all of the pilot studies. The effect 
of gaze direction was not only highly significant, in contrast to the results of pilots studies 1 
and 3, but also obtained an effect size (.629) considerably larger than that of pilot study 2 
(.34). On first glance, this seems to have fulfilled the aim of rectifying the null effect of pilot 
study 3 by increasing the sample size. However, after participant exclusions had been 
made, the data analysed consisted of only one more participant than in pilot study 3, 
resulting in even fewer experimental trials being analysed (240). The augmented effect 
may be attributed to the nature of the stimuli, which afforded an enhanced 
conspicuousness of the gaze manipulations and a greater ease with which the different 
directions could be discriminated. This would have made the gaze cues more discernable, 
facilitating the inference of the action goals, resulting in a greater memory displacement.  
 However, the expected effect of RI in determining the presence of an effect of gaze 
direction was not found. Previous research has established that memory displacement 
requires an optimum time lapse of 250 ms within which the representational continuation 
of the object‟s motion occurs. However, the memory displacement attributed to variation in 
gaze direction in pilot study 4 occurred both in the absence and presence of a RI. In the 
experimental trials, the effect of gaze was highly significant and of comparable size in the 
RI absent condition (F(2,18) = 6.78, p = .006, ηp
2 = .43) and in the RI present condition 
(F(2,18) = 14.13, p < .001, ηp
2 = .61). Therefore, unlike memory displacement for non-
biological stimuli, memory displacement caused by intentional attribution to biological 
stimuli may not be affected by the absence or presence of an RI. This suggests the 
possibility that the two processes are governed by different cognitive mechanisms. This 
hypothesis is investigated further in experiment 1. 
182 
 
Overall discussion 
This series of pilot studies show that estimations of how far a head has rotated are 
affected by the gaze direction of the agent. This supports the hypothesis that anticipation 
of biological motion is subject to social cues conveying the goal of the action. Observers 
attribute the action with goal-directedness, which subsequently affects their anticipation of 
how the action will proceed in the immediate future. As the strongest result was obtained 
in pilot study 4, the stimulus array and test stimulus method employed will form the basis 
for the subsequent experiments. 
 There are several outstanding questions that arise from the results of these pilot 
studies that further experiments will have to address. Firstly, the effect of RI requires 
further investigation on the grounds already outlined above. Secondly, the results of the 
pilots were inconclusive as to which condition(s) produced the effect (gaze-ahead and/or 
gaze-lagging). In all but one of the pilot studies, the weak version of the hypothesis was 
supported (gaze-ahead > gaze-lagging). However, in Pilot study 2, the gaze-ahead 
condition was overestimated compared to the 50% mark and compared to the other gaze 
direction conditions (i.e. ahead > 50% = congruent = lagging). Conversely, in pilot study 4, 
the effect lay in an underestimation of the gaze-lagging condition, which differed 
significantly from 50% and the other gaze direction conditions (i.e. ahead = congruent = 
50% > lagging).  
 Thirdly, error rates were high in the catch trials, even though they were designed to 
be easy (so as to be able to exclude participants not paying proper attention). As they 
stand now, the catch trials may remain too difficult even for those completing the task with 
due attentiveness, resulting in the unnecessary exclusion of participants. The threshold by 
which participants are excluded will be reduced in subsequent experiments by making the 
catch trials easier to complete.  
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Finally, and most importantly, the assertion that the effect of gaze direction on 
estimations of head rotation are the result of higher level attributions of intentionality 
remained untested. The effect may also be the result of several low-level factors, including 
the visual appearance of the pupil shifting within the sclera, or the encoding of a spatial 
relationship between the gaze direction and head rotation that does not entail any 
processing of the social significance of the gaze cue. Experiment 1 will introduce several 
control conditions with which to investigate these alternative explanations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
184 
 
References 
Adams, R. B., Ambady, N., Macrae, C. N., & Kleck, R. E. (2006). Emotional expressions 
forecast approach-avoidance behavior. Motivation and Emotion, 30,(2) 179-188. 
Adams, R. B., & Franklin, R. G. (2009). Influence of emotional expression on the 
processing of gaze direction. Motivation and Emotion, 33,(2) 106-112. 
Adams, R. B., Gordon, H. L., Baird, A. A., Ambady, N., & Kleck, R. E. (2003). Effects of 
gaze on amygdala sensitivity to anger and fear faces. Science, 300,(5625) 1536-
1536. 
Adams, R. B., & Kleck, R. E. (2005). Effects of direct and averted gaze on the perception 
of facially communicated emotion. Emotion, 5,(1) 3-11. 
Adolphs, R. (1999). Social cognition and the human brain. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 
3,(12) 469-479. 
Adolphs, R., Gosselin, F., Buchanan, T. W., Tranel, D., Schyns, P., & Damasio, A. R. 
(2005). A mechanism for impaired fear recognition after amygdala damage. Nature, 
433,(7021) 68-72. 
Aguado, L., Garcia-Gutiuerrez, A., & Serrano-Pedraza, I. (2009). Symmetrical interaction 
of sex and expression in face classification tasks. Attention Perception & 
Psychophysics, 71,(1) 9-25. 
Akiyama, T., Kato, M., Muramatsu, T., Saito, F., Nakachi, R., & Kashima, H. (2006). A 
deficit in discriminating gaze direction in a case with right superior temporal gyrus 
lesion. Neuropsychologia, 44,(2) 161-170. 
Allen, G., & Courchesne, E. (2001). Attention function and dysfunction in autism. Frontiers 
in Bioscience, 6, D105-D119. 
Allison, T., Puce, A., & McCarthy, G. (2000). Social perception from visual cues: Role of 
the STS region. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 4,(7) 267-278. 
185 
 
Amorim, M. A. (2003). "What is my avatar seeing?": The coordination of "out-of-body" and 
"embodied" perspectives for scene recognition across views. Visual Cognition, 
10,(2) 157-199. 
Anaki, D., & Moscovitch, M. (2007). When a face is (or is not) more than the sum of its 
features: Configural and analytic processes in facial temporal integration. Visual 
Cognition, 15,(6) 741-763. 
Anderson, J. R., Kuroshima, H., Kuwahata, H., & Fujita, K. (2004). Do squirrel monkeys 
(Saimiri sciureus) and capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella) predict that looking leads 
to touching? Animal Cognition, 7,(3) 185-192. 
Anderson, N. D., & Wilson, H. R. (2005). The nature of synthetic face adaptation. Vision 
Research, 45,(14) 1815-1828. 
Ando, S. (2002). Luminance-induced shift in the apparent direction of gaze. Perception, 
31,(6) 657-674. 
Ando, S. (2004). Perception of gaze direction based on luminance ratio. Perception, 
33,(10) 1173-1184. 
Apperly, I. A. (2008). Beyond Simulation-Theory and Theory-Theory: Why social cognitive 
neuroscience should use its own concepts to study "theory of mind". Cognition, 
107,(1) 266-283. 
Ashida, H. (2004). Action-specific extrapolation of target motion in human visual system. 
Neuropsychologia, 42,(11) 1515-1524. 
Astafiev, S. V., Stanley, C. M., Shulman, G. L., & Corbetta, M. (2004). Extrastriate body 
area in human occipital cortex responds to the performance of motor actions. 
Nature Neuroscience, 7,(5) 542-548. 
Bach, P., Knoblich, G., Gunter, T. C., Friederici, A. D., & Prinz, W. (2005). Action 
comprehension: Deriving spatial and functional relations. Journal of Experimental 
Psychology-Human Perception and Performance, 31,(3) 465-479. 
186 
 
Baker, C. I., Keysers, C., Jellema, T., Wicker, B., & Perrett, D. I. (2001). Neuronal 
representation of disappearing and hidden objects in temporal cortex of the 
macaque. Experimental Brain Research, 140,(3) 375-381. 
Baldwin, D. A., & Baird, J. A. (2001). Discerning intentions in dynamic human action. 
Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 5,(4) 171-178. 
Baldwin, D. A., Baird, J. A., Saylor, M. M., & Clark, M. A. (2001). Infants parse dynamic 
action. Child Development, 72,(3) 708-717. 
Baron-Cohen, S. (1995). Mindblindness: An essay on autism and Theory of Mind. 
Cambridge, Mass MIT Press. 
Baron-Cohen, S. (2002). The extreme male brain theory of autism. Trends in Cognitive 
Sciences, 6,(6) 248-254. 
Baron-Cohen, S. (2005). The Empathizing System: A revision of the 1994 model of the 
Mindreading System. In Ellis, B. & Bjorklund, D. (Eds.), Origins of the Social Mind: 
Evolutionary Psychology and Child Development. New York: Guilford Press. 
Baron-Cohen, S. (2006). Two new theories of autism: hyper-systemising and assortative 
mating. Archives of Disease in Childhood, 91,(1) 2-5. 
Baron-Cohen, S., Campbell, R., Karmiloff-Smith, A., Grant, J., & Walker, J. (1995). Are 
children with autism blind to the mentalistic significance of the eyes. British Journal 
of Developmental Psychology, 13,(4) 379-398. 
Baron-Cohen, S., O'Riordan, M., Stone, V., Jones, R., & Plaisted, K. (1999). Recognition 
of faux pas by normally developing children and children with Asperger syndrome 
or high-functioning autism. Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders, 29,(5) 
407-418. 
Baron-Cohen, S., Ring, H., Moriarty, J., Shmitz, P., Costa, D., & Ell, P. (1994). Recognition 
of mental state terms: A clinical study of autism, and a functional neuroimaging 
study of normal adults. British Journal of Psychiatry, 165,(5) 640-649. 
187 
 
Baron-Cohen, S., & Wheelwright, S. (2004). The empathy quotient: An investigation of 
adults with Asperger syndrome or high functioning autism, and normal sex 
differences. Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders, 34,(2) 163-175. 
Baron-Cohen, S., Wheelwright, S., Skinner, R., Martin, J., & Clubley, E. (2001). The 
Autism-Spectrum Quotient (AQ): Evidence from Asperger syndrome/high-
functioning autism, males and females, scientists and mathematicians. Journal of 
Autism and Developmental Disorders, 31,(1) 5-17. 
Barrett, L., Henzi, P., & Dunbar, R. (2003). Primate cognition: from 'what now?' to 'what 
if?'. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 7,(11) 494-497. 
Barrett, L., Henzi, P., & Rendall, D. (2007). Social brains, simple minds: does social 
complexity really require cognitive complexity? Philosophical Transactions of the 
Royal Society B-Biological Sciences, 362,(1480) 561-575. 
Barton, J. J. S. (2001). Discrimination of spatial relations and features in faces: Effects of 
inversion and viewing duration. British Journal of Psychology, 92,(3) 527-549. 
Barton, J. J. S., Radcliffe, N., Cherkasova, M. V., Edelman, J., & Intriligator, J. M. (2006). 
Information processing during face recognition: The effects of familiarity, inversion, 
and morphing on scanning fixations. Perception, 35,(8) 1089-1105. 
Barton, J. J. S., Zhao, J. H., & Keenan, J. P. (2003). Perception of global facial geometry 
in the inversion effect and prosopagnosia. Neuropsychologia, 41,(12) 1703-1711. 
Batki, A., Baron-Cohen, S., Wheelwright, S., Connellan, J., & Ahluwalia, J. (2000). Is there 
an innate gaze module? Evidence from human neonates. Infant Behavior & 
Development, 23,(2) 223-229. 
Baudouin, J. Y., & Humphreys, G. W. (2006). Configural information in gender 
categorisation. Perception, 35,(4) 531-540. 
Bauml, K. H., Schnelzer, M., & Zimmer, A. (1997). The influence of inversion on the 
judgment of facial and non-facial attributes. Acta Psychologica, 96,(1-2) 27-42. 
188 
 
Bayliss, A. P., di Pellegrino, G., & Tipper, S. P. (2005). Sex differences in eye gaze and 
symbolic cueing of attention. Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology Section 
a-Human Experimental Psychology, 58,(4) 631-650. 
Bayliss, A. P., Griffiths, D., & Tipper, S. P. (2009). Predictive gaze cues affect face 
evaluations: The effect of facial emotion. European Journal of Cognitive 
Psychology, 21,(7) 1072-1084. 
Bayliss, A. P., Paul, M. A., Cannon, P. R., & Tipper, S. P. (2006). Gaze cuing and affective 
judgments of objects: I like what you look at. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 
13,(6) 1061-1066. 
Bayliss, A. P., & Tipper, S. P. (2005). Gaze and arrow cueing of attention reveals 
individual differences along the autism spectrum as a function of target context. 
British Journal of Psychology, 96,(1) 95-114. 
Bayliss, A. P., & Tipper, S. P. (2006). Predictive gaze cues and personality judgments: 
Should eye trust you? Psychological Science, 17,(6) 514-520. 
Becchio, C., Bertone, C., & Castiello, U. (2008). How the gaze of others influences object 
processing. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 12,(7) 254-258. 
Bentin, S., Allison, T., Puce, A., Perez, E., & McCarthy, G. (1996). Electrophysiological 
studies of face perception in humans. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 8,(6) 
551-565. 
Bertamini, M. (1993). Memory for position and dynamic representations. Memory & 
Cognition, 21,(4) 449-457. 
Bertenthal, B., & Von Hofsten, C. (1998). Eye, head and trunk control: The foundation for 
manual development. Neuroscience and Biobehavioral Reviews, 22,(4) 515-520. 
Bi, T. Y., Su, J. Z., Chen, J., & Fang, F. (2009). The role of gaze direction in face viewpoint 
aftereffect. Vision Research, 49,(18) 2322-2327. 
189 
 
Biguer, B., Jeannerod, M., & Prablanc, C. (1982). The coordination of eye, head, and arm 
movements during reaching at a single visual target. Experimental Brain Research, 
46,(2) 301-304. 
Bindemann, M., Burton, A. M., & Langton, S. R. H. (2008). How do eye gaze and facial 
expression interact? Visual Cognition, 16,(6) 708-733. 
Bindemann, M., Scheepers, C., & Burton, A. M. (2009). Viewpoint and center of gravity 
affect eye movements to human faces. Journal of Vision, 9,(2) 1-16. 
Binkofski, F., & Buccino, G. (2006). The role of ventral premotor cortex in action execution 
and action understanding. Journal of Physiology-Paris, 99,(4-6) 396-405. 
Blair, R. J. R. (2003). Facial expressions, their communicatory functions and neuro-
cognitive substrates. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London 
Series B-Biological Sciences, 358,(1431) 561-572. 
Blair, R. J. R. (2005). Responding to the emotions of others: Dissociating forms of 
empathy through the study of typical and psychiatric populations. Consciousness 
and Cognition, 14,(4) 698-718. 
Blair, R. J. R., Morris, J. S., Frith, C. D., Perrett, D. I., & Dolan, R. J. (1999). Dissociable 
neural responses to facial expressions of sadness and anger. Brain, 122,(5) 883-
893. 
Blakemore, S. J., & Decety, J. (2001). From the perception of action to the understanding 
of intention. Nature Reviews Neuroscience, 2,(8) 561-567. 
Blakemore, S. J., & Frith, C. (2005). The role of motor contagion in the prediction of action. 
Neuropsychologia, 43,(2) 260-267. 
Bock, S. W., Dicke, P., & Thier, P. (2008). How precise is gaze following in humans? 
Vision Research, 48,(7) 946-957. 
Bonifacci, P., Ricciardelli, P., Lugli, L., & Pellicano, A. (2008). Emotional attention: Effects 
of emotion and gaze direction on overt orienting of visual attention. Cognitive 
Processing, 9,(2) 127-135. 
190 
 
Brass, M., & Heyes, C. (2005). Imitation: Is cognitive neuroscience solving the 
correspondence problem? Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 9,(10) 489-495. 
Brouwer, A. M., Franz, V. H., & Thornton, I. M. (2004). Representational momentum in 
perception and grasping: Translating versus transforming objects. Journal of 
Vision, 4,(7) 575-584. 
Brown, W. M., & Moore, C. (2002). Smile asymmetries and reputation as reliable indicators 
of likelihood to cooperate: An evolutionary analysis. In Shohov, S. P. (Ed.), 
Advances in psychology research (Vol. 11, pp. 19-36). Hauppauge, New York: 
Nova Science Publishers. 
Brune, M., & Brune-Cohrs, U. (2006). Theory of mind: Evolution, ontogeny, brain 
mechanisms and psychopathology. Neuroscience and Biobehavioral Reviews, 
30,(4) 437-455. 
Buccino, G., Lui, F., Canessa, N., Patteri, I., Lagravinese, G., Benuzzi, F., Porro, C. A., & 
Rizzolatti, G. (2004). Neural circuits involved in the recognition of actions 
performed by nonconspecifics: An fMRI study. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 
16,(1) 114-126. 
Buchan, J. N., Pare, M., & Munhall, K. G. (2007). Spatial statistics of gaze fixations during 
dynamic face processing. Social Neuroscience, 2,(1) 1-13. 
Burrows, A. M. (2008). The facial expression musculature in primates and its evolutionary 
significance. BioEssays, 30,(3) 212-225. 
Caldara, R., Seghier, M. L., Rossion, B., Lazeyras, F., Michel, C., & Hauert, C. A. (2006). 
The fusiform face area is tuned for curvilinear patterns with more high-contrasted 
elements in the upper part. Neuroimage, 31,(1) 313-319. 
Calder, A. J. (2007). Face cells: Separate processing of expression and gaze in the 
amygdala. Current Biology, 17,(10) R371-R372. 
191 
 
Calder, A. J., Beaver, J. D., Winston, J. S., Dolan, R. J., Jenkins, R., Eger, E., & Henson, 
R. N. A. (2007). Separate coding of different gaze directions in the superior 
temporal sulcus and inferior parietal lobule. Current Biology, 17,(1) 20-25. 
Calder, A. J., & Jansen, J. (2005). Configural coding of facial expressions: The impact of 
inversion and photographic negative. Visual Cognition, 12,(3) 495-518. 
Calder, A. J., Jenkins, R., Cassel, A., & Clifford, C. W. G. (2008). Visual representation of 
eye gaze is coded by a nonopponent multichannel system. Journal of Experimental 
Psychology-General, 137,(2) 244-261. 
Calder, A. J., Lawrence, A. D., Keane, J., Scott, S. K., Owen, A. M., Christoffels, I., & 
Young, A. W. (2002). Reading the mind from eye gaze. Neuropsychologia, 40,(8) 
1129-1138. 
Calder, A. J., & Young, A. W. (2005). Understanding the recognition of facial identity and 
facial expression. Nature Reviews Neuroscience, 6,(8) 641-651. 
Call, J. (2001). Chimpanzee social cognition. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 5,(9) 388-393. 
Call, J., & Tomasello, M. (1998). Distinguishing intentional from accidental actions in 
orangutans (Pongo pygmaeus), chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes), and human 
children (Homo sapiens). Journal of Comparative Psychology, 112,(2) 192-206. 
Calvo-Merino, B., Grezes, J., Glaser, D. E., Passingham, R. E., & Haggard, P. (2006). 
Seeing or doing? Influence of visual and motor familiarity in action observation. 
Current Biology, 16,(19) 1905-1910. 
Campbell, R., Heywood, C. A., Cowey, A., Regard, M., & Landis, T. (1990). Sensitivity to 
eye gaze in prosopagnosic patients and monkeys with superior temporal sulcus 
ablation. Neuropsychologia, 28,(11) 1123-1142. 
Carroll, J. M., & Yung, C. K. (2006). Sex and discipline differences in empathising, 
systemising and autistic symptomatology: Evidence from a student population. 
Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders, 36,(7) 949-957. 
192 
 
Castiello, U. (2003). Understanding other people's actions: Intention and attention. Journal 
of Experimental Psychology-Human Perception and Performance, 29,(2) 416-430. 
Cerf, M., Harel, J., Einhaeuser, W., & Kock, C. (2007). Predicting human gaze using low-
level saliency combined with face detection. Advances in Neural Information 
Processing Systems (NIPS), 20, 241-248. 
Charman, T., Baron-Cohen, S., Swettenham, J., Baird, G., Cox, A., & Drew, A. (2000). 
Testing joint attention, imitation, and play as infancy precursors to language and 
theory of mind. Cognitive Development, 15,(4) 481-498. 
Chawarska, K., Klin, A., & Volkmar, F. (2003). Automatic attention cueing through eye 
movement in 2-year-old children with autism. Child Development, 74,(4) 1108-
1122. 
Chen, C. C., Kao, K. L. C., & Tyler, C. W. (2007). Face configuration processing in the 
human brain: The role of symmetry. Cerebral Cortex, 17,(6) 1423-1432. 
Chen, M., & Bargh, J. A. (1999). Consequences of automatic evaluation: Immediate 
behavioral predispositions to approach or avoid the stimulus. Personality and 
Social Psychology Bulletin, 25,(2) 215-224. 
Cohen, J. D., & Tong, F. (2001). Neuroscience - The face of controversy. Science, 
293,(5539) 2405-2407. 
Conty, L., Tijus, C., Hugueville, L., Coelho, E., & George, N. (2006). Searching for 
asymmetries in the detection of gaze contact versus averted gaze under different 
head views: a behavioural study. Spatial Vision, 19,(6) 529-545. 
Coricelli, G. (2005). Two-levels of mental states attribution: From automaticity to 
voluntariness. [Article]. Neuropsychologia, 43,(2) 294-300. 
Cretenet, J., & Dru, V. (2008). A neurobehavioral investigation into judgmental processes: 
Effect of bilateral motor behaviors. Brain and Cognition, 68,(1) 81-91. 
Critchley, H., Daly, E., Phillips, M., Brammer, M., Bullmore, E., Williams, S., Van 
Amelsvoort, T., Robertson, D., David, A., & Murphy, D. (2000). Explicit and implicit 
193 
 
neural mechanisms for processing of social information from facial expressions: A 
functional magnetic resonance imaging study. Human Brain Mapping, 9,(2) 93-105. 
Csibra, G. (2003). Teleological and referential understanding of action in infancy. 
Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B-Biological Sciences, 358,(1431) 
447-458. 
Csibra, G. (2005). Mirror neurons and action observation. Is simulation involved? 
Interdisciplines. Retrieved from http://www.interdisciplines.org/mirror/papers/4 
Currie, G., & Ravenscroft, I. (1997). Mental simulation and motor imagery. Philosophy of 
Science, 64,(1) 161-180. 
Davidson, R. J., Saron, C. D., Senulis, J. A., Ekman, P., & Friesen, W. V. (1990). 
Approach withdrawal and cerebral asymmetry: Emotional expression and brain 
physiology. 1. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 58,(2) 330-341. 
Davies, T. N., & Hoffman, D. D. (2002). Attention to faces: A change-blindness study. 
Perception, 31,(9) 1123-1146. 
de Gelder, B., & Rouw, R. (2001). Beyond localisation: A dynamical dual route account of 
face recognition. Acta Psychologica, 107,(1-3) 183-207. 
De Groote, I., Roeyers, H., & Striano, T. (2007). Gaze following as a function of affective 
expression in 3, 6- and 9-month-old infants. Infant Behavior & Development, 30,(3) 
492-498. 
de Haan, M., Pascalis, O., & Johnson, M. H. (2002). Specialization of neural mechanisms 
underlying face recognition in human infants. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 
14,(2) 199-209. 
De Jong, M. C., van Engeland, H., & Kemner, C. (2008). Attentional effects of gaze shifts 
are influenced by emotion and spatial frequency, but not in autism. Journal of the 
American Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry, 47,(4) 443-454. 
Deaner, R. O., Shepherd, S. V., & Platt, M. L. (2007). Familiarity accentuates gaze cuing 
in women but not men. Biology Letters, 3,(1) 64-67. 
194 
 
Desimone, R., Albright, T. D., Gross, C. G., & Bruce, C. (1984). Stimulus-selective 
properties of inferior temporal neurons in the macaque. Journal of Neuroscience, 
4,(8) 2051-2062. 
Diamond, R., & Carey, S. (1986). Why faces are and are not special: An effect of 
expertise. Journal of Experimental Psychology-General, 115,(2) 107-117. 
Dinstein, I., Thomas, C., Behrmann, M., & Heeger, D. J. (2008). A mirror up to nature. 
Current Biology, 18,(1) R13-R18. 
Doi, H., & Shinohara, K. (2009). The perceived duration of emotional face is influenced by 
the gaze direction. Neuroscience Letters, 457,(2) 97-100. 
Downing, P. E., Bray, D., Rogers, J., & Childs, C. (2004). Bodies capture attention when 
nothing is expected. Cognition, 93,(1) B27-B38. 
Downing, P. E., Chan, A. W. Y., Peelen, M. V., Dodds, C. M., & Kanwisher, N. (2006). 
Domain specificity in visual cortex. Cerebral Cortex, 16,(10) 1453-1461. 
Downing, P. E., Dodds, C. M., & Bray, D. (2004). Why does the gaze of others direct visual 
attention? Visual Cognition, 11,(1) 71-79. 
Downing, P. E., Jiang, Y. H., Shuman, M., & Kanwisher, N. (2001). A cortical area 
selective for visual processing of the human body. Science, 293,(5539) 2470-2473. 
Downing, P. E., Peelen, M. V., Wiggett, A. J., & Tew, B. D. (2006). The role of the 
extrastriate body area in action perception. Social Neuroscience, 1,(1) 52-62. 
Downing, P. E., Wiggett, A. J., & Peelen, M. V. (2007). Functional magnetic resonance 
imaging investigation of overlapping lateral occipitotemporal activations using multi-
voxel pattern analysis. Journal of Neuroscience, 27,(1) 226-233. 
Driver, J., Davis, G., Ricciardelli, P., Kidd, P., Maxwell, E., & Baron-Cohen, S. (1999). 
Gaze perception triggers reflexive visuospatial orienting. Visual Cognition, 6,(5) 
509-540. 
Duchaine, B., Jenkins, R., Germine, L., & Calder, A. J. (2009). Normal gaze discrimination 
and adaptation in seven prosopagnosics. Neuropsychologia, 47,(10) 2029-2036. 
195 
 
Dunbar, R. I. M. (1992). Neocortex size as a constraint on group-size in primates. Journal 
of Human Evolution, 22,(6) 469-493. 
Dunbar, R. I. M. (1995). Neocortex size and group-size in primates: A test of the 
hypothesis. Journal of Human Evolution, 28,(3) 287-296. 
Dunbar, R. I. M. (1998). The social brain hypothesis. Evolutionary Anthropology, 6,(5) 178-
190. 
Dwyer, D. M., Mundy, M. E., Vladeanu, M., & Honey, R. C. (2009). Perceptual learning 
and acquired face familiarity: Evidence from inversion, use of internal features, and 
generalization between viewpoints. Visual Cognition, 17,(3) 334-355. 
Ekman, P. (1997). Should we call it expression or communication? Innovations in social 
science research, 10,(4) 333-344. 
Ekman, P. (1999). Basic emotions. In Dalgleish, T. & Power, M. (Eds.), Handbook of 
Cognition and Emotion. Sussex U.K.: John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 
Ellison, J. W., & Massaro, D. W. (1997). Featural evaluation, integration, and judgment of 
facial affect. Journal of Experimental Psychology-Human Perception and 
Performance, 23,(1) 213-226. 
Emery, N. J. (2000). The eyes have it: The neuroethology, function and evolution of social 
gaze. Neuroscience and Biobehavioral Reviews, 24,(6) 581-604. 
Engell, A. D., & Haxby, J. V. (2007). Facial expression and gaze-direction in human 
superior temporal sulcus. Neuropsychologia, 45,(14) 3234-3241. 
Falck-Ytter, T., Gredeback, G., & von Hofsten, C. (2006). Infants predict other people's 
action goals. Nature Neuroscience, 9,(7) 878-879. 
Fang, F., Murray, S. O., & He, S. (2007). Duration-dependent fMRI adaptation and 
distributed viewer-centered face representation in human visual cortex. Cerebral 
Cortex, 17,(6) 1402-1411. 
196 
 
Farroni, T., Csibra, G., Simion, G., & Johnson, M. H. (2002). Eye contact detection in 
humans from birth. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United 
States of America, 99,(14) 9602-9605. 
Ferrari, P. F., Kohler, E., Fogassi, L., & Gallese, V. (2000). The ability to follow eye gaze 
and its emergence during development in macaque monkeys. Proceedings of the 
National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 97,(25) 13997-
14002. 
Ferrari, P. F., Rozzi, S., & Fogassi, L. (2005). Mirror neurons responding to observation of 
actions made with tools in monkey ventral premotor cortex. Journal of Cognitive 
Neuroscience, 17,(2) 212-226. 
Finke, R. A., Freyd, J., & Shyl, G. C. W. (1985). Memory distortions induced by implied 
velocity and acceleration. Bulletin of the Psychonomic Society, 23,(4) 276-276. 
Finke, R. A., & Freyd, J. J. (1985). Transformations of visual memory induced by implied 
motions of pattern elements. Journal of Experimental Psychology-Learning 
Memory and Cognition, 11,(4) 780-794. 
Finke, R. A., Freyd, J. J., & Shyi, G. C. W. (1986). Implied velocity and acceleration induce 
transformations of visual memory. Journal of Experimental Psychology-General, 
115,(2) 175-188. 
Finke, R. A., & Shyi, G. C. W. (1988). Mental extrapolation and representational 
momentum for complex implied motions. Journal of Experimental Psychology-
Learning Memory and Cognition, 14,(1) 112-120. 
Fiorentini, C., & Viviani, P. (2009). Perceiving facial expressions. Visual Cognition, 17,(3) 
373-411. 
Flanagan, J. R., & Johansson, R. S. (2003). Action plans used in action observation. 
Nature, 424,(6950) 769-771. 
Flavell, J. H. (1999). Cognitive development: Children's knowledge about the mind. Annual 
Review of Psychology, 50, 21-45. 
197 
 
Flavell, J. H. (2004). Theory-of-mind development: Retrospect and prospect. Merrill-
Palmer Quarterly-Journal of Developmental Psychology, 50,(3) 274-290. 
Fletcher, P. C., Happe, F., Frith, U., Baker, S. C., Dolan, R. J., Frackowiak, R. S. J., & 
Frith, C. D. (1995). Other minds in the brain: A functional imaging study of Theory 
of Mind in story comprehension. Cognition, 57,(2) 109-128. 
Flom, R., & Pick, A. D. (2005). Experimenter affective expression and gaze following in 7-
month-olds. Infancy, 7,(2) 207-218. 
Fogassi, L., Ferrari, P. F., Gesierich, B., Rozzi, S., Chersi, F., & Rizzolatti, G. (2005). 
Parietal lobe: From action organization to intention understanding. Science, 
308,(5722) 662-667. 
Fox, E. (2005). The role of visual processes in modulating social interactions. Visual 
Cognition, 12,(1) 1-11. 
Freedman, E. G. (2008). Coordination of the eyes and head during visual orienting. 
Experimental Brain Research, 190,(4) 369-387. 
Freyd, J. J. (1983). The mental representation of movement when static stimuli are 
viewed. Perception & Psychophysics, 33,(6) 575-581. 
Freyd, J. J. (1992). Dynamic representations guiding adaptive behavior. In Macar, F., 
Pouthas, V. & Friedman, W. J. (Eds.), Time, Action and Cognition: Towards 
Bridging the Gap (pp. 309-323). Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers. 
Freyd, J. J., & Finke, R. A. (1984). Representational momentum. Journal of Experimental 
Psychology-Learning Memory and Cognition, 10,(1) 126-132. 
Freyd, J. J., & Finke, R. A. (1985). A velocity effect for representational momentum. 
Bulletin of the Psychonomic Society, 23,(6) 443-446. 
Freyd, J. J., & Johnson, J. Q. (1987). Probing the time course of representational 
momentum. Journal of Experimental Psychology-Learning Memory and Cognition, 
13,(2) 259-268. 
198 
 
Freyd, J. J., Kelly, M. H., & Dekay, M. L. (1990). Representational momentum in memory 
for pitch. Journal of Experimental Psychology-Learning Memory and Cognition, 
16,(6) 1107-1117. 
Freyd, J. J., & Miller, G. F. (1992). Creature motion. Bulletin of the Psychonomic Society, 
30,(6) 470-470. 
Freyd, J. J., Pantzer, T. M., & Cheng, J. L. (1988). Representing statics as forces in 
equilibrium. Journal of Experimental Psychology-General, 117,(4) 395-407. 
Friesen, C. K., & Kingstone, A. (2003). Covert and overt orienting to gaze direction cues 
and the effects of fixation offset. Neuroreport, 14,(3) 489-493. 
Friesen, C. K., Ristic, J., & Kingstone, A. (2004). Attentional effects of counterpredictive 
gaze and arrow cues. Journal of Experimental Psychology-Human Perception and 
Performance, 30,(2) 319-329. 
Frischen, A., Bayliss, A. P., & Tipper, S. P. (2007). Gaze cueing of attention: Visual 
attention, social cognition, and individual differences. Psychological Bulletin, 
133,(4) 694-724. 
Frischen, A., Loach, D., & Tipper, S. P. (2009). Seeing the world through another person's 
eyes: Simulating selective attention via action observation. Cognition, 111,(2) 212-
218. 
Frischen, A., & Tipper, S. P. (2004). Orienting attention via observed gaze shift evokes 
longer term inhibitory effects: Implications for social interactions, attention, and 
memory. Journal of Experimental Psychology-General, 133,(4) 516-533. 
Frischen, A., & Tipper, S. P. (2006). Long-term gaze cueing effects: Evidence for retrieval 
of prior states of attention from memory. Visual Cognition, 14,(3) 351-364. 
Frith, U., & Frith, C. D. (2003). Development and neurophysiology of mentalizing. 
Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B-Biological Sciences, 358,(1431) 
459-473. 
199 
 
Gallagher, H. L., & Frith, C. D. (2003). Functional imaging of 'theory of mind'. Trends in 
Cognitive Sciences, 7,(2) 77-83. 
Gallagher, H. L., Jack, A. I., Roepstorff, A., & Frith, C. D. (2002). Imaging the intentional 
stance in a competitive game. Neuroimage, 16,(3) 814-821. 
Gallese, V. (2006). Intentional attunement: A neurophysiological perspective on social 
cognition and its disruption in autism. Brain Research, 1079, 15-24. 
Gallese, V., Fadiga, L., Fogassi, L., & Rizzolatti, G. (1996). Action recognition in the 
premotor cortex. Brain, 119,(2) 593-609. 
Gallese, V., & Goldman, A. (1998). Mirror neurons and the simulation theory of mind-
reading. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 2,(12) 493-501. 
Ganel, T. (2006). The objects of face perception. Neuron, 50,(1) 7-10. 
Ganel, T., Goshen-Gottstein, Y., & Goodale, M. A. (2005). Interactions between the 
processing of gaze direction and facial expression. Vision Research, 45,(9) 1191-
1200. 
Gauthier, I., Skudlarski, P., Gore, J. C., & Anderson, A. W. (2000). Expertise for cars and 
birds recruits brain areas involved in face recognition. Nature Neuroscience, 3,(2) 
191-197. 
Gauthier, I., & Tarr, M. J. (1997). Becoming a ''greeble'' expert: Exploring mechanisms for 
face recognition. Vision Research, 37,(12) 1673-1682. 
Gauthier, I., Tarr, M. J., Anderson, A. W., Skudlarski, P., & Gore, J. C. (1999). Activation of 
the middle fusiform 'face area' increases with expertise in recognizing novel 
objects. Nature Neuroscience, 2,(6) 568-573. 
Ge, L. Z., Wang, Z., McCleery, J. P., & Lee, K. (2006). Activation of face expertise and the 
inversion effect. Psychological Science, 17,(1) 12-16. 
George, N., & Conty, L. (2008). Facing the gaze of others. Neurophysiologie Clinique-
Clinical Neurophysiology, 38,(3) 197-207. 
200 
 
George, N., Dolan, R. J., Fink, G. R., Baylis, G. C., Russell, C., & Driver, J. (1999). 
Contrast polarity and face recognition in the human fusiform gyrus. Nature 
Neuroscience, 2,(6) 574-580. 
George, N., Driver, J., & Dolan, R. J. (2001). Seen gaze-direction modulates fusiform 
activity and its coupling with other brain areas during face processing. Neuroimage, 
13,(6) 1102-1112. 
Getzmann, S., & Lewald, J. (2009). Constancy of target velocity as a critical factor in the 
emergence of auditory and visual representational momentum. Experimental Brain 
Research, 193,(3) 437-443. 
Giese, M. A., & Poggio, T. (2003). Neural mechanisms for the recognition of biological 
movements. Nature Reviews Neuroscience, 4,(3) 179-192. 
Gliga, T., & Csibra, G. (2007). Seeing the face through the eyes: A developmental 
perspective on face expertise. Progress in Brain Research: From Action to 
Cognition, 164, 323-339. 
Goffaux, V., & Rossion, B. (2007). Face inversion disproportionately impairs the perception 
of vertical but not horizontal relations between features. Journal of Experimental 
Psychology-Human Perception and Performance, 33,(4) 995-1002. 
Goffaux, V., Rossion, B., Sorger, B., Schiltz, C., & Goebel, R. (2009). Face inversion 
disrupts the perception of vertical relations between features in the right human 
occipito-temporal cortex. Journal of Neuropsychology, 3,(1) 45-67. 
Goldenfeld, N., Baron-Cohen, S., & Wheelwright, S. (2005). Empathizing and systemizing 
in males, females and autism. Clinical Neuropsychiatry, 2,(6) 338-345. 
Gopnik, A. (2003). The theory theory as an alternative to the innateness hypothesis. In 
Antony, L. & Hornstein, N. (Eds.), Chompsky and his critics (pp. 238-254). Oxford: 
Blackwells. 
Gorbet, D. J., & Sergio, L. E. (2009). The behavioural consequences of dissociating the 
spatial directions of eye and arm movements. Brain Research, 1284, 77-88. 
201 
 
Goren, D., & Wilson, H. R. (2006). Quantifying facial expression recognition across 
viewing conditions. Vision Research, 46,(8-9) 1253-1262. 
Graf, M., Reitzner, B., Corves, C., Casile, A., Giese, M., & Prinz, W. (2007). Predicting 
point-light actions in real-time. Neuroimage, 36,(Supplement 2) T22-T32. 
Grafton, S. T., Arbib, M. A., Fadiga, L., & Rizzolatti, G. (1996). Localization of grasp 
representations in humans by positron emission tomography. 2. Observation 
compared with imagination. Experimental Brain Research, 112,(1) 103-111. 
Graham, R., & LaBar, K. S. (2007). Garner interference reveals dependencies between 
emotional expression and gaze in face perception. Emotion, 7,(2) 296-313. 
Gray, J. A. (1994). Three fundamental emotion systems. In Ekman, P. & Davidson, R. J. 
(Eds.), The nature of emotion: Fundamental questions (pp. 243-247). New York: 
Oxford University Press. 
Grezes, J., Armony, J. L., Rowe, J., & Passingham, R. E. (2003). Activations related to 
"mirror" and "canonical" neurones in the human brain: An fMRI study. Neuroimage, 
18,(4) 928-937. 
Griffiths, P. E. (2003). Basic emotions, complex emotions, machiavellian emotions. In 
Hatzimoysis, A. (Ed.), Philosophy and the Emotions. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Grill-Spector, K., Knouf, N., & Kanwisher, N. (2004). The fusiform face area subserves 
face perception, not generic within-category identification. Nature Neuroscience, 
7,(5) 555-562. 
Guo, K., Mahmoodi, S., Robertson, R. G., & Young, M. P. (2006). Longer fixation duration 
while viewing face images. Experimental Brain Research, 171,(1) 91-98. 
Guo, K., Robertson, R. G., Mahmoodi, S., Tadmor, Y., & Young, M. P. (2003). How do 
monkeys view faces? A study of eye movements. Experimental Brain Research, 
150,(3) 363-374. 
202 
 
Hadjikhani, N., Hoge, R., Snyder, J., & de Gelder, B. (2008). Pointing with the eyes: The 
role of gaze in communicating danger. Brain and Cognition, 68,(1) 1-8. 
Hager, J. C., & Ekman, P. (1983). The inner and outer meanings of facial expressions. In 
Cacioppo, J. T. & Petty, R. E. (Eds.), Social Psychophysiology: A sourcebook. New 
York: The Guilford Press. 
Hanna, J. E., & Brennan, S. E. (2007). Speakers' eye gaze disambiguates referring 
expressions early during face-to-face conversation. Journal of Memory and 
Language, 57,(4) 596-615. 
Hare, B., Call, J., & Tomasello, M. (2001). Do chimpanzees know what conspecifics know? 
Animal Behaviour, 61,(1) 139-151. 
Hare, B., & Tomasello, M. (2004). Chimpanzees are more skilful in competitive than in 
cooperative cognitive tasks. Animal Behaviour, 68,(3) 571-581. 
Haselton, M. G., & Buss, D. M. (2000). Error management theory: A new perspective on 
biases in cross-sex mind reading. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 
78,(1) 81-91. 
Haselton, M. G., & Nettle, D. (2006). The paranoid optimist: An integrative evolutionary 
model of cognitive biases. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 10,(1) 47-
66. 
Hassin, R. R., Aarts, H., & Ferguson, M. J. (2005). Automatic goal inferences. Journal of 
Experimental Social Psychology, 41,(2) 129-140. 
Hassin, R. R., Bargh, J. A., & Uleman, J. S. (2002). Spontaneous causal inferences. 
Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 38,(5) 515-522. 
Haxby, J. V., Hoffman, E. A., & Gobbini, M. I. (2000). The distributed human neural system 
for face perception. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 4,(6) 223-233. 
Haxby, J. V., Hoffman, E. A., & Gobbini, M. I. (2002). Human neural systems for face 
recognition and social communication. Biological Psychiatry, 51,(1) 59-67. 
203 
 
Hayes, A. E., Paul, M. A., Beuger, B., & Tipper, S. P. (2008). Self produced and observed 
actions influence emotion: The roles of action fluency and eye gaze. Psychological 
Research-Psychologische Forschung, 72,(4) 461-472. 
Hernandez, N., Metzger, A., Magne, R., Bonnet-Brilhaut, F., Roux, S., Barthelemy, C., & 
Martineau, J. (2009). Exploration of core features of a human face by healthy and 
autistic adults analyzed by visual scanning. Neuropsychologia, 47,(4) 1004-1012. 
Hershler, O., & Hochstein, S. (2005). At first sight: A high-level pop out effect for faces. 
Vision Research, 45,(13) 1707-1724. 
Hess, U., Adams, R. B., & Kleck, R. E. (2007). Looking at you or looking elsewhere: The 
influence of head orientation on the signal value of emotional facial expressions. 
Motivation and Emotion, 31,(2) 137-144. 
Heyes, C. M. (1998). Theory of mind in nonhuman primates. Behavioral and Brain 
Sciences, 21,(1) 101-114. 
Hietanen, J. K. (1999). Does your gaze direction and head orientation shift my visual 
attention? Neuroreport, 10,(16) 3443-3447. 
Hietanen, J. K., & Leppanen, J. M. (2003). Does facial expression affect attention orienting 
by gaze direction cues? Journal of Experimental Psychology-Human Perception 
and Performance, 29,(6) 1228-1243. 
Hietanen, J. K., Leppanen, J. M., Peltola, M. J., Linna-Aho, K., & Ruuhiala, H. J. (2008). 
Seeing direct and averted gaze activates the approach-avoidance motivational 
brain systems. Neuropsychologia, 46,(9) 2423-2430. 
Hoehl, S., & Striano, T. (2008). Neural processing of eye gaze and threat-related 
emotional facial expressions in infancy. Child Development, 79,(6) 1752-1760. 
Hoehl, S., Wiese, L., & Striano, T. (2008). Young infants' neural processing of objects is 
affected by eye gaze direction and emotional expression. PloS One, 3,(6) e2389. 
204 
 
Hoffman, E. A., & Haxby, J. V. (2000). Distinct representations of eye gaze and identity in 
the distributed human neural system for face perception. Nature Neuroscience, 
3,(1) 80-84. 
Hoffman, K. L., Gothard, K. M., Schmid, M. C., & Logothetis, N. K. (2007). Facial-
expression and gaze-selective responses in the monkey amygdala. Current 
Biology, 17,(9) 766-772. 
Hollands, M. A., Patla, A. E., & Vickers, J. N. (2002). "Look where you're going!": Gaze 
behaviour associated with maintaining and changing the direction of locomotion. 
Experimental Brain Research, 143,(2) 221-230. 
Hood, B. M., Macrae, C. N., Cole-Davies, V., & Dias, M. (2003). Eye remember you: The 
effects of gaze direction on face recognition in children and adults. Developmental 
Science, 6,(1) 67-71. 
Hori, E., Tazumi, T., Umeno, K., Kamachi, M., Kobayashi, T., Ono, T., & Nishijo, H. (2005). 
Effects of facial expression on shared attention mechanisms. Physiology & 
Behavior, 84,(3) 397-405. 
Hubbard, T. L. (1995). Cognitive representation of motion: Evidence for friction and gravity 
analogs. Journal of Experimental Psychology-Learning Memory and Cognition, 
21,(1) 241-254. 
Hubbard, T. L. (1997). Target size and displacement along the axis of implied gravitational 
attraction: Effects of implied weight and evidence of representational gravity. 
Journal of Experimental Psychology-Learning Memory and Cognition, 23,(6) 1484-
1493. 
Hubbard, T. L. (1998). Some effects of representational friction, target size, and memory 
averaging on memory for vertically moving targets. Canadian Journal of 
Experimental Psychology-Revue Canadienne De Psychologie Experimentale, 
52,(1) 44-49. 
205 
 
Hubbard, T. L. (2005). Representational momentum and related displacements in spatial 
memory: A review of the findings. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 12,(5) 822-851. 
Hubbard, T. L. (2006). Bridging the gap: Possible roles and contributions of 
representational momentum. Psicologica, 27,(1) 1-34. 
Hubbard, T. L., Blessum, J. A., & Ruppel, S. E. (2001). Representational momentum and 
Michotte's (1946/1963) "launching effect" paradigm. Journal of Experimental 
Psychology-Learning Memory and Cognition, 27,(1) 294-301. 
Hubbard, T. L., & Favretto, A. (2003). Naive impetus and Michotte's "tool effect": Evidence 
from representational momentum. Psychological Research-Psychologische 
Forschung, 67,(2) 134-152. 
Hubbard, T. L., & Ruppel, S. E. (2002). A possible role of naive impetus in Michotte's 
"launching effect": Evidence from representational momentum. Visual Cognition, 
9,(1-2) 153-176. 
Husk, J. S., Bennett, P. J., & Sekuler, A. B. (2007). Inverting houses and textures: 
Investigating the characteristics of learned inversion effects. Vision Research, 
47,(27) 3350-3359. 
Hynes, C. A., Baird, A. A., & Grafton, S. T. (2006). Differential role of the orbital frontal 
lobe in emotional versus cognitive perspective-taking. Neuropsychologia, 44,(3) 
374-383. 
Iacoboni, M., Molnar-Szakacs, I., Gallese, V., Buccino, G., Mazziotta, J. C., & Rizzolatti, G. 
(2005). Grasping the intentions of others with one's own mirror neuron system. 
Plos Biology, 3,(3) 529-535. 
Jacob, P., & Jeannerod, M. (2005). The motor theory of social cognition: A critique. Trends 
in Cognitive Sciences, 9,(1) 21-25. 
Jarraya, M., Amorim, M. A., & Bardy, B. G. (2005). Optical flow and viewpoint change 
modulate the perception and memorization of complex motion. Perception & 
Psychophysics, 67,(6) 951-961. 
206 
 
Jeannerod, M. (2001). Neural simulation of action: A unifying mechanism for motor 
cognition. Neuroimage, 14,(1) S103-S109. 
Jellema, T., Baker, C. I., Wicker, B., & Perrett, D. I. (2000). Neural representation for the 
perception of the intentionality of actions. Brain and Cognition, 44,(2) 280-302. 
Jellema, T., Lorteije, J., van Rijn, S., van t' Wout, M., de Haan, E., van Engeland, H., & 
Kemner, C. (2009). Involuntary Interpretation of Social Cues is Compromised in 
Autism Spectrum Disorders. Autism Research, 2,(4) 192-204. 
Jellema, T., & Perrett, D. (2005). Neural basis for the perception of goal directed actions. 
In Easton, A. & Emery, N. (Eds.), The cognitive neuroscience of social behaviour. 
UK: Psychology Press. 
Jellema, T., & Perrett, D. (2007). Neural pathways of social cognition. In Dunbar, R. I. M. & 
Barrett, L. (Eds.), The Oxford handbook of evolutionary psychology. Oxford/New 
York: Oxford University Press. 
Jellema, T., & Perrett, D. I. (2003a). Cells in monkey STS responsive to articulated body 
motions and consequent static posture: A case of implied motion? 
Neuropsychologia, 41,(13) 1728-1737. 
Jellema, T., & Perrett, D. I. (2003b). Perceptual history influences neural responses to face 
and body postures. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 15,(7) 961-971. 
Jellema, T., & Perrett, D. I. (2006). Neural representations of perceived bodily actions 
using a categorical frame of reference. Neuropsychologia, 44,(9) 1535-1546. 
Jenkins, J., & Langton, S. R. H. (2003). Configural processing in the perception of eye-
gaze direction. Perception, 32,(10) 1181-1188. 
Johnson, M. H. (2005). Subcortical face processing. Nature Reviews Neuroscience, 6,(10) 
766-774. 
Johnson, M. H., Griffin, R., Csibra, G., Halit, H., Farroni, T., De Haan, M., Tucker, L. A., 
Baron-Cohen, S., & Richards, J. (2005). The emergence of the social brain 
207 
 
network: Evidence from typical and atypical development. Development and 
Psychopathology, 17,(3) 599-619. 
Johnson, M. H., Grossmann, T., & Farroni, T. (2008). The social cognitive neuroscience of 
infancy: Illuminating the early development of social brain functions. Advances in 
Child Development and Behavior, 36, 331-372. 
Johnson, S. (2000). The recognition of mentalistic agents in infancy. Trends in Cognitive 
Sciences, 4,(1) 22-28. 
Johnson, S., Slaughter, V., & Carey, S. (1998). Whose gaze will infants follow? The 
elicitation of gaze following in 12-month-olds. Developmental Science, 1,(2) 233-
238. 
Johnson, S. C. (2003). Detecting agents. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society 
B-Biological Sciences, 358,(1431) 549-559. 
Joseph, J. E., Gathers, A. D., Liu, X., Corbly, C. R., Whitaker, S. K., & Bhatt, R. S. (2006). 
Neural developmental changes in processing inverted faces. Cognitive Affective & 
Behavioral Neuroscience, 6,(3) 223-235. 
Kadosh, K. C., & Johnson, M. H. (2007). Developing a cortex specialized for face 
perception. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 11,(9) 367-369. 
Kanwisher, N., McDermott, J., & Chun, M. M. (1997). The fusiform face area: A module in 
human extrastriate cortex specialized for face perception. Journal of Neuroscience, 
17,(11) 4302-4311. 
Kawashima, R., Sugiura, M., Kato, T., Nakamura, A., Hatano, K., Ito, K., Fukuda, H., 
Kojima, S., & Nakamura, K. (1999). The human amygdala plays an important role 
in gaze monitoring: A PET study. Brain, 122,(4) 779-783. 
Kelly, M. H., & Freyd, J. J. (1987). Explorations of representational momentum. Cognitive 
Psychology, 19,(3) 369-401. 
208 
 
Kemner, C., Schuller, A. M., & van Engeland, H. (2006). Electrocortical reflections of face 
and gaze processing in children with pervasive developmental disorder. Journal of 
Child Psychology and Psychiatry, 47,(10) 1063-1072. 
Kerzel, D. (2000). Eye movements and visible persistence explain the mislocalization of 
the final position of a moving target. Vision Research, 40,(27) 3703-3715. 
Kerzel, D. (2002). The locus of "memory displacement" is at least partially perceptual: 
Effects of velocity, expectation, friction, memory averaging, and weight. Perception 
& Psychophysics, 64,(4) 680-692. 
Kerzel, D. (2005). Representational momentum beyond internalized physics: Embodied 
mechanisms of anticipation cause errors in visual short-term memory. Current 
Directions in Psychological Science, 14,(4) 180-184. 
Kerzel, D. (2006). Why eye movements and perceptual factors have to be controlled in 
studies on "representational momentum". Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 13,(1) 
166-173. 
Keysers, C., & Gazzola, V. (2006). Towards a unifying neural theory of social cognition. 
Progress in Brain Research: Understanding Emotions, 156, 379-401. 
Keysers, C., & Gazzola, V. (2007). Integrating simulation and theory of mind: From self to 
social cognition. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 11,(5) 194-196. 
Kleiner, K. A., & Banks, M. S. (1987). Stimulus energy does not account for 2-month-olds 
face preferences. Journal of Experimental Psychology-Human Perception and 
Performance, 13,(4) 594-600. 
Kloth, N., & Schweinberger, S. R. (2008). The temporal decay of eye gaze adaptation 
effects. Journal of Vision, 8,(11) 1-11. 
Klucharev, V., & Sams, M. (2004). Interaction of gaze direction and facial expressions 
processing: ERP study. Neuroreport, 15,(4) 621-625. 
Kluttz, N. L., Mayes, B. R., West, R. W., & Kerby, D. S. (2009). The effect of head turn on 
the perception of gaze. Vision Research, 49,(15) 1979-1993. 
209 
 
Kourtzi, Z., & Kanwisher, N. (2000). Activation in human MT/MST by static images with 
implied motion. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 12,(1) 48-55. 
Kourtzi, Z., & Shiffrar, M. (1999). Dynamic representations of human body movement. 
Perception, 28,(1) 49-62. 
Kuhn, G., & Kingstone, A. (2009). Look away! Eyes and arrows engage oculomotor 
responses automatically. Attention Perception & Psychophysics, 71,(2) 314-327. 
Kuzmanovic, B., Georgescu, A. L., Eickhoff, S. B., Shah, N. J., Bente, G., Fink, G. R., & 
Vogeley, K. (2009). Duration matters: Dissociating neural correlates of detection 
and evaluation of social gaze. Neuroimage, 46,(4) 1154-1163. 
Kylliainen, A., & Hietanen, J. K. (2004). Attention orienting by another's gaze direction in 
children with autism. Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry, 45,(3) 435-444. 
Lambrey, S., Amorim, M. A., Samson, S., Noulhiane, M., Hasboun, D., Dupont, S., Baulac, 
M., & Berthoz, A. (2008). Distinct visual perspective-taking strategies involve the 
left and right medial temporal lobe structures differently. Brain, 131,(2) 523-534. 
Land, M., Mennie, N., & Rusted, J. (1999). The roles of vision and eye movements in the 
control of activities of daily living. Perception, 28,(11) 1311-1328. 
Land, M. F., & Furneaux, S. (1997). The knowledge base of the oculomotor system. 
Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London Series B-Biological 
Sciences, 352,(1358) 1231-1239. 
Lang, P. J., & Davis, M. (2006). Emotion, motivation and the brain: Reflex foundations in 
animal and human research. Progress in Brain Research: Understanding 
Emotions, 156, 3-29. 
Langleben, D. D., Schroeder, L., Maldjian, J. A., Gur, R. C., McDonald, S., Ragland, J. D., 
O'Brien, C. P., & Childress, A. R. (2002). Brain activity during simulated deception: 
An event-related functional magnetic resonance study. Neuroimage, 15,(3) 727-
732. 
210 
 
Large, M. E., Cavina-Pratesi, C., Vilis, T., & Culharn, J. C. (2008). The neural correlates of 
change detection in the face perception network. Neuropsychologia, 46,(8) 2169-
2176. 
Leder, H., & Bruce, V. (2000). When inverted faces are recognized: The role of configural 
information in face recognition. Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology 
Section a-Human Experimental Psychology, 53,(2) 513-536. 
Leder, H., Candrian, G., Huber, O., & Bruce, V. (2001). Configural features in the context 
of upright and inverted faces. Perception, 30,(1) 73-83. 
Leder, H., & Carbon, C. C. (2006). Face-specific configural processing of relational 
information. British Journal of Psychology, 97,(1) 19-29. 
Lee, K., Eskritt, M., Symons, L. A., & Muir, D. (1998). Children's use of triadic eye gaze 
information for "mind reading". Developmental Psychology, 34,(3) 525-539. 
Leopold, D. A., O'Toole, A. J., Vetter, T., & Blanz, V. (2001). Prototype-referenced shape 
encoding revealed by high-level after effects. Nature Neuroscience, 4,(1) 89-94. 
Leopold, D. A., Rhodes, G., Muller, K. M., & Jeffery, L. (2005). The dynamics of visual 
adaptation to faces. Proceedings of the Royal Society  B-Biological Sciences, 
272,(1566) 897-904. 
Leslie, A. M. (1994). ToMM, ToBy, and Agency: Core architecture and domain specificity. 
In Hirschfeld, L. & Gelman, S. (Eds.), Mapping the mind: Domain specificity in 
cognition and culture (pp. 119–148). New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Leube, D. T., Yoon, H. W., Rapp, A., Erb, M., Grodd, W., Bartels, M., & Kircher, T. T. J. 
(2003). Brain regions sensitive to the face inversion effect: A functional magnetic 
resonance imaging study in humans. Neuroscience Letters, 342,(3) 143-146. 
Lieberman, M. D. (2003). Reflective and reflexive judgment processes: A social cognitive 
neuroscience approach. In Forgas, J. P., Williams, K. R. & von Hippel, W. (Eds.), 
Social Judgments: Implicit and Explicit Processes (pp. 46-67). New York: 
Cambridge University Press. 
211 
 
Liu, C. H., & Chaudhuri, A. (2003). What determines whether faces are special? Visual 
Cognition, 10,(4) 385-408. 
Lobmaier, J. S., Fischer, M. H., & Schwaninger, A. (2006). Objects capture perceived gaze 
direction. Experimental Psychology, 53,(2) 117-122. 
Loffler, G., Yourganov, G., Wilkinson, F., & Wilson, H. R. (2005). fMRI evidence for the 
neural representation of faces. Nature Neuroscience, 8,(10) 1386-1390. 
Lorteije, J. A. M., Kenemans, J. L., Jellema, T., van der Lubbe, R. H. J., de Heer, F., & van 
Wezel, R. J. A. (2006). Delayed response to animate implied motion in human 
motion processing areas. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 18,(2) 158-168. 
Lorteije, J. A. M., Kenemans, J. L., Jellema, T., van der Lubbe, R. H. J., Lommers, M. W., 
& van Wezel, R. J. A. (2007). Adaptation to real motion reveals direction-selective 
interactions between real and implied motion processing. Journal of Cognitive 
Neuroscience, 19,(8) 1231-1240. 
Loucks, J., & Baldwin, D. (2009). Sources of information for discriminating dynamic human 
actions. Cognition, 111,(1) 84-97. 
Luo, Y., & Baillargeon, R. (2005). Can a self-propelled box have a goal? Psychological 
reasoning in 5-month-old infants. Psychological Science, 16,(8) 601-608. 
Luo, Y., & Baillargeon, R. (2007). Do 12.5-month-old infants consider what objects others 
can see when interpreting their actions? Cognition, 105,(3) 489-512. 
Luo, Y. Y., & Johnson, S. C. (2009). Recognizing the role of perception in action at 6 
months. Developmental Science, 12,(1) 142-149. 
Macrae, C. N., Hood, B. M., Milne, A. B., Rowe, A. C., & Mason, M. F. (2002). Are you 
looking at me? Eye gaze and person perception. Psychological Science, 13,(5) 
460-464. 
Makin, A. D. J., Stewart, A. J., & Poliakoff, E. (2009). Typical object velocity influences 
motion extrapolation. Experimental Brain Research, 193,(1) 137-142. 
212 
 
Massaro, D. W., & Egan, P. B. (1996). Perceiving affect from the voice and the face. 
Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 3,(2) 215-221. 
Materna, S., Dicke, P. W., & Thier, P. (2008). Dissociable roles of the superior temporal 
sulcus and the intraparietal sulcus in joint attention: A functional magnetic 
resonance Imaging study. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 20,(1) 108-119. 
Mathews, A., Fox, E., Yiend, J., & Calder, A. (2003). The face of fear: Effects of eye gaze 
and emotion on visual attention. Visual Cognition, 10,(7) 823-835. 
Maurer, D., Grand, R. L., & Mondloch, C. J. (2002). The many face of configural 
processing. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 6,(6) 255-260. 
Maus, G. W., & Nijhawan, R. (2006). Forward displacements of fading objects in motion: 
The role of transient signals in perceiving position. Vision Research, 46,(26) 4375-
4381. 
Mazard, A., Schiltz, C., & Rossion, B. (2006). Recovery from adaptation to facial identity is 
larger for upright than inverted faces in the human occipito-temporal cortex. 
Neuropsychologia, 44,(6) 912-922. 
McCabe, K., Houser, D., Ryan, L., Smith, V., & Trouard, T. (2001). A functional imaging 
study of cooperation in two-person reciprocal exchange. Proceedings of the 
National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 98,(20) 11832-
11835. 
McCleery, J. P., Zhang, L. Y., Ge, L. Z., Wang, Z., Christiansen, E. M., Lee, K., & Cottrell, 
G. W. (2008). The roles of visual expertise and visual input in the face inversion 
effect: Behavioral and neurocomputational evidence. Vision Research, 48,(5) 703-
715. 
Mehu, M., Grammer, K., & Dunbar, R. I. M. (2007). Smiles when sharing. Evolution and 
Human Behavior, 28,(6) 415-422. 
213 
 
Mehu, M., Little, A. C., & Dunbar, R. I. M. (2007). Duchenne smiles and the perception of 
generosity and sociability in faces. Journal of Evolutionary Psychology, 5,(1-4) 133-
146. 
Melis, A. P., Call, J., & Tomasello, M. (2006). Chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) conceal 
visual and auditory information from others. Journal of Comparative Psychology, 
120,(2) 154-162. 
Meltzoff, A. N. (2005). Imitation and other minds: The "Like Me" hypothesis. In Hurley, S. & 
Chater, N. (Eds.), Perspectives on imitation: From cognitive neuroscience to social 
science (pp. 55-77). Cambridge: MIT Press. 
Meltzoff, A. N. (2007a). The 'like me' framework for recognizing and becoming an 
intentional agent. Acta Psychologica, 124,(1) 26-43. 
Meltzoff, A. N. (2007b). 'Like me': A foundation for social cognition. Developmental 
Science, 10,(1) 126-134. 
Metzger, M. M. (2001). Which transformations of stimuli are the most disruptive to facial 
recognition? Perceptual and Motor Skills, 92,(2) 517-526. 
Miall, R. C. (2003). Connecting mirror neurons and forward models. NeuroReport, 14,(17) 
2135-2137. 
Michelon, P., & Zacks, J. M. (2006). Two kinds of visual perspective taking. Perception & 
Psychophysics, 68,(2) 327-337. 
Mitchell, J. P. (2005). The false dichotomy between simulation and theory-theory: The 
argument's error. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 9,(8) 363-364. 
Mondloch, C. J., Geldart, S., Maurer, D., & Le Grand, R. (2003). Developmental changes 
in face processing skills. Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 86,(1) 67-84. 
Morewedge, C. K., Preston, J., & Wegner, D. M. (2007). Timescale bias in the attribution 
of mind. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 93,(1) 1-11. 
214 
 
Morris, J. P., Pelphrey, K. A., & McCarthy, G. (2006). Occipitotemporal activation evoked 
by the perception of human bodies is modulated by the presence or absence of the 
face. Neuropsychologia, 44,(10) 1919-1927. 
Morris, J. S., Friston, K. J., Buchel, C., Frith, C. D., Young, A. W., Calder, A. J., & Dolan, 
R. J. (1998). A neuromodulatory role for the human amygdala in processing 
emotional facial expressions. Brain, 121,(1) 47-57. 
Morton, J., & Johnson, M. H. (1991). Conspec and Conlern: A 2-process theory of infant 
face recognition. Psychological Review, 98,(2) 164-181. 
Mosconi, M. W., Mack, P. B., McCarthy, G., & Pelphrey, K. A. (2005). Taking an 
"intentional stance" on eye-gaze shifts: A functional neuroimaging study of social 
perception in children. Neuroimage, 27,(1) 247-252. 
Munger, M. P., & Minchew, J. H. (2002). Parallels between remembering and predicting an 
object's location. Visual Cognition, 9,(1-2) 177-194. 
Munger, M. P., Solberg, J. L., & Horrocks, K. K. (1999). The relationship between mental 
rotation and representational momentum. Journal of Experimental Psychology-
Learning Memory and Cognition, 25,(6) 1557-1568. 
Munger, M. P., Solberg, J. L., Horrocks, K. K., & Preston, A. S. (1999). Representational 
momentum for rotations in depth: Effects of shading and axis. Journal of 
Experimental Psychology-Learning Memory and Cognition, 25,(1) 157-171. 
Nachson, I., & Shechory, M. (2002). Effect of inversion on the recognition of external and 
internal facial features. Acta Psychologica, 109,(3) 227-238. 
Nagai, M., Kazai, K., & Yagi, A. (2002). Larger forward memory displacement in the 
direction of gravity. Visual Cognition, 9,(1-2) 28-40. 
Narumoto, J., Okada, T., Sadato, N., Fukui, K., & Yonekura, Y. (2001). Attention to 
emotion modulates fMRI activity in human right superior temporal sulcus. Cognitive 
Brain Research, 12,(2) 225-231. 
215 
 
Nation, K., & Penny, S. (2008). Sensitivity to eye gaze in autism: Is it normal? Is it 
automatic? Is it social? Development and Psychopathology, 20,(1) 79-97. 
Nelson, C. A. (2001). The development and neural bases of face recognition. Infant and 
Child Development, 10,(1-2) 3-18. 
Neri, P., Morrone, M. C., & Burr, D. C. (1998). Seeing biological motion. Nature, 
395,(6705) 894-896. 
Nesse, R. M. (1990). Evolutionary explanations of emotions. Human Nature, 1,(3) 261-
289. 
Neuhoff, J. G. (1998). Perceptual bias for rising tones. Nature, 395,(6698) 123-124. 
Neuhoff, J. G. (2001). An adaptive bias in the perception of looming auditory motion. 
Ecological Psychology, 13,(2) 87-110. 
New, J., Cosmides, L., & Tooby, J. (2007). Category-specific attention for animals reflects 
ancestral priorities, not expertise. Proceedings of the National Academy of 
Sciences of the United States of America, 104,(42) 16598-16603. 
Nummenmaa, L., Hyönä, J., & Hietanen, J. K. (2009). I'll walk this way: Eyes reveal the 
direction of locomotion and make passersby look and go the other way. 
Psychological Science, 20,(12) 1454-1458. 
O'Toole, A. J., Roark, D. A., & Abdi, H. (2002). Recognizing moving faces: A psychological 
and neural synthesis. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 6,(6) 261-266. 
Oommen, B. S., Smith, R. M., & Stahl, J. S. (2004). The influence of future gaze 
orientation upon eye-head coupling during saccades. Experimental Brain 
Research, 155,(1) 9-18. 
Oosterhof, N. N., & Todorov, A. (2008). The functional basis of face evaluation. 
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 
105,(32) 11087-11092. 
216 
 
Oram, M. W., & Perrett, D. I. (1996). Integration of form and motion in the anterior superior 
temporal polysensory area (STPa) of the macaque monkey. Journal of 
Neurophysiology, 76,(1) 109-129. 
Pascalis, O., & Kelly, D. J. (2009). The origins of face processing in humans: Phylogeny 
and ontogeny. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 4,(2) 200-209. 
Passarotti, A. M., Smith, J., DeLano, M., & Huang, J. (2007). Developmental differences in 
the neural bases of the face inversion effect show progressive tuning of face-
selective regions to the upright orientation. Neuroimage, 34,(4) 1708-1722. 
Pavlova, M., & Sokolov, A. (2003). Prior knowledge about display inversion in biological 
motion perception. Perception, 32,(8) 937-946. 
Pecchinenda, A., Pes, M., Ferlazzo, F., & Zoccolotti, P. (2008). The combined effect of 
gaze direction and facial expression on cueing spatial attention. Emotion, 8,(5) 
628-634. 
Peelen, M. V., & Downing, P. E. (2005). Selectivity for the human body in the fusiform 
gyrus. Journal of Neurophysiology, 93,(1) 603-608. 
Peelen, M. V., & Downing, P. E. (2007). The neural basis of visual body perception. Nature 
Reviews Neuroscience, 8,(8) 636-648. 
Peigneux, P., Salmon, E., van der Linden, M., Garraux, G., Aerts, J., Delfiore, G., 
Degueldre, C., Luxen, A., Orban, G., & Franck, G. (2000). The role of lateral 
occipitotemporal junction and area MT/V5 in the visual analysis of upper-limb 
postures. Neuroimage, 11,(6) 644-655. 
Pelphrey, K. A., Morris, J. P., Michelich, C. R., Allison, T., & McCarthy, G. (2005). 
Functional anatomy of biological motion perception in posterior temporal cortex: An 
fMRI study of eye, mouth and hand movements. Cerebral Cortex, 15,(12) 1866-
1876. 
217 
 
Pelphrey, K. A., Sasson, N. J., Reznick, J. S., Paul, G., Goldman, B. D., & Piven, J. 
(2002). Visual scanning of faces in autism. Journal of Autism and Developmental 
Disorders, 32,(4) 249-261. 
Pelphrey, K. A., Singerman, J. D., Allison, T., & McCarthy, G. (2003). Brain activation 
evoked by perception of gaze shifts: The influence of context. Neuropsychologia, 
41,(2) 156-170. 
Pelphrey, K. A., Viola, R. J., & McCarthy, G. (2004). When strangers pass: Processing of 
mutual and averted social gaze in the superior temporal sulcus. Psychological 
Science, 15,(9) 598-603. 
Perrett, D. I., Harries, M. H., Bevan, R., Thomas, S., Benson, P. J., Mistlin, A. J., Chitty, A. 
J., Hietanen, J. K., & Ortega, J. E. (1989). Frameworks of analysis for the neural 
representation of animate objects and actions. Journal of Experimental Biology, 
146,(1) 87-113. 
Perrett, D. I., Hietanen, J. K., Oram, M. W., & Benson, P. J. (1992). Organization and 
functions of cells responsive to faces in the temporal cortex. Philosophical 
Transactions of the Royal Society of London Series B-Biological Sciences, 
335,(1273) 23-30. 
Perrett, D. I., Rolls, E. T., & Caan, W. (1982). Visual neurones responsive to faces in the 
monkey temporal cortex. Experimental Brain Research, 47,(3) 329-342. 
Perrett, D. I., Smith, P. A. J., Potter, D. D., Mistlin, A. J., Head, A. S., Milner, A. D., & 
Jeeves, M. A. (1985). Visual cells in the temporal cortex sensitive to face view and 
gaze direction. Proceedings of the Royal Society of London Series B-Biological 
Sciences, 223,(1232) 293-317. 
Perrett, D. I., Xiao, D., Jellema, T., Barraclough, N., & Oram, M. W. (2006). Social 
perception from static and dynamic visual information. Perception, 35,(ECVP 
Abstract Supplement) 120-120. 
218 
 
Phillips, A. T., Wellman, H. M., & Spelke, E. S. (2002). Infants' ability, to connect gaze and 
emotional expression to intentional action. Cognition, 85,(1) 53-78. 
Phillips, M. L., Young, A. W., Scott, S. K., Calder, A. J., Andrew, C., Giampietro, V., 
Williams, S. C. R., Bullmore, E. T., Brammer, M., & Gray, J. A. (1998). Neural 
responses to facial and vocal expressions of fear and disgust. Proceedings of the 
Royal Society of London Series B-Biological Sciences, 265,(1408) 1809-1817. 
Phillips, W., Baron-Cohen, S., & Rutter, M. (1992). The role of eye contact in goal 
detection: Evidence from normal infants and children with autism or mental 
handicap. Development and Psychopathology, 4,(3) 375-383. 
Pierno, A. C., Becchio, C., Tubaldi, F., Turella, L., & Castiello, U. (2008). Motor ontology in 
representing gaze-object relations. Neuroscience Letters, 430,(3) 246-251. 
Pierno, A. C., Becchio, C., Wall, M. B., Smith, A. T., Turella, L., & Castiello, U. (2006). 
When gaze turns into grasp. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 18,(12) 2130-
2137. 
Pinsk, M. A., DeSimone, K., Moore, T., Gross, C. G., & Kastner, S. (2005). 
Representations of faces and body parts in macaque temporal cortex: A functional 
MRI study. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States 
of America, 102,(19) 6996-7001. 
Pitcher, D., Walsh, V., Yovel, G., & Duchaine, B. (2007). TMS evidence for the 
involvement of the right occipital face area in early face processing. Current 
Biology, 17,(18) 1568-1573. 
Potter, T., & Corneille, O. (2008). Locating attractiveness in the face space: Faces are 
more attractive when closer to their group prototype. Psychonomic Bulletin & 
Review, 15,(3) 615-622. 
Povinelli, D. J., Bering, J. M., & Giambrone, S. (2000). Toward a science of other minds: 
Escaping the argument by analogy. Cognitive Science, 24,(3) 509-541. 
219 
 
Preston, S. D., & de Waal, F. B. M. (2002). Empathy: Its ultimate and proximate bases. 
Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 25,(1) 1-20. 
Puce, A., & Perrett, D. (2003). Electrophysiology and brain imaging of biological motion. 
Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London Series B-Biological 
Sciences, 358,(1431) 435-445. 
Rakison, D. H., & Poulin-Dubois, D. (2001). Developmental origin of the animate-inanimate 
distinction. Psychological Bulletin, 127,(2) 209-228. 
Ramnani, N., & Miall, R. C. (2004). A system in the human brain for predicting the actions 
of others. Nature Neuroscience, 7,(1) 85-90. 
Redcay, E. (2008). The superior temporal sulcus performs a common function for social 
and speech perception: Implications for the emergence of autism. Neuroscience 
and Biobehavioral Reviews, 32,(1) 123-142. 
Reed, C. L., Stone, V. E., Bozova, S., & Tanaka, J. (2003). The body-inversion effect. 
Psychological Science, 14,(4) 302-308. 
Reed, C. L., Stone, V. E., Grubb, J. D., & McGoldrick, J. E. (2006). Turning configural 
processing upside down: Part and whole body postures. Journal of Experimental 
Psychology-Human Perception and Performance, 32,(1) 73-87. 
Repacholi, B. M. (1998). Infants' use of attentional cues to identify the referent of another 
person's emotional expression. Developmental Psychology, 34,(5) 1017-1025. 
Rhodes, G., Brake, S., & Atkinson, A. P. (1993). Whats lost in inverted faces. Cognition, 
47,(1) 25-57. 
Rhodes, G., & Jeffery, L. (2006). Adaptive norm-based coding of facial identity. Vision 
Research, 46,(18) 2977-2987. 
Ricciardelli, P., Baylis, G., & Driver, J. (2000). The positive and negative of human 
expertise in gaze perception. Cognition, 77,(1) B1-B14. 
Ricciardelli, P., Bonfiglioli, C., Iani, C., Rubichi, S., & Nicoletti, R. (2007). Spatial coding 
and central patterns: Is there something special about the eyes? Canadian Journal 
220 
 
of Experimental Psychology-Revue Canadienne De Psychologie Experimentale, 
61,(2) 79-90. 
Ricciardelli, P., & Driver, J. (2008). Effects of head orientation on gaze perception: How 
positive congruency effects can be reversed. Quarterly Journal of Experimental 
Psychology, 61,(3) 491-504. 
Riesenhuber, M., Jarudi, I., Gilad, S., & Sinha, P. (2004). Face processing in humans is 
compatible with a simple shape-based model of vision. Proceedings of the Royal 
Society B-Biological Sciences, 271,(Suppl 6) S448-S450. 
Ristic, J., Mottron, L., Friesen, C. K., Iarocci, G., Burack, J. A., & Kingstone, A. (2005). 
Eyes are special but not for everyone: The case of autism. Cognitive Brain 
Research, 24,(3) 715-718. 
Rizzolatti, G., & Craighero, L. (2004). The mirror-neuron system. Annual Review of 
Neuroscience, 27, 169-192. 
Rizzolatti, G., Fadiga, L., Fogassi, L., & Gallese, V. (1999). Resonance behaviors and 
mirror neurons. Archives Italiennes De Biologie, 137,(2-3) 85-100. 
Rizzolatti, G., Fadiga, L., Gallese, V., & Fogassi, L. (1996). Premotor cortex and the 
recognition of motor actions. Cognitive Brain Research, 3,(2) 131-141. 
Rochat, M. J., Serra, E., Fadiga, L., & Gallese, V. (2008). The evolution of social cognition: 
Goal familiarity shapes monkeys' action understanding. Current Biology, 18,(3) 
227-232. 
Rogers, T. T., Hocking, J., Mechelli, A., Patterson, K., & Price, C. (2005). Fusiform 
activation to animals is driven by the process, not the stimulus. Journal of Cognitive 
Neuroscience, 17,(3) 434-445. 
Rosenblum, L. D., Yakel, D. A., & Green, K. P. (2000). Face and mouth inversion effects 
on visual and audiovisual speech perception. Journal of Experimental Psychology-
Human Perception and Performance, 26,(2) 806-819. 
221 
 
Rossion, B., Schiltz, C., & Crommelinck, M. (2003). The functionally defined right occipital 
and fusiform "face areas" discriminate novel from visually familiar faces. 
Neuroimage, 19,(3) 877-883. 
Rotman, G., Troje, N. F., Johansson, R. S., & Flanagan, J. R. (2006). Eye movements 
when observing predictable and unpredictable actions. Journal of Neurophysiology, 
96,(3) 1358-1369. 
Rotshtein, P., Henson, R. N. A., Treves, A., Driver, J., & Dolan, R. J. (2005). Morphing 
Marilyn into Maggie dissociates physical and identity face representations in the 
brain. Nature Neuroscience, 8,(1) 107-113. 
Rowe, A. D., Bullock, P. R., Polkey, C. E., & Morris, R. G. (2001). 'Theory of mind' 
impairments and their relationship to executive functioning following frontal lobe 
excisions. Brain, 124,(3) 600-616. 
Ruby, P., & Decety, J. (2003). What you believe versus what you think they believe: A 
neuroimaging study of conceptual perspective-taking. European Journal of 
Neuroscience, 17,(11) 2475-2480. 
Russell, J. A. (1997). How shall an emotion be called? In Plutchik, R. & Conte, H. R. 
(Eds.), Circumplex Models of Personality and Emotions (pp. 205-220). Washington 
D.C.: American Psychological Association. 
Sander, D., Grandjean, D., Kaiser, S., Wehrle, T., & Scherer, K. R. (2007). Interaction 
effects of perceived gaze direction and dynamic facial expression: Evidence for 
appraisal theories of emotion. European Journal of Cognitive Psychology, 19,(3) 
470-480. 
Sangrigoli, S., & de Schonen, S. (2004). Effect of visual experience on face processing: A 
developmental study of inversion and non-native effects. Developmental Science, 
7,(1) 74-87. 
Santos, I. M., & Young, A. W. (2008). Effects of inversion and negation on social 
inferences from faces. Perception, 37,(7) 1061-1078. 
222 
 
Santos, L., & Hauser, M. D. (1999). How monkeys see the eyes: Cotton-top tamarins 
reaction to changes in visual attention and action. Animal Cognition, 2,(3) 131-139. 
Sato, W., Yoshikawa, S., Kochiyama, T., & Matsumura, M. (2004). The amygdala 
processes the emotional significance of facial expressions: An fMRI investigation 
using the interaction between expression and face direction. Neuroimage, 22,(2) 
1006-1013. 
Satpute, A. B., & Lieberman, M. D. (2006). Integrating automatic and controlled processes 
into neurocognitive models of social cognition. Brain Research, 1079, 86-97. 
Saxe, R. (2006). Uniquely human social cognition. Current Opinion in Neurobiology, 16,(2) 
235-239. 
Saxe, R., Xiao, D. K., Kovacs, G., Perrett, D. I., & Kanwisher, N. (2004). A region of right 
posterior superior temporal sulcus responds to observed intentional actions. 
Neuropsychologia, 42,(11) 1435-1446. 
Scerif, G., Gomez, J. C., & Byrne, R. W. (2004). What do Diana monkeys know about the 
focus of attention of a conspecific? Animal Behaviour, 68,(6) 1239-1247. 
Scharlemann, J. P. W., Eckel, C. C., Kacelnik, A., & Wilson, R. K. (2001). The value of a 
smile: Game theory with a human face. Journal of Economic Psychology, 22,(5) 
617-640. 
Schmidt, K. L., & Cohn, J. F. (2001). Human facial expressions as adaptations: 
Evolutionary questions in facial expression research. Yearbook of Physical 
Anthropology, 44, 3-24. 
Scholl, B. J., & Leslie, A. M. (1999). Modularity, development and 'theory of mind'. Mind & 
Language, 14,(1) 131-153. 
Schwaninger, A., Lobmaier, J. S., & Fischer, M. H. (2005). The inversion effect on gaze 
perception reflects processing of component information. Experimental Brain 
Research, 167,(1) 49-55. 
223 
 
Schwarzlose, R. F., Baker, C. I., & Kanwisher, N. (2005). Separate face and body 
selectivity on the fusiform gyrus. Journal of Neuroscience, 25,(47) 11055-11059. 
Searcy, J. H., & Bartlett, J. C. (1996). Inversion and processing of component and spatial-
relational information in faces. Journal of Experimental Psychology-Human 
Perception and Performance, 22,(4) 904-915. 
Sekuler, A. B., Gaspar, C. M., Gold, J. M., & Bennett, P. J. (2004). Inversion leads to 
quantitative, not qualitative, changes in face processing. Current Biology, 14,(5) 
391-396. 
Senior, C., Barnes, J., Giampietroc, V., Simmons, A., Bullmore, E. T., Brammer, M., & 
David, A. S. (2000). The functional neuroanatomy of implicit-motion perception or 
`representational momentum'. Current Biology, 10,(1) 16-22. 
Senju, A., & Hasegawa, T. (2005). Direct gaze captures visuospatial attention. Visual 
Cognition, 12,(1) 127-144. 
Senju, A., & Hasegawa, T. (2006). Do the upright eyes have it? Psychonomic Bulletin & 
Review, 13,(2) 223-228. 
Senju, A., & Johnson, M. H. (2009). The eye contact effect: Mechanisms and 
development. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 13,(3) 127-134. 
Senju, A., Kikuchi, Y., Hasegawa, T., Tojo, Y., & Osanai, H. (2008). Is anyone looking at 
me? Direct gaze detection in children with and without autism. Brain and Cognition, 
67,(2) 127-139. 
Senju, A., Tojo, Y., Dairoku, H., & Hasegawa, T. (2004). Reflexive orienting in response to 
eye gaze and an arrow in children with and without autism. Journal of Child 
Psychology and Psychiatry, 45,(3) 445-458. 
Seyama, J., & Nagayama, R. S. (2006). Eye direction aftereffect. Psychological Research-
Psychologische Forschung, 70,(1) 59-67. 
Shepard, R. N., & Chipman, S. (1970). Second-Order Isomorphism of Internal 
Representations - Shapes of States. Cognitive Psychology, 1,(1) 1-17. 
224 
 
Simion, F., Cassia, V. M., Turati, C., & Valenza, E. (2001). The origins of face perception: 
Specific versus non-specific mechanisms. Infant and Child Development, 10,(1-2) 
59-65. 
Simion, F., Regolin, L., & Bulf, H. (2008). A predisposition for biological motion in the 
newborn baby. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United 
States of America, 105,(2) 809-813. 
Sinha, P. (2000). Last but not least: Here's looking at you, kid. Perception, 29,(8) 1005-
1008. 
Smith, M. L., Cottrell, G. W., Gosselin, F., & Schyns, P. G. (2005). Transmitting and 
decoding facial expressions. Psychological Science, 16,(3) 184-189. 
Spiridon, M., & Kanwisher, N. (2002). How distributed is visual category information in 
human occipito-temporal cortex? An fMRI study. Neuron, 35,(6) 1157-1165. 
Stone, V. E., Baron-Cohen, S., & Knight, R. T. (1998). Frontal lobe contributions to theory 
of mind. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 10,(5) 640-656. 
Striano, T., Reid, V. M., & Hoehl, S. (2006). Neural mechanisms of joint attention in 
infancy. European Journal of Neuroscience, 23,(10) 2819-2823. 
Striano, T., & Stahl, D. (2005). Sensitivity to triadic attention in early infancy. 
Developmental Science, 8,(4) 333-343. 
Stuss, D. T., Gallup, G. G., & Alexander, M. P. (2001). The frontal lobes are necessary for 
'theory of mind'. Brain, 124,(2) 279-286. 
Swettenham, J., Condie, S., Campbell, R., Milne, E., & Coleman, M. (2003). Does the 
perception of moving eyes trigger reflexive visual orienting in autism? Philosophical 
Transactions of the Royal Society B-Biological Sciences, 358,(1430) 325-334. 
Symons, L. A., Lee, K., Cedrone, C. C., & Nishimura, M. (2004). What are you looking at? 
Acuity for triadic eye gaze. Journal of General Psychology, 131,(4) 451-469. 
225 
 
Tanaka, J. W., & Farah, M. J. (1991). 2nd-order relational properties and the inversion 
effect: Testing a theory of face perception. Perception & Psychophysics, 50,(4) 
367-372. 
Tanaka, J. W., & Sengco, J. A. (1997). Features and their configuration in face recognition. 
Memory & Cognition, 25,(5) 583-592. 
Taylor, J. C., Wiggett, A. J., & Downing, P. E. (2007). Functional MRI analysis of body and 
body part representations in the extrastriate and fusiform body areas. Journal of 
Neurophysiology, 98,(3) 1626-1633. 
Teunisse, J. P., & de Gelder, B. (2003). Face processing in adolescents with autistic 
disorder: The inversion and composite effects. Brain and Cognition, 52,(3) 285-
294. 
Theeuwes, J., & Van der Stigchel, S. (2006). Faces capture attention: Evidence from 
inhibition of return. Visual Cognition, 13,(6) 657-665. 
Thornton, I. M., & Hayes, A. E. (2004). Anticipating action in complex scenes. Visual 
Cognition, 11,(2-3) 341-370. 
Thornton, I. M., & Vuong, Q. C. (2004). Incidental processing of biological motion. Current 
Biology, 14,(12) 1084-1089. 
Tipples, J. (2005). Orienting to eye gaze and face processing. Journal of Experimental 
Psychology-Human Perception and Performance, 31,(5) 843-856. 
Tipples, J. (2006). Fear and fearfulness potentiate automatic orienting to eye gaze. 
Cognition & Emotion, 20,(2) 309-320. 
Tipples, J. (2008). Orienting to counterpredictive gaze and arrow cues. Perception & 
Psychophysics, 70,(1) 77-87. 
Todorov, A., Baron, S. G., & Oosterhof, N. N. (2008). Evaluating face trustworthiness: A 
model based approach. Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience, 3,(2) 119-
127. 
226 
 
Todorovic, D. (2006). Geometrical basis of perception of gaze direction. Vision Research, 
46,(21) 3549-3562. 
Todorovic, D. (2009). The effect of face eccentricity on the perception of gaze direction. 
Perception, 38,(1) 109-132. 
Tomasello, M., Call, J., & Hare, B. (1998). Five primate species follow the visual gaze of 
conspecifics. Animal Behaviour, 55,(4) 1063-1069. 
Tomasello, M., & Rakoczy, H. (2003). What makes human cognition unique? From 
individual to shared to collective intentionality. Mind & Language, 18,(2) 121-147. 
Tong, F., Nakayama, K., Moscovitch, M., Weinrib, O., & Kanwisher, N. (2000). Response 
properties of the human fusiform face area. Cognitive Neuropsychology, 17,(1-3) 
257-279. 
Turati, C. (2004). Why faces are not special to newborns: An alternative account of the 
face preference. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 13,(1) 5-8. 
Uddin, L. Q., Iacoboni, M., Lange, C., & Keenan, J. P. (2007). The self and social 
cognition: The role of cortical midline structures and mirror neurons. [Review]. 
Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 11,(4) 153-157. 
Umilta, M. A., Kohler, E., Gallese, V., Fogassi, L., Fadiga, L., Keysers, C., & Rizzolatti, G. 
(2001). I know what you are doing: A neurophysiological study. Neuron, 31,(1) 155-
165. 
Urgesi, C., Candidi, M., Ionta, S., & Aglioti, S. M. (2007). Representation of body identity 
and body actions in extrastriate body area and ventral premotor cortex. Nature 
Neuroscience, 10,(1) 30-31. 
van Dijk, E., van Kleef, G. A., Steinel, W., & van Beest, I. (2008). A social functional 
approach to emotions in bargaining: When communicating anger pays and when it 
backfires. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 94,(4) 600-614. 
227 
 
Vanneste, S., Verplaetse, J., Van Hiel, A., & Braeckman, J. (2007). Attention bias toward 
noncooperative people: A dot probe classification study in cheating detection. 
Evolution and Human Behavior, 28,(4) 272-276. 
Verfaillie, K., & Daems, A. (2002). Representing and anticipating human actions in vision. 
Visual Cognition, 9,(1-2) 217-232. 
Verfaillie, K., & Dydewalle, G. (1991). Representational momentum and event course 
anticipation in the perception of implied periodical motions. Journal of Experimental 
Psychology-Learning Memory and Cognition, 17,(2) 302-313. 
Verplaetse, J., Vanneste, S., & Braeckman, J. (2007). You can judge a book by its cover: 
The sequel. A kernel of truth in predictive cheating detection. Evolution and Human 
Behavior, 28,(4) 260-271. 
Vlamings, P. H. J. M., Stauder, J. E. A., van Son, I. A. M., & Mottron, L. (2005). Atypical 
visual orienting to gaze- and arrow-cues in adults with high functioning autism. 
Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders, 35,(3) 267-277. 
Vogeley, K., Bussfeld, P., Newen, A., Herrmann, S., Happe, F., Falkai, P., Maier, W., 
Shah, N. J., Fink, G. R., & Zilles, K. (2001). Mind reading: Neural mechanisms of 
theory of mind and self-perspective. Neuroimage, 14,(1) 170-181. 
Vuilleumier, P., George, N., Lister, V., Armony, J., & Driver, J. (2005). Effects of perceived 
mutual gaze and gender on face processing and recognition memory. Visual 
Cognition, 12,(1) 85-101. 
Waller, B. M., Cray, J. J., & Burrows, A. M. (2008). Selection for universal facial emotion. 
Emotion, 8,(3) 435-439. 
Wallis, G., Siebeck, U. E., Swann, K., Blanz, V., & Bulthoff, H. H. (2008). The prototype 
effect revisited: Evidence for an abstract feature model of face recognition. Journal 
of Vision, 8,(3) 1-15. 
228 
 
Whalen, P. J., Shin, L. M., McInerney, S. C., Fisher, H., Wright, C. I., & Rauch, S. L. 
(2001). A functional MRI study of human amygdala responses to facial expressions 
of fear vs. anger. Emotion, 1,(1) 70-83. 
Wheelwright, S., Baron-Cohen, S., Goldenfeld, N., Delaney, J., Fine, D., Smith, R., Weil, 
L., & Wakabayashi, A. (2006). Predicting autism spectrum quotient (AQ) from the 
systemizing quotient-revised (SQ-R) and empathy quotient (EQ). Brain Research, 
1079,(1) 47-56. 
Wicker, B., Perrett, D. I., Baron-Cohen, S., & Decety, J. (2003). Being the target of 
another's emotion: A PET study. Neuropsychologia, 41,(2) 139-146. 
Wilkie, R. M., Wann, J. P., & Allison, R. S. (2008). Active gaze, visual look-ahead, and 
locomotor control. Journal of Experimental Psychology-Human Perception and 
Performance, 34,(5) 1150-1164. 
Wilson, H. R., Loffler, G., & Wilkinson, F. (2002). Synthetic faces, face cubes, and the 
geometry of face space. Vision Research, 42,(27) 2909-2923. 
Wilson, M., & Knoblich, G. (2005). The case for motor involvement in perceiving 
conspecifics. Psychological Bulletin, 131,(3) 460-473. 
Wolpert, D. M., Doya, K., & Kawato, M. (2003). A unifying computational framework for 
motor control and social interaction. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal 
Society of London Series B-Biological Sciences, 358,(1431) 593-602. 
Yamagishi, T., Tanida, S., Mashima, R., Shimoma, E., & Kanazawa, S. (2003). You can 
judge a book by its cover: Evidence that cheaters may look different from 
cooperators. Evolution and Human Behavior, 24,(4) 290-301. 
Yazbek, A., & D'Entremont, B. (2006). A longitudinal investigation of the still-face effect at 
6 months and joint attention at 12 months. British Journal of Developmental 
Psychology, 24,(3) 589-601. 
Yovel, G., & Kanwisher, N. (2004). Face perception: Domain specific, not process specific. 
Neuron, 44,(5) 889-898. 
229 
 
Yovel, G., & Kanwisher, N. (2005). The neural basis of the behavioral face-inversion effect. 
Current Biology, 15,(24) 2256-2262. 
Yovel, G., & Kanwisher, N. (2008). The representations of spacing and part-based 
information are associated for upright faces but dissociated for objects: Evidence 
from individual differences. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 15,(5) 933-939. 
 
 
